12.The Art of
Spying
Preface
In a democracy the answer to that recurrent question:
‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’
is you.
This is a general introduction essay into the world of espionage. Some
of what you read below may shock or offend you but I believe you have a
right to consider. Spying and espionage is often seen purely as a
function of government, this is a great misnomer. A baby’s monitor can
constitute a listening device which in other circumstances will be
perceived as a bug. Moving up the scale to the private detective (hired
to observe a possible errant partner) is another low level instance in
the spying profession. Neither the baby, nor private detective will
form a substantive part of this essay; instead I propose to discuss
organisational spying or espionage whether the organisation is a
government; a terrorist or freedom group; a political party or more
often a commercial company with a GNP greater than that of many small
countries.
I have divided this essay into a number of parts:
(1) impact of individual
surveillance;
(2) how terrorists operate.
Throughout the essay additional emphasis may be obtained via the linked
articles displayed in blue. I particularly recommend the general reader
to listen to the BBC radio 4 broadcast ‘BeingBugged’ which can be
accessed from this
link. [NB Link to the broadcast requires Real Player and may
change]
For the more serious scholar I include a brief summary upon the lives
and works of Sun Tzu, The Art of War, and Niccolo Machiavelli, The
Prince. If you want to be successful in any vocation, you must be
willing to spend your time gathering current, hard information. People
have a tendency to want to rely on past experience, general theory, or
old information rather than doing the work necessary to keep themselves
well informed. Sun Tzu warns about these mistakes and tells you what
you must do. Machiavelli elaborates upon the policies you need to
follow to reach your goal.
The essence of espionage is to be found within these works, should you
wish to understand how the minds of our spymasters think; a careful
study of these works will give you the answer. The essay below is a
palimpsest to them.
Spying is seen as the act of obtaining information clandestinely. The
term applies particularly to the covert act of collecting military,
industrial, and political data about one nation for the benefit of
another. In truth the majority of the information collected is not that
‘secret’ but often the interpretation of the synergism is. Espionage is
defined as the practice of spying or the using of spies.
Spying and espionage is a part of intelligence activity, which is also
concerned with analysis of diplomatic reports, newspapers, periodicals,
technical publications, commercial statistics, and radio and television
broadcasts. In the last fifty years espionage activity has been greatly
supplemented by technological advances, especially in the areas of
radio signal interception and high-altitude photography. Surveillance
with high-technology equipment on the ground or from high-altitude
planes and satellites has become an important espionage technique (i.e.
Cuban missile crisis). Code making and code breaking (cryptography)
have become computerized and very effective. The threat of foreign
espionage is used as an excuse for internal suppression and the
suspension of civil rights in many countries. Espionage is a very
important part of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. The
defensive side of intelligence activity, i.e., preventing another
nation from gaining such information, is known as counterespionage.
Under international law, intelligence activities are not illegal;
however, every nation has laws against espionage conducted against it.
History
Beginnings through the
Nineteenth Century
The importance of espionage in military affairs has been recognized
since the beginning of recorded history. The Egyptians had a
well-developed secret service, and spying and subversion are mentioned
in the ‘Iliad’ and in the ‘Bible’. The ancient Chinese treatise (c.500
B.C.) on the Art of War (see Sun Tzu) devotes much attention to
deception and intelligence gathering, arguing that all war is based on
deception. Whilst Sun Tzu was unknown to Niccolo Machiavelli many of
his concepts found new vigour within Machiavelli’s writings. In the
Middle Ages, political espionage became important. Joan of Arc was
betrayed by Bishop Pierre Cauchon of Beauvais, a spy in the pay of the
English, and Sir Francis Walsingham developed an efficient political
spy system for Elizabeth I. (See also Francis Walsingham’s acolytes
Christopher Marlowe and Francis Bacon) With the growth of the modern
national state, systematized espionage became a fundamental part of
government in most countries. Joseph Fouché is credited with
developing the first modern political espionage system, and Frederick
II of Prussia is regarded as the founder of modern military espionage.
During the American Revolution, Nathan Hale and Benedict Arnold
achieved fame as spies, and there was considerable use of spies on both
sides during the U.S. Civil War; though it was not until the Second
World War that the USA convincingly took to espionage. (‘Pearl Harbour’
was the product of the spymasters failure to collect, analyse and then
act.)
In the Twentieth
Century
By World War I, all the great powers except the United States had
elaborate civilian espionage systems and all national military
establishments had intelligence units. To protect the country against
foreign agents, the U.S. Congress passed the Espionage Statute of 1917.
