A Readiness To Fight India
Gunman ‘was sold into terrorism’
Islamist Militancy in Kashmir
Description of Lashkar-e-Toiba
Indian and American officials are now reporting that the Mumbai attackers seem to have connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based Islamist organization. Among other analytical clues, over the weekend, one anonymous American official quoted in the Washington Post noted that Lashkar has a known “maritime” capability. I’m not sure how much seaworthiness a group needs to demonstrate in order to be labeled “maritime” terrorists, but I can testify to the existence of Lashkar’s pontoon boat fleet, as I was not too long ago a passenger on that line.
Late in 2005, I travelled for The New Yorker to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to report on the earthquake that devastated the region. To facilitate international aid, the Pakistani government opened the region to journalists, creating a very rare opportunity to travel without escort and to poke around on the border. I was particularly interested in looking up Lashkar, which I had been following for many years. I made several visits to facilities run by its charity, called “Jamat-ud-Dawa,” which is today tolerated openly by the government of Pakistan but banned as a terrorist organization by the United States on the grounds that it is merely an alias for Lashkar.
In Muzuffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir, Jamat had brought in a mobile surgical unit staffed by long-bearded doctors from Karachi and Lahore—very impressive young men, fluent in English, who offered a reminder that unlike, say, the Taliban, Lashkar draws some very talented people from urban professions. (With its hospitals, universities, and social-service wings, Lashkar is akin to Hezbollah or Hamas; it is a three-dimensional political and social movement with an armed wing, not merely a terrorist or paramilitary outfit.) As part of its earthquake relief work, Lashkar ferried supplies to remote villages isolated on the far side of the churning Neelum River, one of the two snow-fed canyon rivers that traverse the area. I asked to take a ride with its volunteers, and their media officer (yes, they have media officers) agreed.
We rode in a van to the river’s edge, scrambled down a rocky hillside and boarded one of Lashkar’s rubber pontoon boats, about fifteen feet long, with a large outboard motor—useful for carrying relief supplies, but not coincidentally, also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian-held Kashmir. It has long been an open secret, and a source of some hilarity among foreign correspondents, that under the guise of “humanitarian relief operations,” Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. The events in Mumbai have taken the humor of these “humanitarian” rehearsals away. That day on the Neelum, I chatted with our thick-bearded captain in my very poor Arabic. He spoke Arabic as well—from his religious studies, he said, although he conceded, too, that he had travelled to Saudi Arabia, where it is well understood that Lashkar has raised money. I was also told that around the time of the earthquake they set up fund-raising operations in Britain, to tap the Pakistani diaspora there.
Earlier this year, I met with a Lashkar official in Lahore. We talked about how Jamat was getting along under international pressure. I took no notes and the conversation was intended for my informal guidance, but I came away with a number of impressions. On the one hand, the group’s bank accounts remain unmolested by the Pakistani government, which gives Lashkar quite a lot of running room; on the other, the group resents the accommodations reached between Pakistan’s government and the United States. Clearly, Lashkar knows what it must do to protect the Pakistan government from being exposed in the violent operations that Lashkar runs in Kashmir and elsewhere. For example, some of its younger volunteers wanted to join the fight with the Taliban in Western Pakistan and Afghanistan, my interlocutor said, and so Jamat had evolved an internal H.R. policy by which these young men would turn in their Jamat identity cards and go West “on their own time,” much as think tanks allow policy scholars to take leaves of absence to advise political campaigns.
One question that will certainly arise as the Mumbai investigations proceed is what the United States should insist the government of Pakistan do about Jamat and Lashkar. Even for a relative hawk on the subject of Pakistan’s support for Islamist militias, it’s a difficult question—comparable to the difficult question of managing Hezbollah’s place in the fragile Lebanese political system. To some extent, Pakistan’s policy of banning Lashkar and tolerating Jamat has helpfully reinforced Lashkar’s tendency toward nonviolent social work and proseltyzing. In the long run, this work is a threat to the secular character of Pakistan, but it is certainly preferable to revolutionary violence and upheaval right now. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Army and I.S.I. continue to use Jamat’s legitimate front as a vehicle for prosecution of a long-running “double game” with the United States, in which Pakistan pledges fealty to American counterterrorism goals while at the same time facilitating guerrilla violence against India, particularly over the strategic territory of Kashmir, which Pakistan regards as vital to its national interests.
Lashkar is a big organization with multiple arms and priorities and its leadership is undoubtedly divided over how much risk to take in pursuit of violent operations in India, particularly given the comfort and even wealth the group’s leaders enjoy from their unmolested activities inside Pakistan. If the boys in Mumbai had support from Lashkar, did the group’s leader, Hafez Saeed, who runs Jamat, know of the plan? If so, that would be a radical act that would likely mean the end of his charity’s tenuous legitimacy.
If it can be credibly established that Saeed did not know—that this was a rogue operation of some sort, or a strategy cooked up by elements of Lashkar and groups such as the Pakistani Taliban or even Al Qaeda (perhaps conducted, too, with support from rogue elements of the Paksitan security forces)—that would be an even more complicated equation. I was at a conference this morning where another panelist well-versed in these issues said he would not be surprised if it turned out that Lashkar conceived the Mumbai attacks as a way to pull Pakistani Army units and attention away from the Afghan border and into defense positions in the east, to protect the country from the possibility of military retaliation by India. In any event, if the evidence does show that uncontrolled Lashkar elements carried out the attacks, it would force India’s government to judge how to calibrate policy toward a civilian-led Pakistan government and Army command that may have little control over the very same Islamist groups that it purposefully built up and supported just a few years ago. If the evidence shows that these were purposeful attacks endorsed by Saeed and aided by elements of the Army, then the Pakistan government will have no choice but to at least make a show of closing down Jamat and arresting Saeed. Unfortunately, it has taken such action in the past, but that action has turned out to be partially symbolic and constructed for international consumption, rather than marking a true and complete change in policy.
The U.S. can do a few useful things here. At a minimum, it can provide transparent information about the investigation and where the facts lead, so that the Indian and Pakistani political systems are on the same footing; it can indict individuals and groups that can be established as culpable for the Mumbai murders, no matter who those individuals and groups are—even if they include officers in the Pakistan Army; and it can emphasize in public that the United States seeks the end of all Pakistani support for terrorist groups, no matter whether they are operating in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or Mumbai.
Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba Leaders Declare Readiness To Fight India
In Event of Indian Military Action in Pakistan
Tufail Ahmad. December 2, 2008
Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
In the wake of the 11/26 Mumbai terror attacks, there is a growing fear in Pakistan that the Indian Air Force may attack militant hideouts inside Pakistan, in a manner similar to the U.S. missile attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda safe havens within Pakistan’s tribal districts on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
On December 2, 2008, the mass-circulation Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jang reported that the Indian Air Force may attack the town of Muridke, the headquarters of banned militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba . In Muridke, which is near Lahore, Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is operating his organization under the new name of Jamaatud Dawa.
On the other hand, the Taliban commanders, who are currently fending off U.S. missile attacks and who have been bogged down in bloody fighting with Pakistani security forces for the past several months, are seeking a new opportunity for a ceasefire with the Pakistani Army following the Mumbai attacks.
Roznama Jang: Pakistani Army Calls Taliban Commanders "Pakistani Patriots"
The Taliban’s ceasefire offer has been welcomed by hard-line Pakistani Army officers who oppose the U.S.-led War on Terror. On December 1, 2008, Roznama Jang reported that several key Taliban commanders have offered to support the Pakistani Army in the event of any likely Indian attack on Pakistan. In return, Pakistani Army officials have called the Taliban commanders "Pakistani patriots."
The Roznama Jang report added: "As a positive sign that this ceasefire offer [from the Taliban] may be accepted, the Pakistani Army has, as a first step, declared to the media some notorious militant commanders, including Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah, as 'patriotic' Pakistanis ."
Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah are the key leaders of the Taliban movement in Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud has also been accused of plotting the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
The report further noted: "These two militant commanders... have invariably been accused of terrorism against Pakistan, but the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage has suddenly turned terrorists into patriots."
Over the past few days, a number of Taliban commanders and spokesmen have contacted different Pakistani media organizations to offer their support to the Pakistani Army in its stand against India. On November 30, 2008, Wali Muhammad, a spokesman for the Taliban (Mullah Nazir group) in Pakistan’s tribal district of South Waziristan, warned of suicide attacks in India in the case of an attack on Pakistan.
Muhammad, who is also known as Shaheen, added: "Our differences with the [Pakistani] government notwithstanding, if the issue is the national security, we have 500 suicide bombers who will enter India ."
Urging religious and political parties to end their differences and to unite to defend the Pakistani nation, the Taliban spokesman stated that 15,000 armed Taliban fighters would fight alongside the Pakistani Army against India.
Taliban Spokesman: "[The Taliban] Understand How To Defend The Line Of Control [In Kashmir]."
On December 1, 2008, Maulvi Omar, the main spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, also warned India that the Taliban fighters will stand side by side with the Pakistani Army and the security forces in the event of a war.
Omar added that the Indian threats following the Mumbai attacks are aimed not at the Pakistani army and security forces, but at Pakistan as a Muslim country.
Maulvi Omar also threatened that the Taliban fighters could join the Pakistani soldiers on the Line of Control in Kashmir. He added: "The Taliban have been defending the Durand Line [Pakistan-Afghanistan border] with our own weapons, and [we] understand how to defend the Line of Control [dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan] ."
Another Taliban commander, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, who is senior deputy head of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, called the Pashtu-language newspaper Wrazpanra Wahdat from an undisclosed location to say that the fighters loyal to him are ready to defend Pakistan against any likely Indian attack on Pakistan . Accusing Indian intelligence agencies of planning the Mumbai terror attacks, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad added that the Mumbai attacks were an attempt to defame Pakistan, and denied any Taliban involvement in them.
Khyber Agency: Ansarul Islam, Lashkar-e-Islam Offer Support To Pakistan
In Pakistan’s tribal district of Khyber Agency, there are two dominant militant organizations: Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansarul Islam. Both the groups have offered to fight alongside the Pakistan Army against India.
On November 30, 2008, Misri Khan, a spokesman for Lashkar-e-Islam, warned that in the event of an Indian attack, hundreds of thousands of Lashkar-e-Islam fighters will give an appropriate reply to the enemies of Pakistan.
Misri Khan added: "Our ancestors offered sacrifices for the defense of Pakistan’s borders, and Lashkar-e-Islam will not hesitate to make any sacrifice for the security of the nation ."
Similarly, Ansarul Islam, the second dominant group in the Khyber Agency, also announced that its fighters would defend Pakistan's borders against India.
On December 1, 2008, Ansarul Islam spokesman Mubin Afridi warned that thousands of their fighters are waiting for the Pakistani government's order to wage a war against India. He urged other militant groups to end their differences and join hands against India .
The Time Has Come for the Infidels’ Atrocities Against The Muslim Ummah to End
Yahya Mujahid, a close aide to Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and a spokesman for the Jamaatud Dawa, told Roznama Jang that any aerial Indian attack on any of the Dawa-run religious seminaries and offices across Pakistan would be treated as an assault on Pakistani sovereignty. 
Hafiz Abdur Rahman Makki, another official with the Jamaatud Dawa, likewise warned that the Pakistani nation would not permit external conspiracies aimed at breaking up Pakistan to succeed. Addressing a gathering in Karachi, Makki accused international powers of trying to tighten the noose around Pakistan, and added: "The Ummah should unite; the time has come for the infidels’ atrocities against the Muslim Ummah to end ."
He also asked his followers not to run away from jihad if they did not have the capability to wage it, adding: "Acquiring capability and power is necessary to fight against the enemy. However, it is not correct to run away from jihad on this pretext [of lacking the necessary capability to wage it.]"
*Tufail Ahmad is Director of Urdu-Pashtu Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute (www.memri.org ).
 Roznama Jang (Pakistan), December 2, 2008.
 Roznama Jang (Pakistan), December 1, 2008.
 Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), December 1, 2008.
 Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), December 2, 2008.
 Wrazpanra Wahdat (Pakistan), December 2, 2008.
 Roznama Express (Pakistan), December 1, 2008.
 Wrazpanra Wahdat (Pakistan), December 2, 2008.
