Mumbai locals helped us, terrorist tells cops
S Ahmed Ali 30 Nov 2008
Did some Mumbai locals provide support to the Pakistani terrorists? Azam Amir Kasab, the only Pakistani terrorist nabbed alive, has revealed names and addresses of at least five people from the city who helped the terror operation.
Sources said that help like, providing shelter, taking them around and showing places, passing information on police stations and nakabandhis were given by these locals. Joint commissioner of police (crime) Rakesh Maria said,"We suspect there could be local assistants but it is subject to verification. It will be very premature to comment on this at this stage as our investigations is going on.''
Kasab has told police that they were sent with a specific mission of targeting Israelis to avenge atrocities on Palestinians. This was why they targetted Nariman House, a complex meant for Israelis. Sources said Kasab's colleagues killed in the operation had stayed in Nariman House earlier.
"They have stayed in Nariman house on rental basis identifying themselves as Malaysian students.'' said a source. Police are trying to find out how Nariman House rooms were given to non-Jews. Police has taken all the records books of for verification. The second target was the CST railway station because casualties would be high.
Crime branch has also recovered several fake identity and credit cards from the belongings of dead terrorists. "All the cards are in different names and of different banks. Now we are at least trying to figure out how they procured credit cards from various banks.'' said Maria. The recovery of so many cards with different names have led Mumbai police to suspect the involvement of ISI.
Though Maria maintained only 10 terrorists had sneaked in, the two blasts in taxis in Wadi Bunder and Vile Parle have led the police to believe there could be possibility of the presence of another two or more terrorists in the city.
Pointed
intelligence warnings preceded attacks
Praveen Swami 29 Nov 2008
Weaknesses in police infrastructure facilitated the attack, government sources say
India’s intelligence services had delivered at least three precise warnings that a major terrorist attack on Mumbai was imminent, highly-placed government sources have told The Hindu.
However, weaknesses in police manpower and training allowed the attacks to proceed, the sources said.
On November 18, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) intercepted a satellite phone conversation, in which a so-far unidentified caller notified his handlers that he was heading for Mumbai along with a certain cargo.
RAW analysts, however, rapidly determined that the apparently innocuous call was made to a Lahore phone number known to be used by the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s main military commander for operations targeting India, who is known only by the code-names ‘Muzammil’ and ‘Abu Hurrera.’
Mumbai Police investigators have determined that the call was made from a satellite phone that was eventually found abandoned on the Porbandar-based fishing boat Kuber, hijacked by the terrorists mid-ocean, most likely on November 19. The satellite phone also contains records of several other calls to Lashkar handlers in Pakistan.
Government sources said the RAW warning sparked a full-scale hunt for the merchant ship on which the terrorists had sailed from Karachi. The hunt was led by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. India’s coastal defence forces used global positioning system coordinates from the intercepted call to locate the general area in which the ship was located.
Based on the testimony of arrested Lashkar terrorist Ajmal Amir Kamal, investigators believe the terrorists hijacked the Kuber in order to avoid detection after they saw Indian patrols closing in on the area. Kamal, the sources said, has told investigators that some of the terrorists tied red ceremonial threads on their wrists to appear like Indian fishermen.
Earlier, in late September, Intelligence Bureau informants had issued alerts warning that a Lashkar unit was preparing to target the Taj Mahal Hotel. According to the sources, the warning, that was built on the testimony of arrested Mumbai-based terrorist Fahim Ansari, who told investigators in March that he had carried out reconnaissance operations at the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Gateway of India area and the Oberoi Hotels in preparation for an attack.
RAW, too, issued warnings that the Lashkar was contemplating hitting one or more hotels in Mumbai’s northern suburbs, including the Leela Kempinski.
Police sources said these intelligence warnings had led them to deploy personnel near major hotels in Mumbai, and hold meetings with hotel security heads. Parking instructions were introduced at the Oberoi Hotel, and circulars were issued to local businesses asking them to observe special security precautions. However, the restrictions were lifted a week before the attacks, after businesses and residents complained of inconvenience.
“We also removed the additional security,” a police source said, “because our manpower was stretched to the limit and the personnel we had did not, in any case, have the specially-trained personnel needed to avert a suicide-squad attack.”
