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Private Finance InitiativeThe Private Finance Initiative specifies a method, developed initially by the United Kingdom government, to provide financial support for "Public-Private Partnerships" (PPPs) between the public and private sectors. This has now been adopted by parts of Canada, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Finland, Australia, Japan and Singapore (amongst others) as part of a wider reform program for the delivery of public services which is driven by the WTO, IMF & World Bank as a part of their 'deregulation' and privatization drive.These projects aim to deliver all kinds of works for the public sector, together with the provision of associated operational services. In return, the private sector receives payment, above the price that the Public Sector could have achieved the work, linked to its performance in meeting agreed standards of provision. Overview Controversy Comparing cost Our very own Enron Private Affluence, Public Rip-Off Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Delivering the PPP Promise PDF Overview PFI is used in central and local government. In the case of projects procured by local government authorities, the capital element of the funding enabling the local authority to pay the private sector for these projects is given by central government in the form of what are known as PFI "credits". PFI is not just a different way of borrowing money; the loans are paid back over the period of the PFI scheme but by the service provider and is at risk if the service is not delivered to standard throughout. The local authority then procures a partner to carry out the scheme and transfers detailed control, and in theory the risk, in the project to the partner. The cost of this borrowing as a result is higher than normal government borrowing (but cheaper when better management of risks is taken into account) but does not all appear as borrowing in public accounts. Each PFI project is different depending on local circumstances. However there are some common threads that run through all projects. The public sector authority signs a contract with a private sector "Operator". During the period of the contract the Operator will provide certain services, which are currently provided by the local authority. The Operator is paid for the work over the course of the contract and on a "no service no fee" performance basis. The authority will design an "output specification" which is a document setting out what the Operator is expected to achieve. If the Operator fails to meet any of the agreed standards it should lose an element of its payment until standards improve. If standards do not improve after an agreed period, the public sector authority is entitled to terminate the contract. PFI is therefore dependent on both the standard of contracts used and the determination of the parties to enforce them. The National Audit Office scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament and is independent of Government. It provides review reports on the value for money of many PFI transactions and makes recommendations. The Public Accounts Committee and Audit Commission also provide reports on these issues. A notable example of PFI, and the only UK mission so far funded under the scheme, is the British Embassy in Berlin. Controversy The Private Finance Initiative was begun under the Conservative government of John Major in 1992. It immediately proved controversial, as it was perceived by critics as a back-door form of privatisation. Nonetheless, the Treasury found the scheme advantageous and pushed Labour to adopt it after the 1997 general election. PFI has continued and, indeed, expanded under Labour. This has been strongly criticised by many trade unions and elements of "Old Labour". The 2002 Labour Party Conference passed a vote against PFI, though this did not change the government's policy. According to Treasury and NAO reports that PFI deals are very much more likely to be delivered on time and on budget - a study by the Treasury in July 2003 showed that the only deals in its sample which were over budget were those where the public sector changed their minds after deciding what they wanted and from whom they wanted to buy it. It is claimed there is a far greater visibility of long-term consequences of decisions made by politicians and civil servants through PFI deals than conventionally where most of the long-term consequences and obligations of decisions are obscured from public scrutiny. This is not agreed with by those who believe that the details of these deals are wilfully complex and buried in confidential documents and footnotes. As against that, however, there have been a number of high-profile PFI failures, many of which have been exposed by Private Eye, a British satirical magazine. For example, a June 17 2005 leaked government report said that a new privately financed hospital in Leeds had "breached every section of the fire safety code". The PFI Skye Bridge infamously cost the public £93m (and required the closure of the existing ferry to prevent competition), although it should have cost only £15m to build. Equally, the fact that major risks are effectively transferred has been demonstrated in a number of cases, most notably the National Physical Laboratory; this