Germany and Japan established elaborate espionage nets in the years
preceding World War II. In 1942 the Office of Strategic Services was
founded by Gen. William J. Donovan. However, the British system was the
keystone of Allied intelligence, and the fount in which USA
intelligence was baptised.
Since World War II, espionage activity has enlarged considerably, much
of it growing out of the cold war between the United States and the
former USSR. Russia and the Soviet Union have had a long tradition of
espionage ranging from the Czar’s Okhrana to the Committee for State
Security (the KGB), which also acted as a secret police force. In the
United States the 1947 National Security Act created the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate intelligence and the National
Security Agency for research into codes and electronic communication.
In addition to these, the United States has nine other intelligence
gathering agencies to which the old adage ‘too many cooks spoil the
broth’ appears to apply equally well to espionage.
Famous cold war espionage cases include Alger Hiss and Whittaker
Chambers and the Rosenberg Case. In 1952 the Communist Chinese captured
two CIA agents, and in 1960 Francis Gary Powers, flying a U-2
reconnaissance mission over the Soviet Union for the CIA, was shot down
and captured. During the cold war, many Soviet intelligence officials
defected to the West, including Gen. Walter Krivitsky, Victor
Kravchenko, Vladimir Petrov, Peter Deriabin Pawel Monat, and Oleg
Penkovsky, of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence). Among Western
officials who defected to the Soviet Union are Guy F. Burgess and
Donald D. Maclean of Great Britain in 1951, Otto John of West Germany
in 1954, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, U.S. cryptographers,
in 1960, and Harold (Kim) Philby of Great Britain in 1962. U.S.
acknowledgment of its U-2 flights and the exchange of Francis Gary
Powers for Rudolf Abel in 1962 implied the legitimacy of some espionage
as an arm of foreign policy.
China has a very cost-effective intelligence program that is especially
effective in monitoring neighbouring countries. Smaller countries can
also mount effective and focused espionage efforts. The Vietnamese
Communists, for example, had consistently superior intelligence during
the Vietnam War. Israel, size for size probably has the most efficient
espionage establishment in the world. Some of the Muslim countries,
especially Libya, Iran, and Syria, have highly developed operations as
well. Iran’s Savak was particularly feared by Iranian dissidents before
the Iranian Revolution.
In the Twenty
First Century
The 1990s saw the end of the cold war. 9/11 began with a failure of
intelligence. No amount of defence can compensate for poor
intelligence. In the 1990s espionage via the use of the spy on the
street went backwards. Active front line spying was perceived as a cost
saving benefit occasioned by the conclusion of the cold war.
Intelligence systems had lost its human touch to the application of
technical intelligence; information like how many missiles China has
pointed at Taiwan was available, but less information was to hand as to
whether or not China intended to fire them. Now there is a return to
human intelligence. The ability to develop foreign agents, get inside
information from those who know about terrorism, and to be in a
position to understand the terrorist’s mindset to anticipate their next
moves. Spies on the ground are needed who possess the language and
expertise to get inside terrorist organisations. What needs to happen
to fight terrorism is to re-create a level of human talent, a spy. Then
we need a new generation of intelligence professionals who understand
how to operate human agents and the technical systems in a seamless
way. In short, to defeat terrorism in the twenty first century we must
return back to the basics as preached by Sun Tzu and Machiavelli.
Britain’s
secret history
Britain has a murky record of official secrecy which
stretches continuously back to the Elizabethan era. Elizabeth I was
obsessed that Spanish-backed Catholic plotters, loyal to her
half-sister Mary, were attempting to overthrow her. The Virgin Queen's
spymaster, Francis Walsingham, famously trapped Mary into making a move
against Elizabeth through a series of faked letters from her
supporters. Many secret documents were disguised as business
transactions. A letter to Sir Robert Cecil in 1591 about a cargo of
wines was actually a coded description of the Spanish fleet. English
and then British espionage grew during the next two hundred years.
Indeed, part of the success of the Duke of Wellington's often heavily
outnumbered army against Napoleon was down to a network of spies and
codebreakers, especially during the Peninsula Campaign.
The growth of the mass media and increasing literacy throughout the
19th Century meant information was potentially far more damaging once
it had been leaked by civil servants. The British government usually
resorted to the civil courts to pursue the media as there was no
legislation with which to prosecute the leakers. Even when a young
draughtsman named Terry Young was suspected of selling warship designs
to the French in 1887, there was no law under which to prosecute him.
The modern age of British government secrecy began with the wide
ranging Official Secrets Act of 1911. Born of fears of increasing
German military power, the act did not differentiate between secrets
and made it an offence to reveal any government information. Government
officials joked at the time that even the menu in the Civil Service
canteen was secret - and in fact it was under the act, which remained
on the statute books until 1989. During the inter-war period the
government began to use the secret services as an important tool, not
only to protect itself against espionage by foreign powers but also
against political groups it saw as a threat.