New disclosures
Meanwhile, Mumbai Police sources said, the continuing interrogation of arrested Lashkar terrorist Ajmal Amir Kamal had allowed them to put together a coherent account of the mechanics of the assault.
Kamal has claimed that the Lashkar assault team, which trained in boat-handling tactics at the Mangla Dam reservoir on the border between Pakistan’s Punjab province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, was trained to locate their targets on a high-resolution satellite map. If Kamal’s account proves to be correct, it would suggest there was no local support team in place to guide the attack — a decision that may have been made in order to ensure secrecy. A Lashkar team that landed near Mumbai last year was betrayed to Indian intelligence by its supporters in India.
The police sources said media claims that elements of the Lashkar team had checked into the Taj Mahal Hotel prior to the attack appeared unfounded, as did assertions that two of the terrorists were British nationals.
According to Kamal, the men travelled to a launching position on the Sindh coast, near Karachi, in groups of two. Each of the operatives had strict instructions to avoid personal discussions, and knew each other only by Arabic code-names.
Two suspects initially held on suspicion of guiding the fidayeen were found to be not involved and were released, the police sources said.
Decoding
Mumbai
Steve Coll November 28, 2008
Steve Coll November 28, 2008
The terror attacks in Mumbai are a mystery somewhat lacking in mystery. As I write this, the confirmed death toll is above one hundred and fifty, including two Americans. The particulars of the attacking group are unknown; the political-military equation from which the group has almost certainly arisen is not.
The tactics employed by the attackers will be instantly recognizable to Indian investigators because they bear the signature of the more sophisticated groups operating in and from Kashmir, particularly the banned terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and its various splinters, allies, and ideological affiliates. In recent years, these Islamist networks have repeatedly engaged in what participants often refer to as “fedayeen” attacks against Indian government targets.
These attacks are suicidal, in the sense that the boys recruited to carry them out undertake reckless, gun-spraying penetrations of a type that make it very unlikely that they will emerge alive. Also, the assaults usually don’t involve getaway plans or tactical exit strategies other than martyrdom. At the same time, these are not “suicide attacks” in the sense that the attackers don’t wire themselves up as human bombs. The guerrillas will penetrate a police station, government compound, or, as it seems in this case, softer targets such as hotels and a synagogue, fight for as long as they can and finally accept their fates at the hands of opposing security forces.
India, with at least some degree of international cooperation, will now undertake an investigation to try to identify the support networks the Mumbai attackers employed, with a particular eye on signs of direct state sponsorship in Pakistan. If past investigations into such groups prove to be any guide, it may be difficult to find clear-cut evidence of direct involvement by Pakistani intelligence or army personnel. This is because Pakistan, knowing the stakes of getting caught red-handed, has increasingly pursued its clandestine proxy war against India in Kashmir and on the Indian mainland through layers and layers of self-managing and non-state groups. The Pakistani government and its domestic Islamist proxies, including nominally peaceful charities based in Pakistan but with operations in Kashmir, almost certainly pass through money and weapons on a large scale. They do so, however, in such a way that is very difficult to trace these supplies back to the government.
Pakistani strategy in this clandestine war has recently emphasized attempts to “indigenize” the Islamist militants operating in India. To some extent this has involved dialing back direct military, tactical supervision of Kashmiri fighters; instead, the fighters are equipped and trained to operate on their own, and even to choose their own targets. This strategy has also involved attempts to recruit from India’s large non-Kashmiri Muslim population, a small minority of which has been radicalized by the country’s longstanding religious conflict between Muslims and a Hindu majority that has produced its own fringe, radical Hindu vigilantes.
In 2006, I wrote in The New Yorker about a similar attack carried out by Kashmir-linked militants in December 2001 against India’s parliament, and about the India-Pakistan war scare that followed. I did a lot of reporting for that story about the forensic evidence trail surrounding that particular attacking group and I interviewed well-placed Indian and American officials about what intelligence collection showed and did not show about the links between these militants and the Pakistani state. I collected extensive documents from Indian court prosecutions of those who had been accused of aiding the attackers, and I interviewed some of the defendants in the case. Not much of this reporting ended up in the published story because it was, in the end, something of a sidebar and I chose to write mainly about the near-war that followed the original attack.