 Roznama Jang (Pakistan), December 2, 2008.
 Roznama Express (Pakistan), December 1, 2008.
Rhys Blakely December 3, 2008
The sole Mumbai gunman to have been captured alive claims that his father introduced him to the terrorist faction suspected to be behind the terror attacks last week in exchange for cash.
Azam Amir Kasab, 21, believed to be from Pakistan, said that members of his family would be killed because he was ordered not to be taken alive. “Spread terror and your family will be looked after,” he was told, according to a leaked account of his interrogation.
Kasab said that his father introduced him to a commander of the Pakistan group Lashkar-e-Taiba about four years ago. The terrorist commander, known as chacha (uncle), paid the father for his son’s induction.
Kasab was one of at least ten gunmen who killed nearly 200 people in the financial capital of India. He said that he came from a poor family, had not finished primary school and had worked as a labourer.
Security experts said that payment was one of three main recruitment tools used by Islamist extremists, especially in the impoverished villages of south Punjab, from where Kasab claims to come. The others were the madrassas, or Islamic schools, and threats of violence, often made to the families of those being recruited.
However, they said that it was too early to be sure of the background of Kasab and his cohort. As many as 15 Indian officials are sitting in on the militant’s interrogation, and many are leaking their interpretations of his responses. One member of the Mumbai police AntiTerror Squad said that Kasab had given inconsistent answers - sometimes saying that there were ten gunmen, sometimes more than ten.
There is also speculation that Kasab’s apparent fluency in English points to a Pakistani middle-class background. That may make him a “high-quality” militant - well educated with a relatively wealthy family unlikely to be in serious financial trouble, experts said.
It is thought unlikely by some analysts that a coerced recruit would be sent on an attack of the scale of the one carried out in Mumbai. “They would not send somebody who would compromise such a mission,” Kan-chan Lakshman, of the Institute for Conflict Management in Delhi, said.
Foreign security agencies – including US, Israeli and, possibly, British specialists – are poised to be given “informal, unofficial” access to Kasab, one official source said. In a press conference a Mumbai police officer said that all the evidence would be shown to Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State.
Ajit Doval, a former director of the Indian Intelligence Bureau, said it was unlikely that Kasab had yet been given “the third degree” – a term that covers all manner of coercive questioning tactics employed commonly by Indian police, including torture.
A senior Indian police official said that Yusuf Muzammil, a senior Lashkar-e-Taiba figure who has led operations against India, had been contacted using a satellite telephone found with the gunmen and was identified as the leader by Kasab.
Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-i Tayyeba
Yoginder Sikand [November 20, 2003]
'Let not the enmity of any people make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice'
(Holy Qur'an: 5:8)
The emergence of radical Islamist groups in Kashmir over the last decade has added a new dimension to the ongoing conflict in the region. It has led to a rapid transformation in the terms of discourse in which the conflict is represented, by India, Pakistan and by many Kashmiris themselves. The current stage in the Kashmir conflict can be dated to 1989, when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) inaugurated an armed uprising against Indian rule. By the mid-1990s, however, the JKLF had been increasingly taken over by Pakistan-based Islamist groups. The wiping out of many of its cadres in confrontation with the Indian armed forces, the withdrawal of Pakistani support and the growing realisation of the need for peaceful, as opposed to military, means for the eventual resolution of the Kashmir dispute, seem to be among the major reasons for the gradual decline of the JKLF as a military force in Kashmir, despite the fact that its goal of an independent Kashmir still commands the support of many Kashmiri Muslims. On the other hand, military and other forms of support from the Pakistani establishment, from private jihadist groups in Pakistan and elsewhere, in addition to a passionate zeal for what is seen as a 'holy' cause, account, in large measure, for the gradual take-over of the armed struggle in Kashmir by militant Islamist groups, mainly based in Pakistan and led, for the most part, by Pakistani nationals.
Despite the active involvement of Islamist groups in the on-going struggle in Kashmir, little written has been written about them from a scholarly and detached point of view. This article seeks to provide an account of the ideology, organization and development of one of the leading Islamist groups active in Kashmir today, the Lashkar-i Tayyeba. Of the several Pakistan-based Islamist groups active in Kashmir today, the Lashkar is, by far, the most well-organised, well-trained and heavily armed. From the mid-1990s, this once little known group has emerged today as the most serious challenge to the Indian armed forces, being responsible for several attacks in Kashmir, killing a large number of Indian soldiers as well as civilians, both Hindu as well as Muslim.
This article looks at the emergence of the Lashkar as a key player in the present stage of the Kashmiri struggle. Owing to the relative paucity of published material, the article relies heavily on the official Internet web site of the Markaz Da'wat wa'l Irshad ('Centre for Invitation and Instruction'), of which the Lashkar is the armed wing.
This article is divided into three main sections. Part I looks at the origins of the Lashkar in the specific South Asian context, tracing its understanding of Islam and jihad to the emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith ('The People of the Prophetic Tradition'), an Islamic reformist movement, in the sub-continent. We then look at the ideology of the Lashkar, seeing how it seeks to fashion armed jihad as a means for the 'liberation' of Muslims from what it sees as 'oppression' and to advance its own stated goal of establishing the 'supremacy' of Islam, as it understands it, as a global ideology. Part II examines the involvement of the Lashkar in Kashmir, seeing it as emerging out of a broader Islamist movement in the region, the roots of which go back to the early years of the twentieth century. The concluding section of the article looks briefly at how far the Lashkar has been able to actually establish itself among the Kashmiri Muslims. In assessing its ability to do so, a distinction is stressed between, on the one hand, its military engagements against the Indian armed forces, and, on the other, its ability to impose its own vision of Islam as the accepted version.
The Lashkar: Early Origins
The Lashkar is the military wing of the Markaz Da'wat wa'l Irshad, with its headquarters at the town of Muridke in the Gujranwala district in Pakistani Punjab. The Markaz was established in 1986 by two Pakistani university professors, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed and Zafar Iqbal. They were assisted by the late 'Abdullah Azam' a close aide of Osama bin Laden, who was then associated with the International Islamic University, Islamabad. Funds for setting up the organization are said to have come from Pakistan's dreaded secret services agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
The Markaz is affiliated to the Ahl-i Hadith school of thought, a reformist Islamic movement, which had its origins in early nineteenth century north India. The founders of the Ahl-i Hadith, men such as Maulana Nazir Husain (1805-1902), Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali (d1832-90) and Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari (1870-1943), believed that they were charged with the divine responsibility of purging popular Muslim practice of what they saw as 'un-Islamic' accretions and borrowings from their Hindu neighbours, regarding these as 'unlawful innovations' (bida'at), and as akin to shirk, the sin of associating anything with God. They insisted that Muslims must go back to the original sources of their faith, the Qur'an and the Hadith, the Traditions of the Prophet, and abandon all beliefs and practices not sanctioned therein. They called for Muslims to abide strictly by the Islamic law (shari'ah) and to abandon 'imitation' (taqlid) of the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence (mazhab. pl. mazahib), attempting to refashion the worldwide Muslim community in the mould of the Companions of the Prophet. The 'ulama of the Hanafi mazhab, representing the vast majority of the Muslims of South Asia, entered into bitter conflict with the Ahl-i Hadith on the matter of taqlid. The latter defended their opposition to taqlid on the grounds that the schools of jurisprudence had developed more than two hundred years after the death of the Prophet, and that, therefore, the Companions of the Prophet did not follow taqlid. Since, they argued, Muslims should follow the model of the Companions, there was no need for them to 'blindly follow' the schools of jurisprudence, for this would be tantamount to 'personality worship' of the founders of the mazahib, a heinous sin. Further, they claimed, the Hanafis had fabricated numerous hadith to prove the claims of their mazhab, and quoted a hadith to the effect that 'he who fabricates hadith shall be thrown into hell-fire'.
Besides attacking the Hanafi 'ulama, the Ahl-i Hadith directed their attention to bitterly critiquing Sufism, which they saw as a 'wrongful innovation', for, they argued, it had no sanction in the practice of the Prophet and his Companions. Every 'wrongful innovation', they insisted, was a heinous sin, the punishment for which was damnation in hell. They stiffly opposed the adoration of the Prophet as a superhuman being as well as the devotion to the saints and the cults centred on their shrines that are an integral part of popular Sufi tradition in South Asia, seeing this as a deviation from the practice of the Prophet and the early Muslims. Faith in the powers of Sufi preceptors and the widespread belief in the Sufi saints as intermediaries with God were condemned as akin to polytheism. So, too, was the belief in the supernatural powers of the Prophet and of his being ever-present and all-seeing.
Given the immense popularity of the Sufi traditions and the influence of the Hanafi 8ulama among the Muslims of South Asia, it was hardly surprising that the Ahl-i Hadith faced stiffed opposition, being banned from worship at mosques and condemned as apostates and enemies of Islam. For their part, the Ahl-i Hadith appeared to have revelled in controversy, not losing any opportunity of attacking their Muslim opponents for what they branded as their 'un-Islamic' ways. Engaged in constant conflict with other Muslims, drawing clear lines of division between themselves as the only truly Muslim group and the rest, seems to have played a crucial role in the development of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity.
Confrontation with other Muslim groups created an atmosphere conducive to militancy, and the Ahl-i Hadith saw themselves as carrying on in the long tradition of jihad, which they accused other Muslims as having abandoned. The founders of the Ahl-i Hadith claimed the legacy of the early nineteenth century jihad movement led by Sayyed Ahmad Barelvi and Isma'il Shahid against the Sikhs in the Punjab. In the failed revolt of 1857 against the British, several Muslim ulama associated with Ahl-i Hadith-style activism played a role in leading uprisings at some places. After 1857, while some Ahl-i Hadith leaders accommodated themselves to British rule and devoted themselves to peaceful preaching, others continued to carry on violent struggles against the British in the North-West Frontier Province, till they were finally crushed by the end of the nineteenth century. Although from the early twentieth century onwards the Ahl-i Hadith, as a whole, gave up the path of violence in the face of British arms, an Ahl-i Hadith scholar writes that they 'refused to accept the supremacy of the British and the Hindus', and vowed to carry on the struggle through other means to 'convert India into an abode of Islam (dar-ul islam) through jihad'. While they desisted from entering into violent confrontation with the British, their opposition to Sufism and to the Hanafis brought them into conflict with many traditional Muslims, which sometimes took violent forms. However, they were doomed to a marginal existence owing to their vehement opposition to popular Muslim practice, and hence were not able to emerge as a mass movement. Rather, they remained an elitist group, characterised, as Barbara Metcalf writes, by a sense of 'moral superiority' and 'self-righteousness', tinged with 'a certain harshness', and with a small following among urban Muslims, particularly in north India.
The Ahl-i-Hadith in Pakistan and the Rise of the Lashkar:
Since the Lashkar has its headquarters in Pakistan and most of its fighters in Kashmir are Pakistani nationals, the role of the Lashkar in Kashmir must be seen in the context of the growing salience within Pakistan itself of the Ahl-i Hadith, to which it owes allegiance. Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Ahl-i Hadith began making gradual progress in the country, establishing mosques and madrasas of its own. It had to face with stiff resistance from traditional Sufis, for its opposition to Sufism and taqlid. It tended to have a more visible presence in urban areas, its strict scripturalist literalism appealing to groups such as urban traders who were not tied down to local Sufi shrines.
Although the Ahl-i Hadith still has a limited following in Pakistan, from the 1980s onwards it was able to make considerable inroads in Pakistani society. A number of factors have combined to make for this. Firstly, the growing appeal of scripturalist Islam as a result of the rapid expansion in the number of madrasas or Islamic seminaries in the country in recent decades, many of which are sponsored by the Saudis and preach a conservative yet militant form of Islam that has a close resemblance with that of the Ahl-i Hadith. Secondly, the active sponsorship and patronising of such madrasas by the Pakistani state, under and after General Zia-ul Haq (d. 1988). Thirdly, the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, which saw a great expansion of resources for groups such as the Ahl-i Hadith, with massive amounts of aid, in the form of money and arms, pouring in from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Many Ahl-i Hadith and other Sunni madrasas emerged at this time as training grounds for militants active in the Afghan jihad. After expelling the Soviets from Kabul, these mujahids turned their attention to fresh pastures, Kashmir being one of them. Thus, from being a relatively minor group in Pakistan's Islamic landscape, the Ahl-i Hadith grew, by the end of the 1980s, into a major force, with scores of madrasas all over the country, particularly in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, and several newspapers and journals articulating its vision of an Islamic revolution.