The British establishment, shaken by the fate of the Russian royal
family at the hands of the Bolsheviks, targeted left-wing groups. The
‘Zinoviev letter’, which purported to reveal links between the Labour
Party and the Soviet Union, was alleged to have been circulated by MI6
to newspapers to discredit Labour on the eve of the 1924 general
election. The letter was later revealed to have been a forgery.
The secret service was strengthened during World War II by an
enthusiastic Winston Churchill. The successes of the Bletchley
Park codebreakers, who cracked the German Enigma code, led to the
founding of GCHQ, which began intercepting communications from around
the world.
During the 1950s the government began to recognise that the public
wanted access to government documents and introduced the Public Records
Act of 1958. But people interested in government secrets would have to
wait 50 years before the documents were released to the public. (The
equivalent is 100 years in Scotland as is noted in the Dunblane
Enquiry) The act was reviewed in 1967
and the waiting time was reduced
to 30 years. Despite this government secrecy around the development of
its nuclear programme was particularly tight during the Cold War. D
notices, which the government used to prevent the press from revealing
military and other secrets, were widely issued. In 1979 all Cabinet
papers on atomic energy were made exempt from disclosure under the
30-year rule.
In 1993 the D notice system was replaced with standing Defence Advisory
(DA) notices, which cover five areas - military operations and plans;
nuclear weapons; ciphers and codes; installations and home addresses;
and the intelligence services and Special Forces. Several media
organisations were reminded of these standing notices recently, during
the Iraq conflict, especially with regard to the operations of the SAS
and SBS. In 2000 a media blackout was agreed to prevent rebels in
Sierra Leone learning about a pending SAS operation which eventually
freed a group of captured British soldiers.
As our lives have come under increased scrutiny from the government so
the campaign for access to that information has intensified. The
Campaign for Freedom of Information, Liberty and Charter 88 have
successfully lobbied government for the right of individuals to access
the data held on them by government and private companies.
The Official Secrets Act of 1989, while de-classifying a great deal of
government information, was seen as a backwards step by campaigners as
it introduced drastic new controls on the media, including powers to
prevent publication. The government had been worried by the 1985
Spycatcher affair, in which retired MI5 agent Peter Wright published
memoirs containing embarrassing revelations about the security
services. More recently the case of David Shayler has revealed the
lengths the government will go to protect its secrets. Labour came to
power in 1997, having committed itself to introducing Freedom of
Information legislation. When the Freedom of Information Bill was
actually presented to the Commons in 2000, ministers retained
significant powers to withhold information at their discretion and the
bill was criticised for maintaining the culture of secrecy many believe
still exists within the corridors of Whitehall.
The current status
What is happening now, taken from the U.K. citizen’s viewpoint. The
five articles below are taken from the BBC News Online. Whilst the
articles are now somewhat dated the gist is good.
Collectively these articles present a good layman’s guide to the UK
information availability. These articles focus on the inward
perspective.
The next four articles below are taken from assorted papers. Whilst the
articles are now somewhat dated the gist is good. You may appreciate
that from a world perspective the U.K. is not seen as a ‘good guy’
Collectively these articles present a good layman’s guide to the UK
information availability. These articles focus on the outward
perspective. For a more detailed appraisal of current thinking both the
articles below will stimulate the scholar.
Echelon
interception
system - download the (PDF) file
A Revolution
in Intelligence
Affairs - download
the (PDF) file
Below are a series of articles which are in two parts: the impact of
individual surveillance and how terrorists operate. I am midway through
writing a book entitled ‘Terrorism: The Individual’s Guide’ which
provides a detailed manual of how the individual may safeguard himself.
The first four articles below are taken from the BBC News Online.
Whilst the articles are now somewhat dated the gist is good. They
explain basic philosophies.
Bugs
The walls have eyes and ears
Seeking the truth about phone tap
The leaky net
Collectively these articles present a good layman’s guide to the UK
‘bugging’. These articles focus on the citizen’s perspective. You are
advised to listen to the BBC radio 4 broadcast ‘BeingBugged’ which can
be accessed above from the Preface to this essay. [NB This link to the
broadcast requires Real Player and may change]
The two articles below are taken from terrorist manuals. The ANC
article is believed to have a Chinese pedigree.
Collectively these articles present a good guide to terrorist thinking.
Much as you will note has been borrowed from practical training manuals
which are to be found at ‘Spy School’.