The evidence about the attacking group’s support network was murky, incomplete, and polluted by repeated abusive interrogations of suspects in Indian police custody. It certainly did not provide enough courtroom-usable evidence to, say, indict the Government of Pakistan as a party to the parliament. At the same time, there could be no doubt that the attacking militants arose from—and acquired resources such as cash and weapons from—an insurgency in Kashmir that was directly aided and abetted by the Pakistani government. The evidence was detailed and convincing enough that if the offending government were, say, Iran or Syria, there would be no doubt that the United States would seek international sanctions on the basis of the file. In this case and generally, Pakistan gets a pass in Kashmir not because the evidence about its activity is weak but because the United States and Europe fear that an isolated, sanctioned Pakistan would produce destabilization and radicalization. The Pakistan Army understands this international equation thoroughly and exploits the gaps—it is careful not to expose its direct fingerprints, and yet it is brazenly persistent in pursuit of its objective of military pressure against India in Kashmir and political-military pressure on India more broadly.
Outside of Kashmir, there are some cases of terrorism on Indian soil where Pakistani fingerprints are directly visible. An attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi seems clearly to have been carried out by affiliates of a group called Jaish-e-Muhammad which has, at least until recently, enjoyed extensive direct support from the Pakistan security agencies. Fifteen years ago, Bombay (as it was then known) was rocked by terrorist bombings masterminded by a locally-connected Muslim gangster called Ibrahim Dawood; later, Dawood found refuge in Karachi, Pakistan, and, despite many demands by the Indian government that he be surrendered to face justice, he never was.
It is important, of course, to assume nothing about where the evidence trail in these latest Mumbai attacks will lead; in a forensic and legal sense, only the evidence matters, and there isn’t much of it available yet. Still, even if it turns out that the attackers were all rooted in India, and derived all of their training and supplies from mainland Indian sources (unlikely, but conceivable), this does not absolve Pakistan of responsibility for a foreign and intelligence policy, pursued relentlessly for twenty years, that deliberately sponsors and nurtures terrorist groups. India’s Hindu chauvinists have done their share to stoke Muslim rage within India; it is difficult to imagine, however, that without the proxy war conceived and supplied by Pakistan’s Army that scenes such as those now unfolding in Mumbai would have otherwise occurred.
‘Smoking
gun’ to harm Pakistan-India ties, fear US experts
Anwar Iqbal and Masood
Haider November 29, 2008
US anti-terrorism experts have warned that ‘a smoking gun’ in the Mumbai attacks could not only derail Pakistan-India talks, but also jeopardise Islamabad’s relations with Washington.
Christine Fair, a South Asia affairs analyst for US think-tank RAND Corporation, said that the attacks had raised several questions.
“Was Pakistan involved? “What type of Pakistani involvement was there? Did anyone in the government know?”
She warned that “if there is a smoking gun,” it would have serious repercussions for US-Pakistan and Pakistan-India relations.
“The attacks will increase pressure on the incoming Obama administration to be tough on Pakistan,” she warned.
Bruce Riedel, a former South Asia analyst for the CIA and the US National Security Council who now advises President-elect Barack Obama, agreed.
“This is a new, horrific milestone in the global jihad,” he told The Washington Post.
“No indigenous Indian group has this level of capability. The goal is to damage the symbol of India’s economic renaissance, undermine investor confidence and provoke an India-Pakistan crisis.”
But Ms Fair believed that the attacks were apparently carried out by indigenous Indian militants with some outside support.
“This isn’t India’s 9/11. This is India’s Oklahoma City,” said Ms Fair, referring to an April 1995 domestic attack in the US that killed 168 people.
“It is almost unimaginable that this could have been done entirely by outside militants without Indian involvement; implications are very dangerous,” she told Dawn.
“There are a lot of “very, very angry Muslims in India. The economic disparities are startling,” she said. “This is a major domestic political challenge for India.”
Ms Fair said it was not possible to deny what happened during anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002.
“You have Islamist militants in India and you have a militarised Hindu right; these are small numbers but they feed on each other, without one the other will be difficult to exist,” she said.
Ms Fair said the Indians had a ‘strong incentive’ to link this to Al Qaeda,” but so far no one has presented any evidence to show that Al Qaeda is involved.