Along with other Islamist groups, the Ahl-i Hadith immersed itself in the jihad in Afghanistan. In 1986 it set up the Markaz Da'wat wa'l Irshad, based in a sprawling 160-acre campus at Muridke, a town some 30 kilometres from Lahore, to train mujahidin to fight the Soviets. As the Markaz's activities rapidly grew, it was decided to divide its work into two separate but related sections: the educational and the jihadist. Thus, in 1993, the Markaz established its separate 'jihadic and warfare' wing, the Lashkar. The Lashkar later set up four training centres in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where, 'thousands of mujahidin from all over the world are being trained'. Markaz authorities claim that the militants produced at these centres have played a leading role in armed struggles, first in Afghanistan, and then in countries as far afield as Bosnia, Chechenya, Kosovo, the southern Philippines, Kashmir and 'in other areas where Muslims are fighting for freedom'. All Muslims, it believes, are members of one global community. Oppression of Muslims anywhere makes it incumbent on Muslims everywhere to assist them, if necessarily through active engagement in violent conflict with their non-Muslim opponents. As the Lashkar case so strikingly illustrates, one of the characteristic features of some contemporary Islamist movements is precisely this global agenda, a marked contrast with the local or national scope and ambitions of Islamist movements in the past.
According to one report, in recent years the spread of the Markaz/Lashkar in Pakistan has been 'phenomenal', and today it has some five hundred offices all over the country, most of them in Punjab, which operate as recruitment centres for would-be mujahidin. At its Muridke headquarters, the Markaz runs an Islamic school and university, most of whose students are local Pakistanis, with some from both Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Kashmiris from the Indian-ruled part of the state, and several Afghans and Arabs. Established in 1994, several hundred students have already graduated from the school. Scores of smaller schools run on the same lines have been set up in various other parts of Pakistan, and, by mid-2001, their number was said to be almost 130, with some 15,000 students and 800 teachers on their rolls. Young boys of the age of eight are taken in and are given a 12-year training, which includes the standard Islamic disciples, taught from an Ahl-i Hadith perspective, English, Arabic, and Science, as well as the handling of weapons and techniques of armed combat. A strict military atmosphere is enforced. Students must wear military uniforms, abide by military discipline and 'properly assimilate the commandments of their theologians and military instructors that their future profession - as mujahidin- will be in great demand in the Muslim world on the threshold of the new millennium'. Students from different countries and ethnic groups live together, and every effort is made to discourage ethnic differences. They must wear the same clothes, speak the same language (Urdu, Arabic). Names that might suggest local, clan, tribal or caste origins must be effaced. The only identity that should matter to them is of being Muslim, ethnic differences being seen as working to divide and weaken the worldwide Muslim ummah.
At its four training centres, would-be mujahidin are given rigorous military training. This is of two kinds. Firstly, a short twenty-one day course, the daura-i 'ama ('general course'). Secondly, a three-month intensive course, the daura-i khasa ('special course'), geared to guerrilla warfare, in which trainees learn how to handle small arms as well as survival and ambush techniques. These courses, it is claimed, 'change the course of life' of the trainees completely', and a sign of this is said to be that they 'no longer shave' and 'wear their shalwars (baggy trousers) above their ankles, as enjoined by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)'. They are fired with a passionate zeal in what is said to be a 'holy' cause, willing to sacrifice their lives and attain 'martyrdom' for it. Families whose sons die in battles with the Indian forces are said to celebrate and rejoice their deaths, rather than mourn, for they are confident of their securing a place for themselves in heaven. This has particularly crucial implications for how Kashmiri Lashkar activists see themselves. If, traditionally, Kashmiri Muslims were depicted as 'cowards', 'passive' or 'mild', and lax as far as religious observances were concerned, at least compared to their Pathan and Punjabi Muslim neighbours, they are now sought to be made 'true', 'brave' and 'fearless' Muslims, fired by the zeal of would-be 'martyrs' for the faith.
The Ideology of the Lashkar:
Like other Islamist groups, the Markaz/Lashkar sees Islam as a perfect, all- embracing system (nizam). Islam is said to govern all aspects of personal as well as collective life, in the form of the shari'ah. For the establishing of an Islamic system, an Islamic state is necessary, which will impose the shar'iah as the law of the land. This is seen as 'the solution to all our problems'. If such a state were to be set up and all Muslims were to live strictly according to 'the laws that Allah has laid down', then, it is believed, 'they would be able to control the whole world and exercise their supremacy'. Since the laws have already been laid down by God, there is no room for human beings to exercise their judgement in creating fresh legislation. Hence, democracy, in the sense of a system where people make their own laws, is condemned as completely un-Islamic. Since Islam is seen as the very antithesis of nationalism, it demands the establishment of one universal Islamic state, ruled by a single khalifah. Thus, the present division of the Muslims into many nation-states must be overcome. Since 'the ummah is one', it follows from this that 'the system of khilafah does not recognise the physical borders or the independence of one Muslim country from another'. Hence, 'the state is one, the army is one, the flag is one, the budget is one, etc.'.
The struggle for the establishment of the Islamic state can take various forms, peaceful as well as violent. Islam, the Lashkar admits, is 'a religion of peace and harmony', and seeks to 'eliminate mischief and disorder, and to provide peace, not only to Muslims but also to the entire humanity'. However, Muslims are commanded to take to armed struggle, or jihad, to defend their co-religionists suffering from the oppression of others. Such a situation is said to prevail over much of the world today. While jihad in defence of Islam and of Muslims labouring under oppression is presented as a liberation struggle, it is also seen as a means for Islam to 'prevail on this earth', for Islam is seen as the only true religion. Armed jihad must continue 'until Islam, as a way of life, dominates the whole world and until Allah's law is enforced everywhere in the world'. Since Islam is meant for all peoples, the Islamic State must spearhead a movement to spread the Islamic 'ideology' all over the world. In the course of this struggle, it is 'expected' that it will encounter 'conflict' with other states and their ideologies. The conflict can be resolved through peaceful diplomacy, but, if that fails, then the only course left open for the Muslims is armed jihad. In this sense, the Markaz/Lashkar believes, jihad is 'the foreign policy' of the Islamic State. This does not, however, mean that force can be used to coerce others into accepting Islam. Rather, jihad is seen as providing them with the 'security that comes from the application of Islam', while leaving them free to follow their own religion or to become Muslims.
The subject of armed jihad runs right through the writings and pronouncements of the Markaz/Lashkar and is, in fact, the most prominent theme in its discourse. Indeed, its understanding of Islam maybe seen as determined almost wholly by this preoccupation, so much so that its reading of Islam seems to be a product of its own political project. Being born as a result of a war (in Afghanistan), fighting for a holy cause has become the very raison d'être of the Lashkar, and its subsequent development has been almost entirely determined by this concern. The contours of its ideological framework are constructed in such a way that the theme of armed jihad appears as the central element of its project. In the writings and speeches of Markaz spokesmen jihad appears as violent conflict (qittal) waged against 'unbelievers' who are said to be responsible for the oppression of the Muslims. Indeed, it is projected as the one of the most central tenets of Islam, although it has traditionally not been included as one of the 'five pillars' of the faith. Thus, it is claimed that 'There is so much emphasis on this subject that some commentators and scholars of the Qur'an have remarked that the topic of the Qur'an is jihad'. Further, a Markaz statement declares, 'There is consensus of opinion among researchers of the Qur'an that no other action has been explained in such great detail as jihad'.
The global jihadist programme of the Markaz presents itself as a 'liberationist' project, basing itself on widespread feelings of discontent and suffering of sections of Muslims who see themselves as being persecuted by Western-oriented elites in their own countries, as well as by the 'West' more generally. The greatest problem of the Muslims, says Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed, head of the Markaz, is their 'subjugation to the West'. Thus, the Markaz is reported to have gone so far as to call for a jihad against the USA. 'All Muslims', the Markaz believes, are oppressed today, by such 'enemies' as the Hindus, the Jews or Christians. 'Wherever you look, you will find that non-believers are everywhere trying to enslave Muslims and destroy them', it argues. Hence, Muslims must form a 'solid bloc' to defend themselves from these 'enemies', and if all peaceful means fail they must resort to armed jihad for their liberation. This Muslim bloc must be led by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and have its headquarters at Mecca. It must aim at forming a pan-Islamic union based on strong trade, education and defence links, including a joint military command. Mujahidin from various Muslim countries would be trained to undertake jihad against unbelievers if peaceful means to put an end to oppression of Muslims fail. However, the Markaz insists, jihad is to be directed only at military and not civilian targets. It is contrasted with other forms of war that are pursued for purely worldly concerns, and is described as 'the act of supreme sacrifice to preserve human rights bestowed by Allah'. Jihad is thus a means for challenging 'oppression' and of establishing the rule of Islam.
Jihad is seen as the secret of Muslim power in the past when much of the known world was under Muslim rule, and it is argued that when Muslims 'abandoned jihad and other injunctions they began to degenerate'. In Markaz/Lashkar discourse, jihad is projected as a religious duty binding on all Muslims today. Thus, it is claimed that the prevailing global situation warrants all Muslims to be involved in some way or the other in jihad against non-Muslim 'oppressors'. In this grand enterprise there are different roles for different people to play. Those who are ordered by the khalifah to fight must do so, while others may be required to assist the mujahidin by supplying them food, arms and other supplies, providing medical assistance, looking after their families in their absence or even simply by exhorting others to participate in the war. Thus, every Muslim, man or woman, must be mobilised to assist in the struggle in some form or the other, and if any Muslim has 'never intended to fight against the disbelievers', his or her faith 'is not without traces of hypocrisy'. Those believers who have the capacity to participate or assist in the jihad but do not do so are said to 'be living a sinful life'. On the other hand, Muslims are promised that they would receive great rewards, both in this world and in the Hereafter, if they were to actively struggle in the path of jihad. Not only would they be guaranteed a place in Heaven, but they would also 'be honoured in this world', for jihad is also 'the way that solves financial and political problems'.
The Jihad in Kashmir and India
The Markaz sees its active involvement in the armed struggle in Kashmir as only one stage of a wider, indeed global, jihad against the forces of disbelief, stopping at nothing short of aiming at the conquest of the entire world. As Qari 'Abdul Wahid, former amir of the Lashkar in Indian-administered Kashmir, puts it, 'We will uphold the flag of freedom and Islam through jihad not only in Kashmir but in the whole world'. Likewise, Nazir Ahmed, in-charge of the public relations department of the Markaz, declares that through the jihad that the mujahidin have launched, 'Islam will be dominant all over the world, Inshallah (God willing)'. This war is seen as a solution to all the ills and oppression afflicting all Muslims, and it is claimed that 'if we want to live with honour and dignity, then we have to return back to jihad'. Through jihad, it is believed, 'Islam will be supreme throughout the world'. The mujahidin are promised that with the launching of the global jihad against all the 'unbelieving oppressors' of the world, 'The day is just round the corner when Islam will prevail in this earth, Insha Allah'.
In Markaz/Lashkar discourse, the conflict in Kashmir is seen not as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan, but as nothing less than a war between two different and mutually opposed ideologies: Islam, on the one hand, and disbelief [kufr], on the other. This is portrayed as only one chapter in a long a struggle between the two that is said to have characterised the history of Hindu-Muslim relations for the last 1400 years ever since the advent of the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet is claimed on the basis of a hadith to have singled out India as a special target for jihad. 'Whosoever will take part in jihad against India', Markaz leader Muhammad Ibrahim Salaf claims that the Prophet had declared, 'Allah will set him free from the pyre of hell'.
