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Aluminium tubesAluminum tubes were cited as evidence by the White House that Iraq was actively pursuing an atomic weapon. Overview New York Times Internal intelligence evaluations Central Intelligence Agency Department of Energy October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate French intelligence assessments President Bush's State of the Union address Colin Powell at UN Summer 2003 concerns Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence Tube specifications Department of Energy Continuing controversy Timeline See also Overview In 2001 Iraq ordered 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes manufactured from 7075-T4 aluminum with an outer diameter of 81 mm, and an inner diameter of 74.4 mm, a wall thickness of 3.3 mm and a length of 900 mm. In 2002 the White House stated the tubes were part of a clandestine program to make enriched uranium for nuclear bombs as part of a gas centrifuge. The tubes were manufactured in China and were intercepted by the US in Jordan. Condoleezza Rice, said on CNN Late Edition on September 8, 2002 that the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs" and "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." The dissenting view was that the tubes were intended as launch tubes for rockets or for similar conventional weaponry. All experts agreed that the tubes could be used for uranium enrichment using a gas centrifuge. New York Times On September 8, 2002, Michael R. Gordon and Judith Miller published a story in the New York Times titled "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts", which put forward the government's position. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which American officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium. American officials said several efforts to arrange the shipment of the aluminum tubes were blocked or intercepted but declined to say, citing the sensitivity of the intelligence, where they came from or how they were stopped. The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq's nuclear program, officials said, and that the latest attempt to ship the material had taken place in recent months. The attempted purchases are not the only signs of a renewed Iraqi interest in acquiring nuclear arms. President Hussein has met repeatedly in recent months with Iraq's top nuclear scientists and, according to American intelligence, praised their efforts as part of his campaign against the West. The story was later criticized by the New York Times ombudsman for not being credulous enough, or seeking out dissenting opinions. After the article was published, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld appeared on television and quoted the story as vindication of their positions. Central Intelligence Agency In 2002, in the runup to the Invasion of Iraq, the CIA reported to Congress that some analysts believed that the aluminum tubes might have multiple uses, including use as a rocket bodies, and that all intelligence experts agreed that Iraq remained intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and that these tubes, if modified, could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. There was disagreement about whether the centrifuge was their intended use. Department of Energy On September 20, 2002, The United Press International reported that the there were: ... doubts about the quality of some of the evidence that the United States is using to make its case that Iraq is trying to build a nuclear bomb emerged Thursday. While National Security Adviser Condi Rice stated on September 8 that imported aluminum tubes 'are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs' a growing number of experts say that the administration has not presented convincing evidence that the tubes were intended for use in uranium enrichment rather than for artillery rocket tubes or other uses. Former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright said he found significant disagreement among scientists within the Department of Energy and other agencies about the certainty of the evidence. October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate In early October 2002, President Bush was given a one-page summary report of a National Intelligence Estimate on the issue of whether Saddam's procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes was for the purpose of developing a nuclear weapon (the NIE was declassified on July 18, 2003 and presented at a White House background briefing on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.). The report stated that the Department of Energy and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were "intended for conventional weapons," while other intelligence agencies, including some at the CIA, believed that the tubes were intended for nuclear enrichment. All the analysts believed that the tubes could be modified for use in a centrifuge. French intelligence assessments In a speech before the New American Foundation American Stratergy Program Policy Forum on October 19, 2005, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson (Ret.), a former Chief of Staff for the State Department from 2002-2005, stated that French intelligence had conducted its own tests on intercepted aluminum tubes headed to Iraq. According to Wilkerson, "The French came in in the middle of my deliberations at the CIA and said, we have just spun aluminum tubes, and by god, we did it to this RPM, et cetera, et cetera, and it was all, you know, proof positive that the aluminum tubes were not for mortar casings or artillery casings, they were for centrifuges. Otherwise, why would you have such exquisite instruments?" Wilkerson then said, of this assessment, "We were wrong. We were wrong." A June 4, 2003 article in the Financial Times reported that "French intelligence had seized a separate shipment of tubes to the US, and tested their tolerance by spinning them to 98,000 revolutions per minute, concluding they were too sophisticated to have alternative uses." The Times also reported that Secretary of State Colin Powell was denied permission by French political authorities from using this information in his February 5, 2003 speech before the U.N. Security Council. President Bush's State of the Union address In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, Bush stated: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." Colin Powell at UN On February 5, 2003; Colin Powell spoke to the United Nations Security Council: Since 1998, [Saddam's] efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component, sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher. Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old Army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things: First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so. Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? Summer 2003 concerns In the summer of 2003, an informal review of classified government records by Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley concluded that Bush had been directly and repeatedly apprised of the deep rift within the intelligence community over whether Iraq wanted the high-strength aluminum tubes for a nuclear weapons program or for conventional weapons. According to the March 30, 2006 National Journal article that reported on this review, Hadley was most concerned about the October 2002 one-page summary of a National Intelligence Estimate prepared specifically for President Bush (see section above). The review by Hadley was to be part of a damage-control effort launched after former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV alleged that Bush's claims regarding uranium purchases were not true. After the review was completed, Karl Rove, President Bush's chief political adviser, allegedly cautioned other White House aides that Bush's 2004 re-election prospects would be severely damaged if it was publicly disclosed that he had been personally warned that a key rationale for going to war had been challenged within the administration. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence The report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq discussed the controversy. Part III, Intelligence Community Analysis of Iraq's Nuclear Program, states: Tube specifications In 2001, the [US intelligence community] became aware that Iraq was attempting to procure 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes manufactured from 7075-T4 aluminum, with an outer diameter of 81 mm,and inner diameter of 74.4 mm, a wall thickness of 3.3 mm and a length of 900 mm. The tubes were to be anodized using chromic acid and were to be shipped, wrapped in wax paper and separated from each other. Seven-thousand series aluminum alloy is extremely hard and strong and when formed into a tube of more than 75 mm in diameter, is a controlled item under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Annex I11 of UNSCR 687 and 707 which Iraq is prohibited from importing because it could have nuclear applications. [page 5] Department of Energy Based on the reported specifications, the tubes could be used to manufacture gas centrifuge rotor cylinders for uranium enrichment. However, our analysis indicates that the specified tube diameter, which is half that of the centrifuge machine Iraq successfully tested in 1990, is only marginally large enough for practical centrifuge applications, and other specifications are not consistent with a gas centrifuge end use. Moreover, the quantity being sought suggests preparations for large-scale production of centrifuge machines, for which we have not seen related procurement efforts - and the tubes’ specifications suggest a centrifuge design quite different from any Iraq is known to have. Thus, we assess that this procurement activity more likely supports a different application. ... While the gas centrifuge application cannot be ruled out, we assess that the procurement activity more likely supports a different application, such as conventional ordnance production. For example, the tube specifications and quantity appear to be generally consistent with their use as launch tubes for man-held anti-armor rockets or as tactical rocket casings. Also, the manner in which the procurement is being handled (multiple procurement agents, quotes obtained from multiple suppliers in diverse locations, and price haggling) seems to better match our expectations for a conventional Iraqi military buy than a major purchase for a clandestine weapons-of-mass destruction program. However, we have not identified an Iraq-specific, military, or other noncentrifuge application that precisely matches the tube specifications. [page 6] Continuing controversy The report has raised questions as to whether the Bush Administration was aware of dissenting opinions by different agencies with regards to the purpose for the aluminum tubes. In the report, the following statement is made: Conclusion 42. The Director of Central Intelligence was not aware of the views of all intelligence agencies on the aluminum tubes prior to September 2002 and, as a result, could only have passed the Central Intelligence Agency's view along to the President until that time. As was revealed in the review, the CIA's view was that "the tubes were probably intended for an Iraqi uranium enrichment centrifuge program" and that they "have little use other than for a uranium enrichment program." Prior to the invasion, the CIA report to congress clearly said that the tubes may have uses other than for a centrifuge. Timeline 2001 Seizure of tubes in Jordan 2002 CIA reports to Congress that Aluminum tubes may be used for convential or nuclear weapons programs July 2002 New York Times published "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts" on September 8th 2002 Condoleezza Rice appears on CNN and quotes New York Times on September 8th 2002 Department of Energy report refutes use for centrifuge on September 20th 2003 Colin Powell appears before the UN Security Council on February 5th See also David Kelly Hutton Inquiry Operation Rockingham Butler Review September Dossier Yellowcake forgery Bush-Blair memo Iraq document leak 18 June 2005 Dodgy Dossier Yellowcake Forgery |
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