deal ultimately caused the collapse of the building contractor when the cost of building a complex scientific laboratory was very much larger than estimated. The laboratory was ultimately built but the cost of doing so caused the complete financial collapse of a very old and previously financially robust construction company which was ultimately sold, it is believed, for £1. The laboratory continues to operate with the public sector not having to pick up any of the construction cost overrun. Furthermore, the scale of PFI projects in the Health & Education sector since 1997 is now having a serious impact on Public Service Budgets. Because the projects are more expensive in the Private sector (On average 30% more than if the Government borrowed the money and did the work in the Public sector) the payments to the Private owners of the PFI schemes are stretching already constricted Budgets. Many Health Primary Care Trusts are in serious difficulty already, and when the level of spending falls in 2007, some may go bust. The Government is already in negotiation with Private Healthcare providers to come in and run 'failing' Trusts. But this is likely to make the situation worse. In recent months ippr has added its voice to those calling for a review of the PFI. Unlike most of the others on this growing list we aren't interested in attacking the PFI or private companies. Rather, we are concerned about ensuring that taxpayers get value for their money. The problem is that there is a dearth of evidence about value for money and the PFI, and what evidence there is is notoriously difficult to interpret. This confusion has only added to the ill-tempered political debate about the PFI and the wider role of the private sector in the delivery of public services. Unless the question of value for money is seriously addressed, the PFI will continue to come under a destabilising barrage of criticism. Value for money in the PFI Government judges value for money in PFI projects by comparing the cost of company PFI bids with a 'public sector comparator'. Project managers will only get their revenue stream from government if the PFI bids come in lower. Taken at face value this might suggest that all PFI projects are good value for money by definition. ‘ippr's’ report into PPPs in 2001 Building Better Partnerships looked at all the publicly available evidence comparing bid costs with public sector comparators. The results were mixed. Although some projects for roads and prisons showed significant cost savings (of around 15 per cent), others - such as school and hospital schemes - demonstrated more marginal savings of between two and four per cent. These figures must, however, be treated with caution. Most project managers know that they will only get permission to build their new assets if the PFI scheme comes out cheaper, regardless of how marginal the supposed savings are. For example, the new Ministry of Defence Building in Whitehall is set to cost £746 million. This represents a saving of only £100,000 over 30 years (0.1 per cent), compared with the public sector comparator (something the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee has rightly highlighted as a 'spurious' figure). In 2002 ippr returned to the publicly available evidence on cost comparisons between PFI bids and public sector comparators. Out of the 378 PFI projects completed by central and local government at the time only 23 projects (6 per cent) had had any independent examination of value for money by official audit bodies. Again, we found that the PFI picture was mixed: some deals demonstrated significant evidence of lower costs, whilst others, notably school PFIs, languished behind. Moreover, these calculations only tell a part of the story. Not only do they deal with predicted costs rather than actual costs, they also take no account of differences in quality - a key issue in public service delivery. As the PFI matures, evidence about what it delivers in practice is becoming available. However, again, what evidence there is remains mixed. The National Audit Office examined construction performance in the PFI (published February 2003) and found that it had significantly improved time and cost certainty in public procurement. It found that 22 per cent of PFI projects had run over budget compared to 73 per cent of government construction projects, and that 24 per cent of PFI projects were late, compared to 70 per cent of government projects. This level of improvement represents a serious achievement for the PFI. In contrast, evidence about the quality and cost of PFIs in operation is less positive. An Audit Scotland report on schools PFIs in June 2002 praised councils for implementing the schemes well, and highlighted that some of the presumed advantages of the PFI had indeed been realised. However, they also dismissed any cost advantages as 'narrow'. In addition, an Audit Commission report in January 2003 went into more detail about how the operation of early PFI schools compared to conventionally financed projects. The results were not good news for the PFI industry. Five 'design quality matrices' were assessed by construction professionals: architectural design, building services design, user productivity, ownership costs, and detail design. The quality of the PFI schools was worse than the traditionally