The Markaz/Lashkar sees the roots of the Kashmir problem as lying in its Muslim rulers having been replaced, first by the Sikhs and then by the Hindu Dogras through British assistance. With India (the 'Hindus') having taken over Kashmir in 1947, a long and protracted reign of bloody terror is said to have been unleashed on the Kashmiri Muslims. This is seen as a direct and logical consequence of the teachings of Hinduism itself, because, it is alleged, 'the Hindus have no compassion in their religion'. Hence, it is the duty of Muslims to wage jihad against the 'Hindu oppressors', for 'it is the Hindu who is a terrorist'. All Hindus are tarred with the same brush, described in such essentialist terms as 'terrorists', 'traitors', 'cowards', 'enemies', etc., these powerfully echoing widely shared sentiments among Pathan and Punjabi Muslims of Hindus being 'weak' and 'slavish', having been subjected to 'Muslim' rule for centuries, and of being 'crafty' and 'cunning', probably owing to Hindu near-monopoly of trade and commerce in India. This also builds on Pathan sentiments of 'manly honour', 'chivalry' and 'bravery', which Hindus are supposed to lack, being allegedly 'effeminate' and 'cruel'. Thus, Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed declares: 'In fact, the Hindu is a mean enemy and the proper way to deal with him is the one adopted by our forefathers [&] who crushed them by force. We need to do the same'. India is a special target for the Markaz's mujahidin. According to the amir of the Markaz, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed, 'The jihad is not about Kashmir only. It encompasses all of India'. Thus, the Markaz sees the jihad as going far beyond the borders of Kashmir and spreading through all of India. The final goal is to extend Muslim control over what is seen as having once been Muslim land, and, hence, to be brought back under Muslim domination, creating 'the Greater Pakistan by dint of jihad'. Thus, at a mammoth congregation of Markaz supporters in November 1999, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed declared, 'Today I announce the break-up of India, Inshallah. We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan'. On the same occasion, Amir Hamza, senior Markaz official and editor of its Urdu organ, ad-Da'wa, thundered: 'We ought to disintegrate India and even wipe India out'. Those who take part in this anti-Indian jihad are promised that 'Allah will save [them] from the pyre of hell', and 'huge palaces in paradise' await those who are killed in fighting the 'disbelieving enemies'.
This project for the disintegration of India, followed by its take-over by Pakistan and the establishing an Islamic state in the entire sub-continent, is sought to be justified by an elaborate set of arguments that use the rhetoric of liberation. Thus, instances of human-sacrifice, untouchability, infanticide, the oppression of the 'low' castes by the Brahmins and the suppression of women in Hinduism are described in great detail, and on this basis it is sought to be shown that such a religion as Hinduism should not 'be allowed to flourish'. In Markaz literature, the mass slaughter of Muslims by Hindu chauvinist groups, often in league with the Indian state and its agencies, and the growing wave of attacks on other marginalised groups in India such as the 'low' caste Dalits, Shudras and Christians, are presented in stark colours, and the point forcefully made that such a country 'where non-Hindus are not allowed to exist' should break-up. The Markaz/Lashkar poses as a 'champion' of not just the oppressed Muslims of Kashmir or India but even of the 'low' caste Shudras and Dalits. It sees itself as having a divinely appointed mission of saving the Shudras from Brahminical tyranny. Thus, it says, 'It is incumbent upon us to save the Shudras of India [&]from the clutches of Brahmins', and insists that 'the Brahmin Authority' must be 'ransack[ed]'. Although it claims that its jihad is aimed only against 'the tyrannical government and the army' and that 'nowhere do the mujahidin target non-Muslim or innocent people', there are reports that speak of Lashkar fighters being involved in the killing of several Hindu villagers in Jammu, Kashmir and in neighbouring Himachal Pradesh.
The Lashkar's Involvement in Kashmir
Roots of Islamism in Kashmir
The emergence of the Lashkar as a powerful military force in Kashmir must be seen in the context of the emergence of an Islamist constituency in the region, a process that can be traced back to the early years of the twentieth century. A major development in Kashmir at this time was the establishment of the first branch of the Ahl-i Hadith in Srinagar, in 1925, by Sayyed Hussain Shah Batku, a Kashmiri student of the Madrasa Miyan Sahib in Delhi, a seminary set up by one of the pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith in India, Maulvi Nazir Hussain. On his return to Kashmir after completing his education, Batku began directed his attention at attacking what he saw as 'un-Islamic' and 'Hinduistic' practices and beliefs associated with the popular Sufism of the Kashmiri Muslims. Batku is said to have 'raised a storm of controversy' for his critique of customary practices which he condemned as 'un-Islamic', such as visiting Sufi shrines, imploring Sufi saints for interceding with God, keeping fasts on particular days dedicated to various saints and reciting litanies (aurad) in the mosques. This is said to have seriously 'aggrieved the leading theologians of Srinagar'. The leading Hanafi ulama of Kashmir are said to have issued several fatawa against him, branding him as 'an apostate and an infidel' and as the dajjal (Anti-Christ), subjecting him to a 'social boycott'.
Among the other notable pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith in Kashmir were Maulana Anwar Shah Shopiani (d.1969), Maulana Ghulam Nabi Mubaraki (1902-80) and Sabzar Shah. Anwar Shah was a close disciple of Batku, and played a major role in spreading the message of the Ahl-i Hadith in Srinagar and Shopian. He also undertook missionary tours to outlying regions of the state, including Bhadarwah (Doda) and Ladakh. Like Anwar Shah, Maulana Mubaraki was a trained 'alim, a prolific writer and a powerful orator. He edited two Ahl-i Hadith journals, Tauhid and Muslim, and wrote extensively against the Ahmadis, the Shi'as, the Arya Samajists and the Christian missionaries, all of whom he saw as bent on the extirpation of Islam from Kashmir. He served as the president of the Ahl-i Hadith jama'at in Kashmir for several years, as well as the Imam of the Ahl-i Hadith Jam9ia mosque in Srinagar. Unlike Anwar Shah and Mubarakpuri, Sabzar Shah was not a trained 8alim, although he is said to have 'grasped the fundamentals of Islam and wedded himself to the cause of the Ahl-i Hadith'. In order to convey the message of the Ahl-i Hadith beyond the relatively narrow circle of middle-class Kashmiris, to which it had been largely restricted, he would roam the streets of Srinagar in the garb of a peddler selling soaps, combs, pins, bangles and toys. To his customers, mostly women and children, he would invariably speak about the 'strict monotheism' of the Ahl-i Hadith and would fiercely denounce 'shrine worship and other polytheistic practices'. For this, it is said, he was beaten on numerous occasions, but, it is said, he refused to relent.
In the face of the great opposition, the Ahl-i Hadith managed to make a small, yet significant number of converts, mainly in the towns of Srinagar, Islamabad (Anantnag) and Shopian. In 1923, in order to co-ordinate the efforts of individual activists, and to 'face the determined challenge posed by the mullas of Kashmir', a central organisation, the Anjuman Ahl-i Hadith Jammu and Kashmir, was established in Srinagar, with one Haji Muhammad Shahdad as its president. The establishment of the organisation 'came as a thunderbolt' to the traditional Hanafi 'ulama and Sufis of Kashmir, who are said to have now 'declared a virtual war' on the Ahl-i Hadith. Several Ahl-i Hadith activists were physically attacked; a social boycott was instituted against them; they were turned out of their localities; and, being branded as apostates, they were refused entry into the mosques, following which they had to set up their own separate places of worship. Leading Hanafi 8ulama issued fatawa declaring them to be non-Muslim renegades.
Despite the zeal of its activists, the Ahl-i Hadith singularly failed to develop a mass following in Kashmir. Several factors may be adduced for this. Firstly, its stern opposition to the 'blind imitation' of the schools of jurisprudence brought upon it the wrath of the traditional Hanafi 'ulama, who exercised a significant influence in Kashmir. Secondly, its hostility to Sufism, which it branded as an innovation not sanctioned by the practice of the Prophet, could hardly win the hearts of many Kashmiris, given the strong influence of popular Sufism in the region. For their trenchant criticism of popular practices associated with the shrines and cults of the Sufis, the followers of the Ahl-i Hadith were branded by the Kashmiri 'ulama as kafirs (unbelievers) and munkar-i auliya ('deniers of the friends of God'), this greatly limiting their appeal to the Kashmiri Muslims. Thus, The Mirwai'z of the Khanqah-i Mu'alla, one of Kashmir's most important Sufi shrines, denounced the Ahl-i Hadith as the dajjal (Anti-Christ). One Hanafi 'alim issued a fatwa declaring that no Muslim should marry a follower of the Ahl-i Hadith, and nor could the corpse of an Ahl-i Hadith follower be buried in a Muslim graveyard. Other 'ulama declared it impermissible (haram) for Hanafi Muslims to pray along with Ahl-i Hadith followers. For their part, Ahl-i Hadith Imams condemned Kashmiri Hanafi mosques as 'little better than temples', because of the practice therein of reciting litanies (aurad) aloud before the congregational prayers 
The Ahl-i Hadith's advocacy of a stern, legalistic understanding of Islam brooked no compromise with deeply rooted local cultural traditions, many of which it did not hesitate to brand as 'Hindu' or 'un-Islamic'. This naturally limited its appeal among many Kashmiris. In addition, the Ahl-i Hadith focussed most of its efforts in the towns of Kashmir, almost completely neglecting the countryside, where most Kashmiri Muslims lived. It confined itself, by and large, to stirring religious controversy and preaching, not providing any significant social services which might have made for a larger following. Further, internal differences contributed to the weakening of the movement. In 1940, it split into two rival groups on the issue of qabl-i zawal, or on whether the Friday congregational prayers could be offered between 11 am and 12 noon.
Writing in 1997, Wani noted that the Ahl-i Hadith has not been able to 'take deep roots in the [Kashmir] valley'. Rather, it remains a largely elitist phenomenon, with its core support base among a limited section of the urban lower middle and middle classes, roughly the same core support-base of competing groups such as the secular nationalist JKLF and the Islamist Jama'at-i Islami. Although Ahl-i Hadith thus failed to establish a mass base for itself in Kashmir, it did provide fertile soil for the emergence of other Muslim reformist trends from the 1930s onwards, inspired by its efforts at purging the popular Kashmir Muslim religious tradition of elements that were deemed to be 'un-Islamic'. These trends, in turn, played a significant role in preparing the ground for radical Islamist groups, including the Lashkar. Of particular importance in this regard was the emergence of the Jama'at-i Islami. Established in 1941 by Sayyed Abul 'Ala Maududi, and organised as an independent organisation and political party in Kashmir in 1952, the Jama'at-i Islami is now a major force to contend with in the region. Like the Ahl-i Hadith, the Jama'at-i Islami sought to combat 'un-Islamic' practices, but, unlike it, it abstained from directly attacking the Sufi tradition, and refrained from branding other Muslims as apostates or deviant. In contrast to the Ahl-i Hadith, the Jama'at was not opposed to Sufism as such but only to those practices and beliefs associated with popular Sufism, which it saw as 'un-Islamic'. Its advocacy of an Islam based on the model of the Prophet's Companions and its opposition to what was seen as local 'un-Islamic' customs, such as prostration at the graves of saints, beseeching them for help, keeping fasts or holding feasts on special days dedicated to them, made for a growing appeal to a class of educated, particularly urban, Kashmir Muslims who were influenced by Muslim reformists currents from outside. Unlike the Ahl-i Hadith, which devoted most of its energies simply to preaching and entering into controversies with its Muslim opponents, the Jama'at gave great stress to modern education, setting up scores of schools where secular as well as religious subjects were taught. Its social services, combined with its resolute opposition to Indian rule, won it considerable support among many Kashmiri Muslims, disillusioned with the politics of the ruling National Conference for what they saw as 8selling out9 the interests of the Kashmiris to India. For many young Muslims belonging to this class, the Jama'at's understanding of a socially engaged Islam was seen as an attractive alternative to popular Sufism, that was branded as 'other-worldly', 'superstitious', 'corrupt', and, above all, 'un-Islamic'. It is primarily among this constituency that the Ahl-i Hadith's vision of Islam, which the Lashkar represents, derives its greatest support in Kashmir today. Owing to their shared commitment to a radical understanding of Islam, the Lashkar seems to have been able to win over the support of several Kashmiris associated with or sympathetic to the Jama'at-i Islami, thus making for a broader appeal for the Ahl-i Hadith than it previously enjoyed.