My
own modus operandi
Spying is an ugly trade. It is deceitful and obnoxious. I hate it but I
am very able. Spying remains a necessary evil. Fundamentally, it serves
the twin purposes to warn and to influence. Spying as I know it is
pro-active. It achieves things yet by its very nature is largely
unaccountable. The spying I am involved with is neither the maintenance
of a governmental status quo; nor the protection of the privileged but
a control function with its own agenda implemented often via the use of
clandestine means. True there are links with and often co-operation
with government sponsored intelligence agencies, the police, and
military but in actuality I understand that I support a ‘gigantic old
boys club’ without the green wellied public school boy. It is
independent, it is self perpetuating, it operates across frontiers, and
has influence. It is not a James Bond ‘Smersh’ type operation nor is it
an ‘Elders of Zion’ look a like. It is not even that secret but unlike
the Scottish ‘Speculative Society’ it is political and does seek to
influence.
I am an old fashioned spy. I have not been to spy school nor have I
been formally trained. My knowledge and understanding comes from 25 odd
years of practical experience. I now receive no direct remuneration and
obtain no recognition. I do it, in my mind, for the highest of motives:
patriotism. Patriotism for what you may well ask. Well to that, there
no longer is an easy answer. It is the ideals by which I have been
nurtured and encultured by; ideals that made the English language the
‘lingua franca’ of our modern world; the ideals of democracy and
freedom. But above all I believe in God and that he ordained absolute
rights and wrongs. To me the Platonic form for Good still exists. These
are simple beliefs which give me great strength.
Spying uses influence and persuasion to manoeuvre others to provide
information with or without the use of technology. A spy lives by his
ability to manipulate people into doing things that help him achieve
his goal, but success often requires knowledge or access to
sophisticated technology. In most cases a successful spy will have
strong people skills. He will be charming, polite and easy to like –
social traits needed for establishing rapid rapport and trust. A good
spy is typically fast on his feet and quite articulate. An experienced
spy is able to gain access to virtually any targeted information by
using the strategies and tactics of his craft. It’s human nature to
trust our fellow man, especially when the request meets the test of
being reasonable. A spy uses this human disposition to exploit and
achieve his goal. A spy anticipates suspicion and resistance, and he
turns distrust into trust. He plans his life like a chess game,
anticipating questions with authoritative answers. Most of the time
people give one the benefit of the doubt: that’s the natural behaviour
of civilised people. A spy gathers as much information about a target
as possible and then uses that information to gain the trust as an
insider. Above all vulnerability lies in people and not in machines.
For every good use of technology it can always be manipulated.
It’s amazing how easy it is for the spy to get people to do things
based upon how he structures the request. The spy’s premise is to
trigger an automatic response based on psychological principles, and
rely on the mental shortcuts people take when they perceive the spy as
an ally. The truth of the matter is that no one is immune to being
duped by a good spy. Because the pace of normal life, we don’t always
take time for thoughtful decisions, even on matters of great
importance. Complicated situations, lack of time, emotional state, or
mental fatigue can easily distract us. So we take a mental shortcut,
making our decisions without analysing the information carefully and
completely, a mental process known as automatic responding.
A spy will target an employee who has little understanding of how
valuable the information being sought is, so the target is more likely
to grant the request. The target’s rubbish may be the spy’s treasure.
We don’t give much consideration to the materials we discard in our
personal lives so why should it be different in a work situation.
Experience and statistics clearly show that the greatest threat to an
organisation is from the inside. It is an insider who has the intimate
knowledge of where the information resides and as to where the
institution is vulnerable.
How I operate or the mechanics of my operation. It is very basic; there
is little high Tec. In one cell in which I operate there are four other
members. I have dealt with them for years. Requests are bandied
backwards and forwards between us. Each cell member is a member of
another cell with members of whom I have no direct access or knowledge.
I guess in the U.K. there may be a total of forty members, worldwide
the number is circa 852. I in turn have built for myself a network of
friends and associates upon which by referral I have established many
more contacts. No friend, associate or contact has true conception of
my function though some may perceive me to be a newspaper scout.
I shall explain further by example. I take a number of instances in
which I have either directly or indirectly obtained information. My
intelligence gathering and use thereof depends upon old and tried
methods. Agreed, as yet, we do not have the ‘thought police’ but in
terms of extraction and persuasion some of the methodology below comes
dam close.
My first
example is via
my assistance and possible influence with the media. Globally this is a
prime collective directive of me and my colleagues. Like most people,
journalists require assistance so an interesting story is often
appreciated. You build a rapport with a reporter and soon you may be
able to influence the tenor of the story. For a number of years my
prime ‘espionage’ function was to place stories with the Scottish
media. This I either did direct or via ‘double gangers’ who I
unknowingly to them prompted them to act for my purpose. In realistic
terms I provided over 200 stories a year to the media. That said not
all matters run smoothly. One week I gave summary details of five
possible stories to the Scotsman.