financed sample on all five counts, and were 'significantly worse' on four. The synergies expected to come from the PFI process had failed to materialise. This type of auditing exercise must now be urgently repeated across other policy areas, particularly in the NHS and prison sector. Where next for the PFI The Department for Education and Skills has responded to the criticisms of schools PFIs with new proposals for establishing joint venture companies to deliver projects through a different structure, although still using PFI as a procurement method. This structure is inspired by the LIFT PPP project for primary health premises and is initially being piloted in Church of England schools. The revised structure aims to resolve criticisms of PFI architecture by promoting six national 'exemplar designs', which local authorities can tailor to their local needs. It also seeks to address the problem of local government staff being relatively weak and inexperienced when negotiating with the private sector by creating a 'national procurement vehicle' with highly skilled commissioners negotiating centrally on behalf of local authorities. The DfES is to be congratulated for listening to its critics and indicating its willingness to change. The new model rejects the previous assumption that improved quality would result from bringing together the design, building finance and maintenance of an asset. However, the model raises potentially difficult issues surrounding financing. If the financing of schools projects is bundled together this could have some advantages, not least in lowering costs. But it means that financing will not be dependent on specific projects, and as a result projects will lose the important scrutiny effect that can be provided by private financiers and rating agencies. An alternative to such a scenario is to limit new contracts with the private sector to construction and operations, with design and finance both provided by the state. Another major source of contention regarding PFI policy is the degree to which services should be included within deals. Currently most PFI projects limit private sector involvement to support services, although prison PFIs and the new Diagnostic and Treatment Centres in the NHS also feature core service delivery undertaken by the private sector. In the current political climate the PFI is likely to remain primarily for construction. The Government is wary about relying on contracts alone to secure the public interest for complex and high profile services. In our latest publication In the Public Interest? Assessing the potential for Public Interest Companies ippr argues that new models with stakeholder ownership, such as foundation hospitals, are likely to become the government's vehicle of choice in such situations for some years to come. Conclusion There is nothing wrong with the PFI in principle. But the policy has to be seen to deliver in practice. We need more evidence about how the PFI is performing, and to this end ippr would like to see a major audit review of PFIs across the public services. We do not desire a moratorium on the PFI, and do not harbour any antagonism against the policy or those using it. Indeed, schools were always expected to receive limited benefits from the PFI process, and so audit reviews across other public services are likely to show the PFI in a more favourable light. The PFI can and should stand up on its own two feet alongside other procurement options. However, the benefits of a moving away from the PFI monoculture that has developed during previous few years would not be restricted to taxpayers and users. The challenge for the industry is to welcome honest independent evidence on the performance of the PFI, to encourage government to change the PFI where necessary, and understand that the PFI will not always be the best option available - particularly for the delivery of key public services. These are essential preconditions to the political heat being taken out of the difficult public debate on the PFI. All
it has delivered is one financial scandal after another - but the
government remains wedded to PFI - George Monbiot June 28, 2005 The Guardian
How much longer can this farce carry on? Everywhere the chickens released by the government's private finance initiative are not so much coming home to roost as crashing into the henhouse and sliding down the wall in a heap of blood and feathers. The prediction made in 2002 by the Banker magazine - that "eventually an Enron-style disaster will be rerun on a sovereign balance sheet" - could be starting to materialise. The private finance initiative (PFI) is the scheme allowing private corporations to build and run our public services and lease them back to the government. The government says that this allows it to commission more schemes than it could with public funds, and offers better value for money. And it doesn't seem to matter how often the story falls apart. Last week, after spending £14m on lawyers, consultants, architects and miscellaneous money-wasting schemes, the NHS ditched its plans for a massive hospital in west London. The projected cost of the Paddington health campus had risen from £360m to £1.1bn, while the number of beds had fallen from 1,000 to 800. This is pretty normal for a PFI scheme; in one case I've studied, beds fell