Another important question, she said, was how Israel would respond, especially if there’s a Pakistani involvement. “Another important question is: Could this be a reaction to (secret) Pakistan-Israel talks?”
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Namrata Goswami, associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agreed with Ms Fair.
“They want to establish some kind of linkage with Al Qaeda,” she told USA Today. “But I don’t believe it is there. The motive is very, very clear. This outfit wants to attract sponsors abroad. There’s a lot of money in it.”
Ms Goswami also endorsed Ms Fair’s views that Indian Muslims bore plenty of grievances against the Hindu majority. They lag behind economically. And they have been targeted by Hindu extremists; hundreds of Muslims died, for instance, in communal riots in Gujarat in 2002, she said.
Gary Ackerman, a pro-Indian Democratic Congressman from New York, worried about the Mumbai attacks’ implications for the United States.
“The implication for us is that there are bad guys still out there, and we’re going to have to learn how to deal with them, because our friends are getting sucked into this big-time,” said Congressman Ackerman, who chairs the House subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
USA Today quoted Bahukutumbi Raman, former head of counter-terrorism for India’s intelligence agency, saying that the attackers caught Indian security forces unprepared.
“Till now, we were greeting with glee Pakistan’s incompetence in dealing with terrorism,” he said. “We can no longer do so. We have become as clueless as Pakistan.”
One highly placed US intelligence official, who has been briefed on the attacks, told CNN that the head of the operation was a Bangladeshi and that the militants were Indians, Kashmiris and Bangladeshis. The Indian military had sustained a large number of casualties, the source said.
The experts who spoke to CNN also mentioned another group called the Indian Mujahideen. Despite its relatively new status, the organization is thought to have the organisational capability to carry out such attacks, said Paul Cruickshank, a fellow at the Centre on Law and Security at New York University’s School of Law.
Experts and analysts are warning against rush to judgment.
The New York Times said on Friday “many security experts insist the style of the attacks and the targets in Mumbai suggested the militants were likely to be Indian Muslims, with a domestic agenda” suggesting it may not be the work of Pakistan’s intelligence services or Al Qaeda.
Referring to a claim by a previously unknown outfit ‘Deccan Mujahideen’ that it has carried out the attacks, an Indian security official, who spoke on condition of anonymity with the newspaper, said the name suggested ties to a group called Indian Mujahideen.
The Indian Mujahideen has been implicated in a string of bombing attacks in the country killing about 200 people this year alone
Britain
unprepared for Mumbai-style attack, former head of SAS says
Sean Rayment, 29 Nov 2008
Britain is unprepared for a Mumbai (Bombay)-style terror attack and hundreds of civilians would die if the country was targeted in such a way, the former head of the SAS has revealed.
In an exclusive interview with The Sunday Telegraph, the former Army officer, who cannot be named for security reasons, described the Indian attack as the "doomsday scenario" every country fears.
The former SAS commander, a lieutenant colonel who was involved in providing support to the Metropolitan police following both the 7/7 and 21/7 London tube attacks, said that the UK does not have enough of the right type of counter-terrorist forces in London or other major cities to deal with a multi-site, and mobile terrorist incident such as we seen in Mumbai.
The officer, who won the Military Cross fighting al-Qaeda units in Afghanistan in 2001, and spent most of the last three years in Iraq fighting against the same enemy said: "The doomsday scenario that we always presented in planning was multiple and mobile incidents in London by suicidal armed terrorists because very quickly they could achieve a lot of fatalities before anyone could pinpoint the threats and react effectively.
"This would produce the type of chaos that would defy even the most sophisticated command and control systems. You would turn London into a temporary war zone very quickly."
Writing in The Sunday Telegraph today, Peter Clarke, the former head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorism branch, also warns that there is now a real risk that a Mumbai-style massacre could take place in Britain.
Speaking for the first time since resigning from the Army last year, the former SAS Colonel said almost every counter-terrorist force in the world would struggle to cope with multiple terrorist attacks on the scale faced in Mumbai and particularly in countries such as the UK that choose not arm its conventional Police.