The Lashkar in Kashmir
As in the case of the other Pakistan-based militant groups now active in Kashmir, the Lashkar's direct participation in the Kashmir conflict dates back to the end of the Afghan war in 1992, in which an estimated 1600 of its militants are said to have participated. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Lashkar shifted its attention to Kashmir to 'help the oppressed and innocent Kashmiris who were undergoing Indian aggression for the past fifty years'. In this, it was assisted by the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the powerful Pakistani secret service agency, both key players in the Afghan jihad. Raman, an Indian political analyst, writes that from 1992 onwards, the Pakistani authorities began sponsoring militant Islamist outfits, including the Lashkar, to undertake what it called a jihad in Kashmir, instead of channelling such aid directly, in order to escape being branded as a 'terrorist state'. Raman calls this the 'privatisation of jihad', and remarks that the patronage given to these groups must be seen as a reflection of the growing fear of mass support of the JKLF and its advocacy of an independent Kashmir, which went fundamentally against Pakistan's own perceived interests. The Islamists were seen as a far more reliable ally, for all of them are fiercely opposed to nationalism, and, therefore, insist that Kashmir must join Muslim Pakistan, this being seen as but the prelude to a grand unity of all Muslims. With various militant Islamist groups, many of them Pakistan-based and led by Pakistanis, now being liberally assisted by the Pakistani state, assistance to the JKLF began drying up. Presumably, the Indian authorities must have seen this new situation to their advantage, as it meant a serious division in Kashmiri Muslim ranks.
The Lashkar is said to have first entered Kashmir in 1990, sending in a number of its trained activists, most of who were Pakistani nationals. It then 'upgraded' its jihad there in 1993, when its militants attacked an Indian army base in Poonch. In 1994, following the laying down of arms by the JKLF, the Lashkar began sending large numbers of its fighters into Kashmir, most of them from outside Kashmir, mainly Pakistanis, Kashmiris from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and Afghans. 1996 witnessed a major shift in the Lashkar's Kashmir strategy, with greater attention being paid to the border districts of Jammu, particularly Rajouri and Poonch, areas dominated by non-Kashmiri Muslims such as the cattle-grazing Gujjars and Bakkarwals, ethnically related to the Punjabi Muslims, as well as Doda. Reports suggest that some of the mass killings of Hindu villagers in these areas have been its handiwork, with the aim of engineering an exodus of the Hindu population of these areas so as to make its task easier. By mid-2001, the Lashkar claimed, it had killed 14369 Indian soldiers in Kashmir, losing in the process 1016 of its own men. 
In mid-1999 India and Pakistan almost came to war after Pakistan-based militants, believed to have been backed by the Pakistani army, occupied certain strategic heights in the Kargil sector in the Ladakh region in the remote northern part of Kashmir. The four principal militant groups taking part in this operation, all Islamist and manned mainly by non-Kashmiris, were the Harkat ul-Mujahidin, the Tehrik-i Jihad, al-Badr and the Lashkar. These groups together formed a joint military command to co-ordinate their military operations against the Indian army. The Lashkar contingent consisted, among others, of several students from its college at Muridke, led by one 'Abdur Rahman 'Abid, a graduate of Madinah University. The Lashkar force was joined by some two hundred militants from the Nuristan province of Afghanistan, the first time that such a large number of Afghan fighters had entered Kashmir in recent years.
The Pakistani attempt to enter Kashmir through Kargil, however, failed, and under pressure from the West, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, appealed to the militants to withdraw from the heights that they had captured. The militants reluctantly obeyed what they saw as Sharif's capitulation to the USA, but announced what they called 'the second stage' of the Kashmir jihad- taking the battle against the Indian army right inside the Kashmir valley itself, in order, as Zaki ur-Rahman Lakhvi, the amir of the Lashkar, put it, 'to avenge' the atrocities unleashed by the Indian army on the Kashmiri Muslims. According to the amir of the Markaz, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed, in this second phase 'the jihad would spread all across Kashmir. It would spread to every peak, every forest and every path'. As part of this new strategy, the Lashkar came up with a new means of attack suicide bombers, which it named as 'Ibn Taimiya Fida'i ('Faithful') Missions', in memory of the medieval Arab Islamic scholar who crusaded against what he saw as un-Islamic practices, and to whom the Ahl-i-Hadith owes much of its inspiration.
The successful attack by a fida'i mission on the Indian army headquarters in Srinagar in November 1999, in which several Indian soldiers were killed, came as a great boost to the morale of the Lashkar fighters, smarting under their forced withdrawal some months earlier from the Kargil heights. In the wake of the attack, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed declared before an audience of an estimated three hundred thousand people in Muridke in November 1999 that his fighters could now 'strike anywhere in India', threatening even to target the Indian Prime Minister's office if India did not stop its aggression against the Kashmiri Muslims and vacate Kashmir. The jihad, declared the Hafiz, was not now limited simply to freeing Kashmir from Indian control. Rather, he stressed, it was aimed at 'liberating' India itself.He revealed that the Lashkar was now planning to extend its activities beyond the borders of Kashmir deep inside India.  Some 50,000 Pakistani youth are said to have responded to this appeal to join the grand anti-India crusade. That this was no empty boasting was made clear in a Lashkar attack on an Indian army post at the Red Fort, the very heart of Delhi, in December, 2000, in which several Indian soldiers are said to have been killed.
The Limits of Jihad: Its Implications for Kashmir, India and Pakistan
The development of the Ahl-i Hadith in Kashmir, from being a marginal group, fiercely opposed to by many Kashmiri Muslims, to emerging, in the form of the Lashkar, as the most formidable element in the on-going armed struggle in the region, poses crucial questions regarding the actual level of support for the Ahl-i Hadith's own vision of Islam in Kashmir. Given the limited support for the Ahl-i Hadith in Kashmir prior to the outbreak of the armed struggle in 1989, it appears that its emergence as a major actor in the region owes largely to the role of the Lashkar in taking on the Indian army. The support for the Lashkar in Kashmir, limited though it might be, must, then, be seen as essentially a result of its stern opposition to Indian rule rather than as representing any considerable acceptance of its theological vision. In assessing the Kashmiri Muslim response to the Lashkar9s involvement in the region, a clear distinction needs to be made between how many Kashmiri Muslims would probably see the Lashkar's military strikes against Indian soldiers and army installations, on the one hand, and how far they might accept its understanding of Islam and its own ultimate agenda, on the other. Many Kashmiris, and not necessarily all supporters of a 'Wahhabi' sort of Islam, might well support the Lashkar in its willingness to take engage the Indian army. On the other hand, the consistent opposition of the Lashkar to any negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue, insisting that the only solution of the question is carrying on with the jihad till the region finally merges with Pakistan, certainly limits its potential support base. The fact that the Lashkar is almost entirely in the hands of Pakistanis and Kashmiris from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and that it refuses to recognise the possibility of an independent Kashmir, means that it has a very limited appeal to those Kashmiris who support an independent, sovereign state, which, however, neither India nor Pakistan seem willing to accede.
A further obstacle in the path of the Lashkar in Kashmir is its own understanding of Islam, rigid, regimented and vehemently opposed as it is to Sufism. 'Sufism', the Lashkar insists, 'has been designed with no other purpose than to dampen the spirit of jihad'. Since jihad is seen as integral to Islam, Sufism is regarded as 'un-Islamic'. The Lashkar's vehement opposition to Sufism, in line with the Ahl-i Hadith position on the matter, seems at striking odds with Kashmir tradition, where Sufism is still deeply rooted. The history of the spread of Islam in Kashmir is virtually synonymous with the missionary efforts of various Sufi orders, most notably the Kubrawi, the Suhrawardi, the Qadri, the Naqshbandi and the Rishi. Till today, Sufism remains the dominant form of Islamic expression in Kashmir, and the vehement opposition to it from Islamist groups that see it as 'un-Islamic' has registered little success. Indeed, defenders of the cults centred round the Sufi saints have not hesitated to brand the 'Wahhabis' as 'un-Islamic' and 'enemies of the faith' in turn. Till such time as Sufism remains dominant in the region, and continues to play a central role in the definition of Kashmiri identity, there seems little hope for groups such as the Lashkar to see their understanding of Islam win popular acceptance for their vision of Islam. The Lashkar is even less likely to find warm support among the Shi'as of the region, who form the majority in the Kargil district of Ladakh and are a sizeable minority in the Kashmir Valley, for the Shi'as are seen by the Ahl-i Hadith as non-Muslim 'heretics'.
If the odds seem so heavily weighed against the Lashkar in attempting to win support for its own vision of Islam among the Kashmiri Muslims, it can still continue to play a major role in escalating the conflict in the region, making it even more difficult to resolve the issue. The Lashkar insists that dialogue with the 'disbelievers' is prohibited in Islam, and that hence the only way ahead is through armed jihad. This intransigence has serious implications for all three parties to the Kashmir dispute India, Pakistan as well as the people of Kashmir. While carrying on with the armed strikes in order to inflict maximum damage to India might suit the short-term interests of the Pakistani establishment, it might, as some commentators have warned, have major consequences for Pakistan's own future, the full implications of which do not seem to have been appreciated by the managers of Pakistan's Kashmir policy. It is quite possible that the growing strength of groups like the Lashkar might mean that Pakistan, too, could soon be engulfed in civil war, with armed groups seeking to take over the country in the name of establishing an Islamic order.
The Lashkar, for its part, insists that it will not stop with its jihad in Kashmir, but, rather, regards it as but the beginning of a greater struggle to establish an Islamic state in all of South Asia, including both India as well as Pakistan. It has repeatedly condemned what it sees as 'un-Islamic' forces within Pakistan, demanding that there should be a 'total enforcement of Allah's shari'ah' in the country. The Pakistani ruling elite are accused of 'disbelief', for taking the name of Islam, while at the same time refusing to establish an Islamic system in the country. There is every fear that if the Pakistani state were to enter into some sort of agreement with India on Kashmir, armed Islamist groups active in Kashmir today might turn their attention inwards, and seek to carry on with their agenda at home through armed struggle. Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed, the amir of the Markaz, himself hints at the possibility, cautioning that, 'As soon as we start to fight the disbelievers, we are sure to stop fighting among ourselves. But if we persist in keeping from jihad against the enemy, we are bound to go on fighting among ourselves'. Pakistani political scientist Eqbal Ahmad, sensing the very real threat of militant Islamist groups, many of them active in Kashmir today, plunging Pakistan into a bloody civil war, warns his countrymen, 'The chickens of jihads once sponsored by imperialism and the [Pakistani] state have been coming home to roost. Afghanistan threatens to become a metaphor for the future'. Ahmad's appeal seems to have fallen on deaf ears, for the Pakistani establishment seems oblivious to the consequences of its continued patronage of groups such as the Lashkar, that today have become so powerful as to be, in the words of Minhas, a Pakistani analyst, quite 'unmanageable'.
The implications of the Lashkar's determination to carry on with what it calls a jihad against India poses serious questions for India, too, faced as it is with the growing threat of Hindu militancy, targetted primarily against the country's large Muslim population. As mentioned earlier, the Lashkar views its involvement in Kashmir as merely a prelude to a grand war against India, aiming at nothing less than the merger of India into a 'Greater Pakistan'. It sees itself as crusading on behalf of India's Muslims, who are said to be labouring under great oppression at the hands of militant Hindu organizations and the Indian government. Leading Markaz spokesmen have appealed for Indian Muslim leaders to launch an armed struggle against India.  Not many Indian Muslims would, however, seem to be receptive to the appeals of the Lashkar to launch a jihad against the Hindus. With a Hindu right-wing government in power in India, and the growing challenge of Hindutva fascism, voices calling for peace and dialogue with the Hindus seem to prevail over those insisting on confrontation and conflict.