Exceptionally, without further reference to me or fact find, a front
page story was run by the Scotsman newspaper on the judge, Lord Gill
(Scotland’s second highest judge) in which he purportedly gave advice
to his gardener concerning the gardener’s partner’s child murder
accusation. I think that the Scotsman must have been short of copy that
day. Mildly put, the article was a bit off the mark; Lord Gill
threatened to sue the Scotsman. I was approached by the Scotsman and
asked to dig them out of their hole. I was more than a little angry and
I enclose below a letter of mine to Jeanette Oldham, the Scotsman
reporter, who had, in my opinion, prematurely written the story.
‘Dear Jeanette,
I have now had a chance to read and study the article. Had the
article’s title read Judge’s wife there would be less of a problem. I
am unhappy that this matter appears to be degenerating as I wish to
maintain my incognito as I also have excellent sources into other and
more senior judicial families.
Alan was made aware of the article on Saturday. He is under great
pressure not to speak. Alan has had an unfortunate life and without
doubt Lady Gill has sought to assist him. Lady Gill, as is to be
expected, has a network of friends. As a consequence of this network
Alan has obtained many part time gardening jobs in Edinburgh especially
in the Morningside area where Alan also obtained living accommodation
(digs). Apart from Lady Gill, Alan was prone to seek the advice of well
wishing ladies. Alan, perhaps being somewhat naive and innocent, was
not averse to discussing his position with Lord and Lady Gill. Alan
appears to have become a close confidant of Lady Gill in that Lady Gill
would relate to Alan (a) financial details on the Gills; i.e. how much
the Gill’s had sold their London home for (b) what Lord Gill was
working on; i.e. Alan did advise in advance to many Morningside ladies
of Lord Gill and Lord Cullen’s recent appointments. There appeared to
be no doubt that this information emanated from Lady Gill. In similar
fashion, from informed ‘Labour Party gossip’ I obtained the outcome of
the Lockerbie verdict a full three days prior.
In regard to the article published on Saturday 10th August I believe
that Alan has commented that the Scotsman may be wrong in respect of
the current Lord Advocate; he can no longer recall but Alan is annoyed
that some of his other advocate employers are currently reluctant to
acknowledge him. Alan is emphatic that he has received the support of
Lady Gill concerning his wife’s position. Furthermore, Alan has stated
that Lady Gill, in comforting Alan over his wife, has been most
deprecating to Alan concerning Scotland’s judicial system’s inability
to secure justice.
I am lead to believe Alan has also taken his wife to the Edinburgh home
of the Gills. I do not believe Alan has taken his wife to the London
home of the Gills. I believe that it is an undisputed fact that Alan
has been to the Gills’ London homes and that Alan as a
handyman/gardener has often assisted Lady Gill there.
I do not believe that Lord Gill has given his personal or moral support
to Alan’s wife. (If Lord Gill has seen or been made aware of the
background reports on Alan’s wife I would find this summation difficult
to comprehend). I do believe that Lady Gill has given her moral support
to Alan’s personal anguish; and by implication it does seem highly
probable that Lord Gill may so have done also to Alan. I am lead to
believe that Alan has discussed at the Gill’s Edinburgh home the
relevant court papers on Alan’s wife with Lady Gill. I do believe that
Alan believes in his wife’s innocence and as a consequence of such
belief Alan may have perceived that Lady Gill (and indirectly Lord
Gill) in her support for Alan also supported the position of Alan’s
wife.
Finally, I do believe if Lord Gill’s lawyers persist down this path
that there may be further grumping in the Gill household and not a few
senior labour politicians and their judicial colleagues and relatives
may become progressively upset and not a little embarrassed.
Kind regards
Martin Frost
I execrated the Scotsman by arranging in depth interviews with Alan,
the gardener, and his wife. The Scotsman thus subsequently secured, and
justified the information which they had earlier gone to press on.
Personally, I believe Lord Gill to be one of the finer judges on the
bench. I am not adverse to his judgment as is found in the Scottish
Judiciary and the Speculative Society and my belief is that the
conspiracy theorists should be looking more to the real influence of
the denizens of Edinburgh’s ‘New Club’ than
the Speculative Society.
That said I have subsequently sometimes thought that that Lord Gill’s
apparent surrender of the Scottish jurisdiction in Cintec v Parkes
& Frost (as noted elsewhere in this website) was perhaps shaded by
this gardener episode.