He added: "It was always the doomsday scenario which Peter Clarke and I both recognised as the most challenging. In the early stages of such an attack there would a lot of death and chaos. Our unarmed police would be able to do very little except report in. There would be many hours of chaos before the police, backed by the military counter-terrorist response teams were in a position to contain, let alone neutralise, the terrorist threats."
The former officer added that British armed response teams are not as numerous, well trained or equipped as they should be to deal with a fast moving and violent a scenario as that which occurred in Mumbai.
"A Mumbai-style attack requires a military-type response," he said. "Our armed police are brilliant at dealing with armed criminals, in ways that produce the best possible chance of a conviction of a suspect in the law courts but they are as yet unlikely to be as effective as they need to be when chasing terrorists armed with AK47s and chucking grenades in the centre of London."
"What we probably need is more forward-based rapidly deployable armed police units that are trained to find and fix a mobile enemy with limited/no information in a very confusing situation, to set the conditions for follow-on decisive assaults (as happened in the Hotels in Mumbai); and that initial 'fixing force' task is a very demanding task and one that requires time and resources to build properly. The only other short-term option would be to prepare the limited number of Foot Guards and Household Cavalry to be prepared to do this, which may be possible, but less desirable politically for this country than a properly equipped police response."
The former SAS officer now works in the private sector developing an independent Blackberry-based communications, information and tracking technology that reduces the individual and corporate risks for those living and operating in dangerous countries or during incidents such as those faced in Mumbai.
Mumbai:
Institutional Paranoia And Obama's Foreign Policy
Cernig Friday Nov 28,
2008
There are a lot of conflicting reports coming out of the Indian subcontinent right now, and no-one seems to have told their right hand what their left hand is doing. For instance, The UK's Telegraph reports Vilasrao Deshmukh, the chief minister of Mumbai, saying that two British citizens were among the terrorists who first attacked Mumbai two days ago and who are still being winkled out of their positions by Indian special forces- while elsewhere the Mumbai Police Commissioner Hassan Gafoor is being quoted as saying "We have found nothing to indicate they were British."
That confusion extends to speculation about who is to blame, although India seems to be prematurely certain. Pranab Mukherjee, India's Foreign Minister, has said: "Preliminary evidence, prima facie evidence, indicates elements with links to Pakistan are involved." India is stopping and searching Pakistan-flagged merchant vessels, yet the best indications are that the terrorists came ashore from Indian fishing vessels. Rather than admit it might have an indigenous terrorism problem, which would open an unhappy can of worms about tensions between militant Muslim extremists and equally militant Hindu supremacists, the Indian government is stretching as hard as it can to implicate Pakistan. Their working theory is that these Indian boats were hijacked off Pakistani shores - yet they've no evidence for that at all.
Analysts also say that the sophistication of the attacks point to training outside India, and Pakistan is India's favorite venue. But there are also Islamist terror camps in Bangladesh, where the 10,000 strong JMB group receives ample funding and arms from sympathizers across the Muslim world. Even in India, a massive country with large rural areas under-patrolled by police, Islamist terrorist camps have been found in the Karnataka jungles of the Southwest. The Maoist Naxalite movement operates in thirteen of India's twenty-six states and is a robust organisation with anywhere up to 20,000 members. In April 2006, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the Naxalite threat the “biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.” There's plenty of indigenous terrorist training capacity, not all of it controlled by or even backed by Pakistan.
However, institutional paranoia is the defining mental state of Pakistani-Indian relations. One of the big stories right now in Pakistan is about official claims that India is planning to destroy Pakistan by thirst, using dams on the Indus to deprive Pakistan's population centers of water. Rumor has it that, when Pakistani President Zardari recently offered to commit Pakistan to a "no first use" nuclear policy in a broadcast to Indian TV, he infuriated his military leadership from Kayani on down. Indian finger-pointing will not have defused their anger.The Indian and Pakistani governments have said that the head of Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency has agreed to to go to Indiato share information, at India's invite. However, despite the PR spin of Zardari's civilian government it's in no way clear that the dog yet wags the tail when it comes to civilian control of Pakistan's military and that visit might yet not happen in such a hostile atmosphere - which Indian politicians will immediately see as a sign of guilt.