The Crisis in Afghanistan and the Lashkar in Kashmir
The American reprisals against the Taliban following the 11 September, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, were fiercely opposed by Islamist groups, including the Lashkar. In the wake of the attacks, the Lashkar is said to have despatched several of its armed volunteers to Afghanistan, to supplement the 600 Lashkar special guards who had earlier been specially appointed as personal security for Osama bin Laden. The Lashkar viewed the American assault on Afghanistan as the launching of a new 'crusade' by the 'Christian' West against the Muslim world. One of the principal aims of the attacks, it claimed, was to destroy Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. The head of the Markaz warned Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf not to co-operate with America, and issued a thinly veiled threat, calling for defiance of the government if it continued to toe the American line. The head of the fatwa section of the Markaz, Mufti 8Abdur Rahman, issued a fatwa claiming it a binding duty on all Muslims to help their Afghan co-religionists. If Pakistan's rulers supported America, he laid down, this would be treated as a gross violation of Islam, and they would be considered as 'rebels and traitors of Allah and His prophet'. If a group of Muslims is attacked by 'unbelievers', the fatwa said, 'the entire Muslim community must help it, even through war'. In the ongoing 'war between Islam and disbelief', as it described it, it declared, 'it has become obligatory for all the Muslim states in the interest of the dignity of Islam and the Muslims to [&] forge unity in their own ranks and send their armies to support jihad and the mujahidin'. 
Under pressure from the Americans, Musharraf was forced to take action against some militant groups based in Pakistan and active in Afghanistan, including the Lashkar. Several leading Lashkar activists, including the head of the organisation, Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed, were arrested, only to be soon released. Careful not to embarrass Musharraf, and to win his support for its continued involvement in Kashmir, the Markaz reorganised itself in December 2001, setting up two separate wings. The first, christened as the Jama'at ud-Da''wa , was to focus on tabligh or Islamic missionary activism and on 'political and reformist activities'. The other, which would retain the name of the Lashkar-i Tayyeba, would devote itself to jihad, which would remain confined to Kashmir alone. In other words, jihadist activities of the Lashkar in other parts of the world were to be stopped, and the resources of the organisations directed to Kashmir. In the face of charges that the mainly Punjabi Pakistani Lashkar activists in Kashmir had taken over the movement and had, in the process, marginalized the Kashmiris, a new central committee of the Lashkar was set up in late December 2001, which consisted entirely of Kashmiris, from both Pakistani- and Indian-administered parts of the state, and headed by a little-known Kashmiri Islamic scholar, 'Abdul Wahid. This promoting of Kashmiris within the central apparatus of the organisation was also intended to rebut charges of the militant movement in Kashmir being an externally inspired and directed one, and not an indigenous 'liberation' struggle. Significantly, alongside this, the radical anti-American rhetoric was toned down in the Markaz's official website, probably under pressure from Musharraf. However, despite Musharraf's insistence that Pakistan was taking all possible steps to prevent the entry of militants into Kashmir from its territory, Lashkar activists continue to cross over into Kashmir and their military engagements with the Indian armed forces show no sign of letting up.
The continuation of the armed conflict in Kashmir has resulted in untold sufferings for the Kashmiris, and has also diverted scarce resources from desperately needed development work to an unprecedented arms build-up in the region. An entire generation has grown up in Kashmir for whom killings are a daily affair. It is increasingly becoming clear to many, including the Kashmiris themselves, that the only possible long-term, viable solution to the vexed Kashmir issue is through a negotiated agreement between India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir that satisfies all parties to the dispute. Armed conflict can only mean a further tragic loss of life and continued destruction. Given this, it appears that if groups such as the Lashkar refuse to read the signs of the times they might be threatened with further marginalisation. Already muffled voices within Kashmir's pro-Pakistan Jama'at-i Islami, in addition to pro-independence Kashmiri nationalist groups, have been calling for peaceful dialogue, and it seems, one hopes, a matter of time before other Islamist groups would begin to veer round to seeking a resolution of the dispute through peaceful means.
In this context, the refusal of certain Islamist groups in Pakistan and Kashmir, such as the Lashkar, on the one hand, and militant Hindu groups in India, on the other, to consider a negotiated settlement of the dispute, based on the aspirations of the Kashmiris themselves, is the greatest hurdle in the path of establishing peace in the region. With any move towards peaceful negotiation of the dispute ruled out on the grounds that entering into agreements with 'disbelievers' is forbidden in Islam, the Lashkar insists that the jihad must continue till its logical culmination the break-up of India and its absorption into a 'Greater Pakistan'. While this seems an obviously vain and dangerous hope, it is a vision, one must recognise, that inspires thousands of Lashkar activists, leading them on to even sacrificing their lives, to kill or to be killed.
The Lashkar has been able to carve for itself a presence as a major actor in the Kashmir conflict less because of the appeal of its ideology than owing to its engagement with Indian armed forces in the region. The 8Islamisation9 of the conflict has had crucial implications for the way in which numerous Kashmiris have come to see themselves. The image, long internalised, of Kashmiris as 'passive' 'cowards' has been forcefully challenged by gun-wielding militants. The tolerant, rich and vibrant Kashmiri Sufi tradition has come under great strain, as new forms of understanding Islam have emerged, stressing conflict, armed jihad and martyrdom. If Kashmir was one of the few parts of South Asia that were spared the frenzy of Hindu-Muslim violence in 1947, it owed, in large measure, to the deeply embedded Sufi traditions of the Kashmiris. Today, with traditional Sufism being under threat from competing understandings of Islam, and with unrelenting assaults on Muslims in India at the hands of Hindu chauvinist groups, Kashmir's indigenous religious resources of conflict-management and inter-community dialogue seem powerless to pose any major challenge to the politics of religious hatred. In the meanwhile, the toll of innocents, sacrificial victims at the altar of communal strife, continues to mount.
 The JKLF abandoned the path of military struggle in 1994, believing that the struggle for Kashmiri independence should be carried out using non-violent means.
 The Markaz9s website can be accessed on www.markazdawa.com. However, the contents of the site are constantly changed, and many articles quoted here have been removed, particularly after the incidents of 11 September, 2001.
 Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, Verso, London & New York, 2002, p.199.
 Shakeel Ahmad Meeruthi, foreword in Hafiz Salahuddin Yusuf, Tehrik-i-Jihad, Jama9at Ahl-i-Hadith Aur 8Ulama-i-Ahnaf, Dar-ul Kitab Islamiya, Delhi, 2000, p. 3. See also, Sanaullah Amritsari, Ahl-i Hadith Aur Islam, Dar-ul Kitab, New Delhi, n.d., p.8.
 Abu Naim, Bar-i Saghir Mai Agar Wahhabi Na Hotey, Ahl-i Hadith Academy, Maunath Bhanjan, 2002, p.21.
 Hafiz Salahuddin Yusuf, Tehrik-i-Jihad, Jama9at Ahl-i Hadith Aur 8Ulama-i Ahnaf, Dar ul-Kitab Islamia, Delhi, 2000, p. 54. For this purpose, some saw the need for co-operating with the Hindus to overthrow the British, and hence several Ahl-i Hadith 8ulama joined the Indian National Congress
( Sa9eed 8Abdul Bari, Azad Hindustan Mai Muslim Tanzimey: Ek Ja9iza, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi, 2001, pp.147-48).
 Abu Muhammad Shakil Ahmad Meeruthi, Akabir 8Ulama-i Ahnaf Ke Bhuley Bisrey Fatawe, Dar ul- Kitab Islamiya, Delhi, 2001, p.32).
 Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, p. 283.
 A Brief Introduction to the Markaz and the Lashkar, http://www.lashkertaiba.net/introduction/introduction.html. These four centres are the Mu8askra-i-Taiba, the Aqsa, the Umm al-Qurra and 8Abdullah bin Ma8sud.
 A fierce advocate of pan-Islamism, the Markaz/Lashkar seeks to unite Muslims all over the world into one solid bloc. It is said to be part of Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden9s 8International Front for Jihad Against the USA and Israel9 (Badamibagh And After, http://www.saag.org/notes/note46.html).
 I owe this point to Francis Robinson.
 Lashkar-i-Taiba: The New Masters of Kashmir, http://jammu-kashmir.com/insights/insight9808.html
 Jihad, http://www.homestead.com/kashmirstory/jihad2~main.html
 Names are also probably changed to conceal their actual identities. A radical uniformity is sought to be imposed by giving the recruits a common Arabic title of Abu (8father of), after which an Arabic name is added.
 Allah9s Army: Mujahideen-e-Lashkar-e-Taiba, http://members.xoom.com/_xmcm/markazdawa/lashkar.html
 Implementation of Shar9iah is a Cure-All, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazinevoiceofislam/feb00/democracyvsislam.html
 Speech of Hafiz 8Abdur Rahman Makki, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/mak.html
 Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Neither Despotism Nor Democracy in Islam, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazinevoiceofislam/nov99/editorial.html, p.2.
 Democratic System vs. Islamic Polity, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazinevoiceofislam/feb00/democracyvsislam.html
 Editorial, Voice of Islam, February, 2000, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazinevoiceofislam/feb00/editorial.html, p.2.
 Jihad in the Present Times [part 1], http://www.dawacenter.com/jihad/jihad001.html, p.2.
 Jihad: The Foreign Policy of the Islamic State, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/sept99/jihad.html, p.1. .
 Jihad: The Foreign Policy of the Islamic State, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/sept99/jihad.html, p.2.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed, Jihad is the Only Solution, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/feb00/seminar.html
 B.Raman, Osama Bin Laden: An Up-Date, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper25.html, p.3.
 Radio al-Jihad, http://www.marazdawa.org/RADIO/news.HTM.
 What Jihad Means in Islam, http://members.xoom.com/_XMCM/markazdawa/jehad.htm, p.2.
 Jihad in the Present Times [part iii], op.cit., p. 3, dawacenter.com/jihad/jihad003.html.
 Jihad in the Present Times, [part iii], op.cit., p.3.
 Jihad in the Present Times, part [ii], op.cit., p.5.
 Jihad in the Present Times, [p.iii], op.cit., p.7.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa9eed, Khutbah Jumu8ah, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/khutbah-e.html, p.1.
 Jihad is the Only Solution, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/feb00/seminar.html
 Speech by Qari 8Abdul Wahid Kashmiri, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/kashmiri-e.html
 Speech by Abu Sa8ad Shabbir Ahmad, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/shabbir-e.html
 Editorial, Voice of Islam, February, 2000, p.2, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/feb00/editorial.html
 http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/Isalaf-e.html, p.1.
 Kashmir: The Forgotten Jihad, http:www.dawacenter.com/kashmir/kashmir.html, p.1.
 Radio al-Jihad, http://www.marazdawa.org/RADIO/news.HTM
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed, No More Dialogue on Kashmir, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazines/voiceofislam/sept99/editorial.html
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa'eed9s address to the Takmil-i Pakistan Conference, http://www.markazdawa.org, p.1.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed, Khutbah Jumu8ah, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/khutbah-e.html., p.1.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa8eed, Khutbah Jumu8ah, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/khutbah-e.html., p.1.
 Speech by Muhammad Ibrahim Salafi, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/Isalafi-e.html.
 Speech by Muhammad Ibrahim Salafi, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/Isalafi-e.html
 Mushtaq Ahmad Wani, Muslim Religious Trends in Kashmir in Modern Times, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1997, pp.35-36.
 Ibid., pp.36-37.
 Ahl-i-Hadith followers generally worship in separate mosques all over South Asia, many of them refusing to pray behind Imams belonging to other Muslim groups. Their practice of amin bi9l jahr (announcing amen aloud) and rafa-i yada9in (lifting the hands till the ears before genuflecting in prayer) clearly distinguish them from the Hanafis. On numerous occasions, Ahl-i Hadith followers have been forcibly expelled from Hanafi mosques.
 Ibid., 1941.
 Bashir Ahmad Khan, 'The Ahl-i Hadith: A Socio-Religious Reform Movement in Kashmir', The Muslim World, vol.90, nos. 1 & 2, Spring 2000, p.133.
 Ibid., pp.138-151.
 Wani, op.cit., p.41.
 Wani, op.cit., p.41.
 Islamism, understood here as a political ideology committed to the setting up of an Islamic state, inspired by a vision of Islam as an all-embracing ideology.
 For details, see Ashiq Kashmiri, Tarikh-i-Tahrik-i-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir: Aghaz-i-Islam Se 1947 Tak, Department of Publications and Publicity, Jama8at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, n.d., and by the same author, Tarikh-i-Tehrik-i-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir:1947 Se 1970 Tak, Department of Publications and Publicity, Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, 1984.
 Several leading early Jama9at activists hailed from Sufi families known for their piety and scholarship. Senior Jama'at leader, Qari Saifuddin, translated and published the works of the leading Kashmiri Rishi, Hazrat Nuruddin Nurani, presenting him as an orthodox Muslim, in contrast to the image of him as having been an unorthodox Sufi and a proponent of syncretism.