It is true that over the years I have amassed a most comprehensive
library upon our Scottish judiciary and people of influence. Too often
by the media I have been directly or indirectly approached for
salacious gossip. Per se in its absolute right I am not interested
unless such vice leads to transgression. For example Lord Hardie
appears to have had an unfortunate episode with his credit card ending
up in the hands of a ‘rent boy’. I was asked and could have provided
definitive information but I took the view that the intelligence source
needed to be protected in the public interest, i.e.
Lockerbie.
My second
example is that
of assistance to a friendly power. I was consulted by an American as to
who I might know that could assist the USA in bugging the Lord
Advocate. I provided the American with a name and thereafter I
understand the USA achieved their objective.
I was able to provide such a name because of my networking; and this is
how it transpired. I have a friend called Dorothy Easson. She is a
respectable lady, the daughter of a farmer. I used her friendship to
access third parties. For instance, Dorothy was a close confidant of
Mrs Jauncey, former wife of Lord Jauncey. Indirectly I was thus able to
leapfrog from Dorothy, to Mrs Jauncey, and from her to her children who
in turn accessed the information that I required. Such information at
that time related to Lord Jauncey’s disposition towards Mrs Eirlys
Smith (see the Lady Smith essay) as Lord Jauncey was presiding over her
disciplinary proceedings. At no time did Dorothy or any of the parties
realise I was manipulating them as a row of dominoes.
I was aware that Dorothy Easson had other friends. Via two sets of
totally unrelated acquaintances I was able to vet a wig repairer off at
the bottom of Hanover Street and also identify a ‘soft female target’
at the Crown Office (home of the Lord Advocate) who intimately
worked with Lord Hardie, the then Lord Advocate. I advised the
American. Thereafter, I believe that very sophisticated listening
devices were placed not only in the judicial wigs but more aptly about
Crown Office and at the Lockerbie trial venue. Furthermore, I
understand that the accused counsel’s were also bugged as my American
friend in a spirit of ‘quid pro quo’ was only too happy to provide me
gratis with details of counsel’s peccadilloes.
Subsequently, I was told of the purported reason for the bugging.
Namely, Crown Office was in possession of evidence that Crown Office
was withholding from the defence. Had such information been understood
and/or made available there would have been no conviction and the
prospect of the Lockerbie trial aborted. The USA wanted any conviction,
the monitoring was placed to forewarn of a possible upset in the USA’s
machinations. I am not prepared to answer if the relevant Lord
Advocates and Lord Cullen knew that there was a deliberate miscarriage
of justice, but what do you think?
Finally, Dorothy Easson, until advised of this article, is still
totally unaware of my ‘dark side’ and will no doubt be upset by this
revelation. She remains a good friend and indeed a most useful one for
she had dinner last month (September 04) with Sir Angus Grossart who
features on my Royal Bank of Scotland web section.
My
third example involves
spying for business or private use. Frankly, when one has taken years
building a web of contacts it would be against human nature not to
avail oneself of possible personal advantage. Since direct remuneration
usually isn’t in the offering and I am not obliged to disclose a
Register of Interest then private use is a recognised perk of the
territory. However, unlike government work there is often the need to
employ directly or indirectly fact finders to obtain specific
information. I therefore provide the following illustrations.
As will be apparent from elsewhere upon this web site I have been in
dispute with the Unity Trust Bank Plc
(UTB) for some 14 years and in
litigation with them for over 10 years. It may come as a surprise that
UTB, as the trade union bank and a model of professed socialist ideals
and fair play, resorts to the dark art of espionage in the bank’s
industrial dispute with me. Furthermore, it may also come as a surprise
as the Leeds High transcripts in UTB v M Frost evidence that UTB
obtained private and confidential tax information from the Inland
Revenue not only on me but also upon my supporting witnesses.
What is even more upsetting to me is that private representatives,
ultimately employed by UTB, forcible entered my Bradford premises in an
attempt to ascertain my whereabouts; and in so doing assaulted my
eighty year old mother, knocking her to the ground and thereupon
trampling over her. When I complained to Mr Clive Franks, UTB’s
Edinburgh lawyer, I received no apology but instead a distorted
religious homily inferring that as a perceived ‘bad man’ I was
ultimately responsible for UTB’s action against my mother.
This response, on top of the Smith episode as narrated in the Lady
Smith web section, I am afraid to say turned a monetary dispute into a
blood feud. Consequently, I set out to ascertain as much information as
possible on Mr Clive Franks and all others associated with my UTB
dispute.