Both nations' militaries have defined themselves in terms of their rivals since the two states separated and there's little real sign of that abating. Despite American VSP received wisdom that two US allies will never war between themselves, neither the Indians nor Pakistani's see things that way. An op-ed in The Asian Age newspaper back in 2006, following the massive Mumbai rail bombs, made it very clear:
There is a reality about India-Pakistan relations that sudden bonhomie cannot wish away. The reality is decades of distrust and suspicion, nurtured and cultivated by vested interests that include governments in Pakistan and political parties in India. The Hindu-Muslim angle remains the cornerstone of this distrust, as does the deeply embedded view that Islamabad and New Delhi can never really wish well for the other. Both governments are willing to lie down and be tickled endlessly by Washington, but when it comes to each other, every word is dissected and every action viewed under the prism of dislike and intolerance.
That op-ed is no longer online, but I quoted it last in 2006 post in which I argued that willfully ignoring this dynamic of paranoia was setting the U.S. up for it's next foreign policy disaster.
The incoming Obama administration (and my friends at the Center for American Progress) seems to have learned nothing from the Bush administration's mistakes in this regard and is set to perpetuate them. There's a massive helping of "pony plan" in Democratic plans for the region. The NYT today explains the idea thus:
Reconciliation between India and Pakistan has emerged as a basic tenet in the approaches to foreign policy of President-elect Barack Obama, and the new leader of Central Command, Gen. David H. Petraeus. The point is to persuade Pakistan to focus less of its military effort on India, and more on the militants in its lawless tribal regions who are ripping at the soul of Pakistan.
A strategic pivot by Pakistan’s military away from a focus on India to an all-out effort against the Taliban and their associates in Al Qaeda, the thinking goes, would serve to weaken the militants who are fiercely battling American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
And Reuters correspondent Myra MacDonald adds:
...the argument is that the cause of instability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan, and that Pakistan in turn will never fully turn against Islamist militants as long as it believes it might need them to counter India. Since Pakistan is nervous both about the growing power of India on its eastern border, and about rising Indian influence in Afghanistan on its western border, the best way to calm the situation down, so the argument goes, would be to persuade the two rivals to make peace.
It was always an ambitious plan — getting India and Pakistan to put behind them 60 years of bitter struggle over Kashmir as part of a regional solution to many complex problems in Afghanistan. Have the Mumbai attacks pushed it out of reach? And if so, what is the fall-back plan?
Even before Mumbai, Obama's plan was looking like it might fall apart. Before reports from Mumbai had begun to surface, the Indian foreign minister, in a joint press conference with his Pakistani opposite number, had poured cold water on an important facet of the plan:
On Jammu and Kashmir, Mukherjee rejected any third party interference, when asked to comment on the reports that the US president-elect was mooting to appoint Bill Clinton as his emissary to settle Kashmir issue. "There was no question of the intervention of third party. Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. It is part of composite dialogue process," he stressed.
Still, it remains true that Pakistan is the true "central front" for international terrorism. Every single major Islamist terror attack in the West in the last decade has had links to Pakistan. Bush's policy of hiding the truth and appeasing Pakistan's military dictator while fuelling a regional arms race by selling to both sides didn't work. Invading Pakistan is a non-starter. If any plans to foster an Indo-Pakistan thaw are unworkable because of deep-seated paranoia and anger - and I believe they are - then I personally have no idea what to do. The thing is, I don't feel confident that anyone else does either. Obama's plan, born from think-tanks like the Center for American Hope, always felt to me like a case of "we have to have a plan that stresses negotiation" rather than any deep seated conviction that such a plan would work.
The intertwined Gordian Knot of Afghanistan-Pakistan-India has no easy or obvious solutions, and is essentially uncuttable by Alexander's method while two of those three are nuclear powers. The US and the West will be working hard at it for decades, and there's no clear hope that even then it will be soluble. Imperial Britain's "divide and conquer' policies for its former dominions, decades of local tit-for-tat provocations and short-term thinking from successive US governments haven't done anything except tangle the knot further. It's a problem for the world comparable in scale to that of Israel and Palestine, but gets far less attention - and it's still the venue for the most likely next American foreign policy disaster.
See also
India’s Suspicion of Pakistan
Mumbai terrorist attacks
Pakistan steps up security after alert by Taliban
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