A common energy policy for Europe?
At the beginning of this year, it looked as though the European 'giant' was about to get a severe chill when the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine saw Moscow turn off the gas supply. Not since the oil crisis of 1973 had Europe been so compelled to face the harsh reality of its vulnerability in terms of its energy supplies. That made the headlines, but did not give rise to the green paper on energy presented by the European Commission this week, for the debate about the need for a common European energy policy is not new at all.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair put the issue back on the political agenda at last year's summit of European government leaders in Hampton Court. However, his passionate plea for a common European energy policy was nothing new, and it merely served as a way to mask the wide difference of opinion between London and the rest of Europe on various other issues. It was an easy way for Mr Blair to score, because no one doubts the need for a European approach to the problem of meeting its energy needs.
National not European
However, when it comes to the matter of implementing such a policy, the cacophony of divergent opinions is soon heard once again. Energy policy is, after all, still regarded primarily as a matter of national interest, with European interests coming second. This is why it's almost impossible to get all the European Union's member states to agree in this area, as energy expert Jacques de Jong of the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands acknowledges:
"As things stand now, Brussels will not be prescribing what happens. Each country decides for itself which energy sources are used. But what is important, of course, is that you take a joint look at what the effects will be of the decisions taken at national level, and whether these are the best choices when seen in a mutual context."
Even the European Commission, which was given the task of producing a new green paper on the issue by EU government leaders late last year, wasn't keen to get its fingers burned. The document contains numerous recommendations and suggestions which are far from new. The most daring proposal is probably the call for a linking of Europe's foreign and energy policies. Recent events in the relationship with Russia provide proof of how controversial and impossible to implement such a plan can be.
Different approaches
Countries such as Poland and Ukraine, through which most of the gas pipelines to Western Europe run, do not trust Moscow at all. They've been calling for a tough and self-confident stance towards Moscow, which is totally at odds with the soft and friendly approach taken, for example, by Berlin.
Germany's former chancellor Gerhard Schröder even closed a deal with Moscow for the construction of a highly expensive gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. In this way, Germany can assure itself of a reliable supply of gas from Moscow, without worrying about political arguments between Russia and, for example, Poland.
Moscow, too, was more than happy that it had been able to play off the various European parties and customers against each other. Looked at from a purely commercial point of view, this project is nonsensical since changes to the existing network that runs through Poland would be much cheaper. Nonetheless, Jacques de Jong is hopeful there will be a more common European approach to energy suppliers such as Russia, and says that doesn't mean we have to be nice all the time to President Putin:
"Mr Putin also realises that it is in his interests to safeguard the role as a reliable energy supplier. That's also in the interests of Russia's economy. So, Russia needs Europe, just as Europe needs Russia."
Mr de Jong believes that, as a key investor and supplier of technology, Europe can take a stand towards Russia. Europe would have preferred to see Russia's powerful gas giant Gazprom divided into three separate divisions, but now this hasn't happened, it could create one gigantic European 'customer' as a counterbalance. Looked at from this perspective, the possibility of a further wave of mergers and takeovers among European energy companies would be completely desirable.
Unrealistic
However, given the national blockades which the French and Spanish government have created to halt such developments, this wouldn't appear to be a realistic possibility as yet. Moreover, there's a second objection to the common European energy market which Brussels favours. The existence of highly powerful European market players would require a strong European authority to safeguard consumer interests against monopolies and other undesirable developments, and such a powerful authority hardly exists at all at the moment, certainly not in the field of energy.
The new EC green paper makes no mention at all of this issue, namely the need for a balance between the power of the free market and a strong European administration that not only protects consumer interests but also determines - foreign and energy - policy. The EU member states are not prepared to surrender their powers in these areas. In addition, each country may decide for itself whether it is to opt for new nuclear power plants, new natural gas pipelines or, for example, to build terminals for supplies of liquid natural gas (LNG) brought in by tankers from the Caribbean.
As long as significant national interests play a role, it's unlikely that even the most logical of financial or strategic choices will ever be made. With it's relatively visionless green paper, the EC appears to be skirting around the heart of the problem, and the Brussels' compromise continues with the now familiar calls for more environmentally friendly bio-fuels, new pipelines to supplies in central Asia and north Africa, LNG terminals and strategic reserves of gas to deal with possible crisis situations.