 Allah9s Army&, op.cit..
 Are the Talibans Coming?, http://www.kashmir.force9.co.uk/editorials.htm
 B.Raman, Kashmir: After Ten years of Militancy, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper44.html.
 Bhim Singh, Sulagta Kashmir, Voice of Millions, New Delhi, 1996, p.128
 Lashkar-I-Taiba: The New Masters of Kashmir, op.cit..
 These groups all share a common commitment to an Islamist vision. Some of these groups are clearly sponsored by the Pakistanis, who, it seems, feel that the existence of multiple groups would make them more dependent on Pakistan. A united movement, it would appear, might pose serious challenges to Pakistani control and manipulation.
 Kashmiri Militants Fighting Indian Advance, http://www.ummah.org.uk/kashmir/news/advance.htm
 Kargil: The Graveyard of Indian Troops, http://www.dawacenter.com/archives/tour.html
 Militants Say Over 200 Afghans Deployed In Kashmir, http://www.rawa.org/kashmir.html
 Kashmir Militants Start 8Round Two9 Of Struggle, http://www.asia2000.org.nz/news/NL1392432000.html
 Kargil:The Graveyard of Indian Troops, op.cit..
 Ijitma Coverage By Indian Newspapers, http://www.dawacenter.com/ijtimah/indiannewspapers.html.
 8There is no negotiated settlement in Islam9, a Markaz statement insists, adding that, 8there should be no deal with the disbelivers [as] [t]here is no way the disbelievers will allow Islam to prevail (Kashmir, the Forgotten Jihad, http://www.dawacenter.com/kashmir/kashmir.html, p.1.
 Jihad in the Present Times [part v], http://www.dawacenter.com/jihad/jihad005.html, p.3.
 A term used to refer to the followers of the eighteenth century Arab Muhammad ibn 8Abdul Wahhab, who vehemently opposed Sufism, branding it as 8un-Islamic9.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa9eed, Hizbul Mujahideen Should Not be Deceived by India9s False Promises, http://www.markazdawa.org/ENGLISH&_VISLAM/August2000/editorial.htm, p.2.
 Hafiz Muhammad Sa9eed, No More Dialogue on Kashmir, http://www.dawacenter.com/magazine/voiceofislam/sept99/editorial.html, p.2.
 Eqbal Ahmad, Jihad International Incorporated, http://www.sangat.org/review/islam/jihad.html, p.4.
 Saeed Ahmed Minhas, Sectarianism and Deeni Madaris in Pakistan, http://www.sangat.org/review/Islam/minhas.html, p.1.
 http://www.markazdawa.org/English/newsandmedia/news/english/INDEX.HTM, p.1.
 http://markazdawa.org/English/newsand media/jtimes/200220_4/014.htm.
 8Lashkar-i-Taiba Chief Urges Muslim Ummah to Rise, Stand Shoulder to Shoulder with the Afghans9. Jihad Times, 26 October, 2001 [http://markazdawa.org].
 Mufti Abdur Rahman, 8The Decree in Support of Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan9, http://markazdawa.org/English/magazines/VOICE/200220/page2.htm.
 Sati Sahni, Kashmir Underground, Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1999, p.132 .
Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (Soldiers of the Pure) is one of the most feared groups fighting against Indian control in Kashmir.
Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf banned Lashkar-e-Toiba, along with four other Islamic groups, in January 2002 amid pressure that followed the 11 September attacks in the US.
Until then Lashkar, with its reputation for being purely focused on fighting India in Kashmir, was able to operate openly inside Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting members.
Almost every shop in the main bazaar of every town, large or small, in Pakistan had a Lashkar collection box to raise funds for the struggle in Kashmir.
Laskhar had no involvement in sectarian attacks in Pakistan and its leaders were often critical of other militant groups operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan who also took part in the sectarian Sunni-Shia bloodshed within Pakistan.
Problems arose, however, when some breakaway Lashkar members began to disagree with President Musharraf's strategy post 9/11 and were blamed for anti-government attacks in Pakistan.
In the months after 9/11, breakaway factions of militant groups started to come together under a loose anti-US banner.
The United Jihad Council at first chose to ignore Lashkar
This meant that Lashkar members came into contact with the sectarian groups.
After the ban, the government did not try to break up Lashkar but it restricted the movements of its leaders and the group's members were told to keep a low profile.
By mid-2002 it had renamed itself Jama'at ud Dawa (Party of the Calling).
It said it would continue its activities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India believes the group is now more factionalised.
Lashkar has been blamed for bomb attacks last October in the Indian capital Delhi that killed more than 60 people.
It has not admitted carrying out those attacks. But it does claim responsibility for attacking an army barracks at the Red Fort in Delhi in 2000.
Three people died in the December 2000 attack at the 17th Century fort, one of the capital's most famous landmarks.
The massive earthquake in the region in October 2005 has also affected its fortunes.
Since then, the group has again been allowed to openly collect funds in Pakistan, officially for reconstruction work. Many of their offices have reopened and its members have played a prominent role in rebuilding work.
Lashkar rose to prominence nearly 10 years ago and has often been blamed by the Indian authorities for carrying out armed attacks, not only in Kashmir, but also elsewhere in India.
Police accused it of carrying out deadly explosions in the city of Mumbai (Bombay) in August 2003 that killed 55 people and injured 180.
India also says it was involved in the most audacious attack on Indian soil - the armed raid on India's parliament in December 2001 that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of all-out war.
Until its ban in 2002, Lashkar had never been shy of accepting responsibility for most of the armed attacks against Indian military targets.
However, it always denied killing civilians, maintaining that it was against the organisation's religious belief.
And it strongly rejected the Indian claim of its involvement in the attack on the parliament in Delhi.
The BBC's Zaffar Abbas in Islamabad says Lashkar-e-Toiba was formed soon after the birth of its parent religious organisation, Markaz Dawa ul Irshad in the late 1980s.
Police detain two Lashkar-e-Toiba suspects in Delhi
The Markaz (Centre for Preaching) was set up in the town of Muridke outside Lahore by a former professor of engineering at the University of Punjab, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed.
Spread over several hectares, the Markaz soon became known for preaching hardline views on Islam.
Some of its annual congregations attracted as many as 100,000 people, during which calls were made for jihad or holy war.
By 1994 Lashkar-e-Toiba had emerged as the militant wing of the organisation.
Unlike most other Kashmir militant groups, a majority of its members were non-Kashmiri, and its headquarters were also based in Pakistan.
Lashkar generally shunned the alliance of the Kashmiri militant groups known as Muttehadda Jihad Council or the United Jihad Council, preferring to act alone.
Initially it was ignored by most other groups, but earned their respect once it introduced the concept of "Fedayaeen fighters" to carry out daring attacks against the Indian troops.
Lashkar-e-Toiba (many variations, e.g.: Lashkar-e-Taiba)
Operational 1991 - Present
Led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
Objectives Destroy India and Israel; Annihilate Hinduism and Judaism; Independence of Jammu and Kashmir from India, pan-South Asian Islamic influence; anti-Western, anti-Russian[, anti-Chinese, antisemitic
Active region(s) India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
Ideology Islamic fundamentalism
Major actions Suicide attacks, massacre of civilians, attacks on security forces
Notable attacks Jammu & Kashmir attacks; November 2008 Mumbai attacks (attributed to LeT members)
Status Designated U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organization by U.S. (26 Dec 2001); Banned in U.K. (2001); Banned in Pakistan (2002); Related Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JUD) party banned by U.S. (2006)
Some western news articles are using the spelling Lashkar Taiba.
Lashkar-e-Taiba ; literally Army of the Good, commonly translated as Army of the Righteous; also transliterated as Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Taiba, or LeT) is one of the largest and most active terrorist organizations in South Asia.
It was founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, and is currently based near Lahore, Pakistan operating several militant training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Taiba members have carried out major attacks against India and its primary objective is to end Indian rule in Kashmir Some breakaway Lashkar members have also been accused of carrying out attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Karachi, to mark its opposition to the policies of President Pervez Musharraf The organization is banned as a terrorist organization by India, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Russia and Australia. According to some sources, Laskar-e-Taiba renamed itself to Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JUD) in January 2002 to escape the ban imposed by the Pakistani government
The Lashkar-e-Taiba was from the outset a U.S. enterprise and was supported in the 1980s by the CIA and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) service. The United States government in essence created the Lashkar-e-Toiba guerilla training camp near Kunnad, Afghanistan and in 1987 created the Lashkar-e-Toiba's sprawling base camp on 80 hectares in Muridke near Lahore, Pakistan. The Kunnad camp had been a forward base to train Afghan mujahadin terrorist groups engaged in the American war against the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul, Afghanistan. The construction of the sprawling complex was one of the first major CIA-backed moves to create a base for operations against the government of Afghanistan.
Formed in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, the Lashkar-e-Toiba is the military wing of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an Islamic fundamentalist organisation of the Ahle-Hadith sect in Pakistan. The MDI is based in Muridke near Lahore, Pakistan and is headed by Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who is also the amir of Lashkar-e-Toiba. He now heads an Islamic charity, Jamaat ud Dawa, which is suspected of financing operations for Lashkar-e-Toiba. Its first presence in Jammu and Kashmir was recorded in 1993 when 12 Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) in tandem with the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz, another Islamic military organization then active in the Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir.
Following the U.S. classification of the outfit as a foreign "terrorist" organization, which put pressure on the Pakistani government to curb overt activities of the organization, the top leadership of MDI initiated a reshuffle of the parent outfit. Presently, the MDI claims that it has been reorganized into two independent wings, one exclusively devoted to preaching of Islam with Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed as its chief, the other to carry on its violent campaign in Kashmir under the leadership of Kashmiri scholar Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri.
Unlike other militant groups in Pakistan, it was not responsible for the sectarian violence in Pakistan until it was officially banned by the Government of Pakistan. Though the group was banned in 2002 by the Pakistani government, clandestine support by army and intelligence officers is often mentioned in media reports. The Pakistan government categorically denies providing any support to LeT. The party JUD is legal in Pakistan, although it was banned by the United States in April 2006. The head was arrested by Pakistan, possibly under pressure from the United States.
The declaration of LeT as a terrorist organization by the United States Secretary of State in 2003 preserves the U.S. Government’s ability to take action against them in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, making it illegal for persons in the United States or areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction to provide material support to this terrorist group. It requires U.S. financial institutions to block assets held by them; and it enables them to deny visas to representatives of this group. But as with various other militant organizations they continue their operations, accounts and various other activities through other sister organizations that have not come under the U.S. and Pakistan scanners.
The LeT's professed ideology goes beyond merely challenging India's sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Lashkar's agenda, as outlined in a pamphlet titled "Why are we waging jihad", includes the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of South Asia, Russia and even China. Further, the outfit is based on a sort of Islamist fundamentalism preached by its mentor, the JuD. It seeks to bring about a union of all Muslim majority regions in countries that surround Pakistan. In its history the organisation has shown scant respect for human life and has carried out terrorist activities of great brutality. Many of its objectives are inspired by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. With the American presence and military pressure in Afghanistan, the ISI lost its protege organisation- The Taliban's strategic utility. Organisations like the LeT have been used to absorb the resilient remnants of The Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives in the region.
The outfit had claimed that it had assisted the Taliban militia and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan during November and December 2002 in their fight against the US-aided Northern Alliance.
Leadership and command structure
The outfit's headquarters was located in the MDI’s complex at Muridke near Lahore until late 2001 when they had to shift its headquarters from Muridke to Muzaffarabad; this was undertaken mainly for political reasons (including detachment from Jama'at-ud-Da'wah and pressure from the Pakistan government)for a free Kashmir state, although the MDI has claimed that the LeT has shifted all its facilities and offices because the outfit needed more space and since it formed a new General Council.