I make no apologies but confirm re Mr Franks for instance that
discreetly I have amassed information from interviews with his wife,
his family, his friends, his business associates and employees. Such
was and is obtained from direct visits to his place of work, his home,
his late mother in law’s home and pertinent surveillance. Again upon
the UTB direct, apart from myself having the occasional breakfast with
their late chairman, Mr Jimmy Knapp, I confirm that I have benefited
from an appropriate board room mole for a number of years. Such
information collected and collated will form part of my enhanced
revised claim against UTB which as Lord Eassie on Friday 22nd October
04 indicated remained my entitlement. Thus I hope to secure a direct
benefit from my ‘art of spying’.
Another illustration of spying for business use is to be found in my
business dealings with Mr Stuart Usher,
Mrs Joan Pentland-Clark,
and Mr Andrew
McNamara (all of
which are to be found elsewhere upon this web
site). As in all spying, it is a question of like for like. To obtain
quality information which pierces the heart of the enemies thought
process; you must get in close which often means you need to dupe your
target into trusting a confidant or more often the confidant’s
confidant.
Unfortunately after due enquiry, diligence and unknowing contact, I was
apprised that much of Mrs Joan Pentland-Clark’s upset concerning her
late husband’s subsequent wife was unfounded. Stuart Usher’s cause
became increasingly difficult when certain Brodies based story lines
began to unravel.
Personally, I still believe he has good reason to be dissatisfied with
his family lawyers, Brodies, but perhaps not in the way he currently
understands. After war broke out betwixt me and my erstwhile
partner Mr Andrew McNamara I determined it was appropriate to reach
into McNamara’s inner sanctums. Fortunately for me, for many years, I
have had a good friend by the name of Deni Read. He is highly
intelligent and an amazing man but in addition to being a useful friend
he is a man with many contacts. Deni’s brother is generally regarded as
Scotland’s most dangerous multiple murderer and is currently serving
several life sentences in Carstairs (Scotland’s prison for the mentally
deranged).
Anyhow, upon the above principle of like for like it was not a
difficult task to recruit Read associates to seamlessly integrate and
to drink at the East Kilbride pubs that Andrew McNamara likes to
frequent. Similar logic was then applied to Andrew McNamara’s brother
and then in turn to the partners’ of his children. Soon sufficient
cross checked information was to hand. To use an old South African
maxim: ‘The veldt is spied; let the hunt begin’ may well sum up my
current thinking.
From the above you can readily appreciate that spying is not difficult.
The art lies in doing it well and clandestinely. Patience is all. You
use people; all must be seen as potential information conduits. Slowly
you build a web of ‘sleepers’ but remembering that by its very essence
a web is full of holes.
The relatively new Chief Constable of Lothian & Borders Police is Paddy
Tomkins out of the London Metropolitan Police. I understand he
is
a very able man but in an Edinburgh Morningside house I was informed of
his job offer prior to Tomkins’ own receipt. From the same source I was
informed that the Dunblane Enquiry non disclosure ban (Lord Cullen’s
100-year Closure Order on files in relation to his inquiry into the
Dunblane massacre) was due to a possible Royal masonic connection,
maybe, but personally from elsewhere I believe that to be duff gem
though highly illustrative of the ethos behind my source.
My own information is that there is a possible cross link with the
earlier Edinburgh Gay Judge scandal of the 1990s, but it appears we
will have to wait another 90 odd years before a truth emerges.
Ian Smith, of Rhodesian fame, lost his war due to poor intelligence. He
forgot that his trusted black servants were thinking people with their
own political agenda. Thankfully, for people like me the world is full
of trusted folk. My spying unlocks the access to them.
Conclusion
Success is ultimately about doing, not thinking. Success is not an
intellectual activity but a physical one. Thought, and its precursor
intelligence, offers a means of reducing the price of success.
Knowledge, the conventional wisdom has it, is power; but knowledge
cannot destroy or deflect or damage unless the possession of knowledge
is allied to objective force. Knowledge of what your enemy can do and
of what he intends is never enough to ensure security, unless there is
also the power and will to resist and preferably forestall him.
Intelligence can sharpen your gaze but the ability to strike remains
the best protection. Sun Tzu offers a model for intelligence gathering;
Machiavelli provides a framework for action and I trust the essay above
gives an insight into today’s spying practical application.
The distinction between "spies" and general information is important.
Sun Tzu realized that people were the ultimate source of all
information. Today, we may think that we rely on publications, studies,
and reports, but what we are really relying upon is people. The modern
distilling process that information goes through can easily destroy its
freshness and potency. Sun Tzu wants you to remember that the ultimate
source of all information is people. The closer you are to them and the
better your contacts, the better your information.