The new Council comprises Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri (the Supreme Leader), with Zaki ur Rehman Lakhwi as the 'Supreme Commander' within Jammu & Kashmir. Other members of the General Council are - Abdullah of Anantnag (Islamabad) - Haji Mohammad Azam of Poonch - Muzammil Butt of Doda - Mohammad Umair of Baramullah - Chaudhri Abdullah Khalid Chauhan of Bagh - Rafiq Akhtar of Muzaffarabad - Aftab Hussain of Kotli - Faisal Dar of Srinagar - Chaudhri Yusuf of Mirpur - Maulana Mohammad Sharif Balghari of Baltistan -
Until these new organisational changes, the organisational level of the Lashkar-e-Taiba was led by its Amir, Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and the operational chief of the outfit was reported to be 'commander' Saifullah. Organisation's field structure in Jammu & Kashmir is organised at district levels with 'district commanders' in charge. Within Pakistan, the outfit has a network of training camps and branch offices, which undertake recruitment and fundraising.
While the organisation receives increasing inspiration from Al-Qaeda, it also has close links with rogue elements in the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. This owes its roots in the policy of successive Pakistani elements using terrorism, particularly against India, with strategic flexibility.
Until 2002 the group collected funds through public fundraising events, usually using charity boxes in shops and mosques. With development of humanitarian work of Jama'at-ud-Da'wah, it has expanded its humanitarian efforts. In fact aid for the Oct. 8th earthquake from most Indian organizations was entrusted to Jama'at-ud-Da'wah. They were the first on the scene of Margalla Towers in F-10, Islamabad - before the government, the army or civilians.
A large amount of funds collected for charities within Europe, mostly by misleading Pakistani-Muslim community in Britain are funneled for the activities of Lashkar-e-Taiba. There have been countless investigations indicating the aid given for earthquake victims was directly involved to expand Lashkar-e-Taiba's activities within India. Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives have been apprehended in India, where they have been obtaining funds from sections of the Muslim Community.
The outfit also collects donations from the Pakistani immigrant community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen.They do to hide their terrorist activities under the guise of charity.
The group actively carries out attacks on Indian Armed Forces in Kashmir and Jammu and still operates in the jungles in Pakistan. It is considered a well-trained terrorist group.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba group has repeatedly claimed through its journals and websites that its main aim is to destroy the Indian republic and to annihilate Hinduism and Judaism. LeT has declared Hindus and Jews to be the "enemies of Islam", as well as India and Israel to be the "enemies of Pakistan".
Apart from conducting terrorism, it is also known to conduct training camps and humanitarian work with regards to the earthquake. These camps have long been tolerated by the Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency because of their usefulness against India and in Afghanistan, though they have been told not to mount any operations for now. Lashkar-e-Taiba had links to Jama'at-ud-Da'wah, however Jama'at-ud-Da'wah publicly retracted any association with them after the United States Department of State declared Lashkar-e-Taiba to be a terrorist organisation.
Several American Muslims, including members of the so-called "Virginia Jihad Network," were convicted of training at LeT camps in Kashmir and Pakistan.
Designation as terrorist group
On February 28, 2001, in Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 1261, British Home Secretary Jack Straw designed the group a Proscribed Terrorist Organization under the Terrorism Act 2000.
On December 5, 2001, the group was added to the Terrorist Exclusion List. In a notification dated December 26, 2001, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, designated Lashkar-e-Taiba a Foreign Terrorist Organisation.
It is banned in India as a designated terrorist group under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
It was listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia under the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 on 11 April 2003 and was re-listed 11 April 2005 and 31 March 2007.
On 2 May it was placed on the Consolidated List established and maintained by the Committee established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 as an entity associated with al-Qaeda.
Lashkar-e-Taiba was banned in Pakistan in 2002.
Compared to other groups in J&K, the LeT has commanded significant attention primarily due to two reasons. First, for its well planned and executed attacks on security force (SF) targets in the State and second, for the dramatic massacres of non-Muslim civilians. After the Kargil War of May-July 1999, (when Pakistani troops and insurgents, including those of the Lashkar, were forced to withdraw from peaks on the Indian side of the Line of Control - LoC), the outfit launched its 'suicide attacks' strategy whereby small groups (2-5 members) of fidayeen (suicide squads) would storm a security force camp or base. In another frequently used strategy, groups of Lashkar insurgents, dressed in SF fatigues, would arrive at remote hill villages, round up Hindu or Sikh civilians, and massacre them. These two strategies have been designed to achieve maximum publicity and extract public allegiance, mainly out of fear. On December 8, 2001, two LeT fidayeen managed to penetrate inside a security force convoy and opened fire killing one personnel. They were able to generate adequate confusion to escape from the convoy after the attack but were later killed in an encounter with another SF unit.
In some fidayeen attacks launched by the LeT, the terrorists entrenched themselves inside the camp, killing as many SF personnel as they could, before they were themselves killed. In one such instance, two Lashkar fidayeen stormed an SF base at Wazir Bagh in Srinagar, on March 26, 2001, and shot dead four personnel before being killed. In certain incidents, members of the squad are reported to have successfully fled after the initial attack. Such was the case at Mendhar in Rajouri district, on December 16, 2000 as also at Mahore, Udhampur district, on November 5, 2000.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba, according to a news report of December 17, 2001, was responsible for 35 of the 42 such suicide attacks carried out since 1999. More than the number of casualties of the security forces, it is the psychological impact of these attacks that has led to the Lashkar gaining widespread attention.
LeT cadres, unlike other militants, are known to prefer death in an encounter with the security forces rather than be arrested. For instance, in 1997, the largest group of militants killed in clashes with the security forces belonged to the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Majority of the massacres of unarmed Hindus and Sikhs between March 1997 and October 2001 have reportedly been carried out by the LeT. One instance is the murder of 23 persons in Wandhama on January 23, 1988. A second instance is the June 19, 1998, massacre in which 25 members of a wedding party in Doda, Jammu were killed. The extreme level of brutality, which sets Lashkar-e-Taiba apart from other rebel outfits that operated in Kashmir before, is evident in the Wandhama massacre, where children as young as one year old were killed along with women and defenseless men.
Role in India-Pakistan relations
Pakistan denies giving orders to Lashkar-e-Taiba's activities. However, the Indian government and many non-governmental think-tanks allege that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence is involved with the group . The situation with LeT causes considerable strain in Indo-Pakistani relations, which are already mired in suspicion and mutual distrust.
Area of operation
While the primary area of operations of the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s militant activities is the Kashmir valley, the outfit is also active in the Jammu region besides having undertaken isolated attacks in other parts of India. The Lashkar is reported to have conducted several of its major operations in tandem with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The Kashmiri cadre of the HM provide vital knowledge of the ground conditions in the target zone, while the highly trained and motivated LeT insurgents undertake the attack.
The LeT was also reported to have been directed by the ISI to widen its network in the Jammu region where a considerable section of the populace comprised Punjabis. The LeT that has a large number of activists who hail from Pakistani Punjab can thus effectively penetrate into Jammu society.
News reports, citing security forces, said that the latter suspect that in the December 13, 2001 attack on India’s Parliament in New Delhi, a joint group from the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) were involved. The LeT was also held responsible by the government for the December 23, 2000 attack in Red Fort, New Delhi. LeT confirmed its participation in the Red Fort attack and its involvement in the Parliament attack.
LeT cadres have also been arrested from different cities of India. On May 27, a LeT militant was arrested from Hajipur in Gujarat. On August 15, 2001, a LeT militant was arrested from Bhatinda in Punjab. The LeT has also built contacts with other Islamist militant outfits active in India. An arrested activist of the proscribed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), is reported to have confessed during interrogation on August 21, 2001, that two LeT militant had held discussions with SIMI’s Malegaon unit in Mumbai on August 6, 2001 to carry out subversive activities in the State of Maharashtra.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba was created to participate in the Mujahideen conflict against the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan. In the process, the outfit developed deep linkages with Afghanistan and has several Afghan nationals in its cadre. The outfit had also cultivated links with the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan and also with Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. Even while refraining from openly displaying these links, the LeT office in Muridke was reportedly used as a transit camp for third country recruits heading for Afghanistan. A news report in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. has indicated that the outfit provides terrorists for the outer circle of bin Laden’s personal security.
The outfit collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. The LeT maintains ties to various religious/military groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya primarily through the MDI fraternal network.
Reports also indicate that the LeT receives considerable financial, material and other forms of assistance from the Pakistan government, routed primarily through the ISI. Pakistan’s security agencies are reported to be providing training to the outfit. A December 13, 2001 news report cited a LeT spokesperson as saying that the outfit wanted to avoid a clash with the Pakistani Government. He claimed, even though the government has been an ardent supporter of all Muslim freedom movements, particularly that of Kashmir, in the present conditions a clash was possible because of the sudden wedge that appeared between the interests of the government and those of terrorist outfits active in J&K.
According to the declaration of LeT operatives, the Pakistan Army, particularly in the borders with India (the International Border and the Line of Control - LoC) aids members of the outfit in their infiltration, extraction and clashes with Indian security forces near the borders by providing covering fire.
The Markaz campus at Muridke in Lahore, its headquarters, was used as a hide-out for Ramzi Yousef and Mir Aimal Kansi, who was convicted and sentenced to death for killing two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers outside the CIA’s headquarters in Washington in January 1993.
Role in Afghanistan
Guantanamo detainee Khalid Bin Abdullah Mishal Thamer Al Hameydani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal said that he had received training via Lashkar-e-Taiba.
The Combatant Status Review Tribunals of Taj Mohammed and Rafiq Bin Bashir Bin Jalud Al Hami, and the Administrative Review Board hearing of Abdullah Mujahid and Zia Ul Shah allege that they too were members or former members of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Also, the Lashkar is claimed to have operated a military camp in post-Sept 11 Afghanistan, and extending support to the ousted Taliban regime.
Recent focus on Lashkar-e-Taiba
In March 2000, Lashkar-e-Taiba militants are claimed to have been involved in the Chittisinghpura massacre, where 35 Sikhs in the town of Chittisinghpura in Kashmir were killed. An LeT militant who was arrested in December of the year admitted to the involvement of the group and had no regret in perpetrating the anti-Sikh massacre.
2005 London bombings: Links to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al-Qaeda involved.
2005 Delhi bombings: During Diwali, Lashkar-e-Taiba bombed crowded festive Delhi markets killing 60 civilians and maiming 527.
2006 Varanasi bombings: Lashkar-e-Taiba was involved in serial blasts in Hindu city in the state of Utter Pradesh. Thirty seven people died and 89 were seriously injured.
2006 Mumbai train bombings: The investigation launched by Indian forces and US officials have pointed to the involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai serial blasts on 11 July 2006. The Mumbai serial blasts on 11th July claimed 211 lives and maimed about 407 people and seriously injured another 768.
2006 blasts at Malegaon: The investigation, presently in its early stages, point to the Lashkar-e-Taiba as suspects. They have had connections with Malegaon's radical Islamist organisations. Alternate theories involving the Bajrang Dal as the perpetrators are also being considered, however, no evidence points to the involvement of Bajrang Dal, and the modus operandi of the attacks are more consistent with Islamist terror outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba.
On September 12, 2006 the propaganda arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba issued a fatwa against Pope Benedict XVI demanding that Muslims assassinate him for his controversial statements about Muhammad
On September 16, 2006, a top Lashkar-e-Taiba militant, Abu Saad, was killed by the troops of 9-Rashtriya Rifles in Nandi Marg forest in Kulgam. Saad belongs to Lahore in Pakistan and also oversaw LeT operations for the past three years in Gul Gulabhgash as the outfit's area commander. Apart from a large quantity of arms and ammunition, high denomination Indian and Pakistani currencies were also recovered from the slain militant.
On July 31, 2008, Webnewswire, a leading Indian newswire, released 'Undisputed proof that Lashker-e-Taiba is (or was) based in Pakistan.' It lists information available in public sources such as archive.org to prove that the organisation was based in Pakistan.
In November 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba has been suspected but has denied being a part of the Mumbai attacks]. According to reports, the lone terrorist captured by Indian authorities now admits the attacks were planned and executed by the terrorist organization. US intelligence sources have confirmed that there is mounting evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba is behind the attacks.
Mumbai locals helped us - terrorist
2006 Indian bomb outrage - seeking the culprits
Partition of India
The Coming War in Pakistan
If we had acted differently
Readers please email comments to: editorial AT martinfrost.ws including full name
|Note: martinfrost.ws contains copyrighted material, the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.|
|Return to home page