In the original text, Sun Tzu describes the five types of spies that
you need, but what he is really describing is the five categories of
information you need to be effective. He labels spies as "local
spies, inside spies, double agents, doomed spies, and surviving spies."
He then goes on to describe each of these types of spies and what kind
of information you get from them. Local spies provide information
on the battleground; inside spies provide information on the
competition; double agents play both sides; doomed spies provide
misinformation to the competition; and surviving spies provide
real-time information on current battles.
Collecting information is just the first step. You must also know how
to use it. Sun Tzu sees this as more of an art than a science. You must
be smart enough to correlate data. You must be open and unbiased to
evaluate it. If you aren’t sensitive to subtleties, you won’t find the
truth in information. You must pay close attention to small details.
Information is helpful in every area. In the first chapter, Sun Tzu
describes the art of war as the art of deception. If you want to make
better decisions than the enemy (competition), you must make sure that
the competition doesn't get your information.
Gathering information can be a double-edged sword. In gathering
information, you must be careful not to divulge what your plans
are. Your spying (market research) gathers information but it
must not spread it. Research that divulges your plans or position to
the enemy (competition) can destroy you. Acquiring and using
competitive intelligence is a circular process. From general
information, we generate more specific plans. The more specific your
plans are, the more specific the information you require. In other
words, the information you start with is never enough. As you sharpen
your strategy, you must also sharpen the currency of your intelligence.
As Sun Tzu says in the Art of War:
You may want to attack an army’s
position.
You may want to attack a certain
fortification.
You may want to kill people in a certain place.
You must first know the guarding general.
You must know his left and right flanks.
You must know his hierarchy.
You must know the way in.
You must know where different people are stationed.
We must demand this information from our spies.
Sun Tzu didn't want you to take anything for granted in the
process. Specific plans require specific competitive
information. Sun Tzu's approach totally focuses on the enemy
(competition). Good information is not an absolute. Your information is
only "good" if it is better than your enemies. Information must not
only be relevant to the specific problem at hand, it must be relatively
better than the enemies. Feeding the enemy (competition) false
information through double agents, or what Sun Tzu calls "doomed
spies," makes perfect sense in this view. Sun Tzu realizes that success
doesn't require perfection; you only need to be better than your
competitors in order to outperform them.
This focus on the enemy (competition) identifies people who work for or
do business with your enemy (competition) as one of your best sources
of information. The Art of War says:
I want to know the enemy spies in
order to convert new spies into my men.
You find a source of information and bribe them.
You must bring them in with you.
You must obtain them as double agents and use them as your emissaries.
Let’s analogise the above into a business situation. As a salesperson,
this means that you want to find out the competition's sales pitch and
use it against them. As a sales manager, you might want to find the
competition's best salespeople and hire them away. As a marketing
person, you may want to find out their most effective distributors and
win them way. As a manager, you might want to hire away the
competition's best people and duplicate their best practices.
Again, notice how Sun Tzu's thinking always comes down to people.
Information can come in many forms, but the most expensive and
difficult form of information is what is in people's heads. This
is why Sun Tzu advises us to use our best people to collect information
for us. He realizes that the best minds are the best at recognizing
what is relevant and important. To achieve your ultimate purpose: You
must always be careful of your success. Learn from the history of
success. You must be an informed and capable manager. You must use your
best and brightest people to gather information. This is how you
achieve the greatest success. This is how you satisfy the needs of the
organization. Your management practices and ability to perform and
produce depends on information.
Now added to Sun Tzu detailed pragmatism you need to superimpose
Machiavelli’s global perspective and sense of purpose. Machiavelli
would feel at home in the world today. You don't need a birthright to
be a modern prince -- just an impulsive ruthlessness such as he
described four centuries ago while trying to get back into the good
graces of a Medici nobleman. Applying Machiavelli's coldly
hard-headed world view to the modern world, offers a battle plan for
success.
Simply put: how did the rich and powerful individuals who move the
earth get where they are today? Are they smarter? Faster? Better
looking? Certainly not. Some are even short and ugly. What, then, is
their edge?
The answer is simple: they're meaner. That's all.
The most visible fact about Machiavelli's doctrine is that Machiavelli
seems to be a teacher of wickedness but that opinion seriously prevents
one from doing justice to what is truly admirable in Machiavelli: the
intrepidity of his thought, and the grandeur and depth of his vision.
Thus if you truly wish to emulate a ‘spymaster’ or practice the ‘art of
spying’ become a Machiavellian Sun Tzu. Conversely, if you require to
understand how our global economy functions then become a Machiavellian
Sun Tzu. Again if you wish to become and become the Prime Minister of
Great Britain, well you surely are a Machiavellian Sun Tzu.
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