by 20%, while costs rose by 1,100%. What makes this case unusual is that the project was dropped before the money was spent. Last Wednesday, the government admitted that PFI projects for council house repairs had been a costly disaster. This is hardly news to anyone who has watched this programme's seven-year meltdown. But despite the admission, the policy has not been officially scrapped; councils are still told they will receive no new money for refurbishments unless they hand their houses to the private or voluntary sector. On the same day, we discovered that the PFI computer system that is meant to keep a record of MOT test results for cars in the UK has been delayed by another year. It was supposed to have been ready in May 2002. On June 17, Scottish ministers decided it was cheaper to spend £25m buying out the private financiers who built the Inverness airport terminal than to let them carry on. In six years, the corporations had made £8.5m on an investment of just £5.5m. This is a photocopy of the Skye bridge bail-out; it was bought back by the Scottish executive last year for £27m. A bridge that should have cost £15m has hit the public for £93.6m. Two days before the Inverness announcement, the Ministry of Defence quietly dropped a £1bn PFI scheme for military training. It didn't disclose how much money it had spent developing it. On June 14, a leaked government report revealed that so many corners have been cut in the construction of a £47m privately financed mental health unit in Leeds that it might have to be pulled down and rebuilt. On June 10, the National Audit Office published a report showing how the companies that had built the Norfolk and Norwich hospital had, as well as making stupendous profits, legally walked off with an additional payment of £73m by exploiting the gap between the financial risk the government said they had taken on and the risk they had really shouldered. It wasn't as if the government didn't know this was coming: in June 2001, a summary of leaked documents that showed this was going to happen was published in this column. The Treasury sat back and watched. On June 9, the Health Service Journal published an extraordinary admission by a senior civil servant in the Department of Health. PFI deals, Bob Ricketts revealed, were locking the NHS into 30-year contracts for services that might become useless in five. "I've seen some awfully grand PFI schemes," he warned, "that are starting to give us a real problem." So what has the government learned from all this? Nothing. It is ideologically committed to part-privatisation. It won't disclose how much it is planning to spend on PFI schemes - a spokesperson at the Treasury says this is "commercially confidential" - but it is locked into £3.6bn of new deals this year. According to a spokesman for the Department of Health: "The government has no intention of abandoning PFI." The heap of blood and feathers, though brain dead, keeps running. So the government fobs us off with spin, misreporting and lies. PFI, the Treasury tells us, "is a small but important part of the government's strategy for delivering high-quality public services". Small? £42bn has been officially committed so far. This, according to the public-spending specialist Professor Allyson Pollock, is an underestimate, covering only the 43% of PFI contracts classified as "off balance sheet". Less true still is the Treasury's assertion that there is "no bias in favour of any particular procurement route". As people working for NHS trusts and local authorities will testify, the government made it clear that for certain kinds of projects, public funds are not available. But the biggest lie involves the government's claims of value for money. "All PFI projects," the Treasury says, "were delivered within public sector budgets ... no construction cost overruns were borne by the public sector." Well, it's a bit like hospital waiting lists: it depends when you start counting. The genius of PFI is that the overruns take place before the project begins. There are three ways in which this happens. The first is that the schemes are tailored to suit the private sector. Where public money might have been used to renovate a hospital, PFI demands that it is pulled down and rebuilt. But the two costs are not compared; instead we are told we have a choice between rebuilding it with public funds or with private funds. Then the next fiddle kicks in. Civil servants, knowing that, as the former secretary of state for health announced, "it's PFI or bust", must mash the "public sector comparator" figure to show that PFI delivers best value for money. As Jeremy Colman, at the time the UK's assistant auditor-general, said: "If the answer comes out wrong you don't get your project. So the answer doesn't come out wrong very often." The third fiddle is that the concept of "risk transfer" can be used to come up with any figure you want. You simply announce that x million pounds of "financial risk" is being transferred by PFI to the private sector, and hey presto, it's x million pounds more expensive to build the project with public money. As the Norfolk and Norwich hospital fiasco shows, the risk costing bears no relation to any actual hazard taken on by the contractors. Is it an exaggeration to say that we might be facing "an Enron-style disaster" in the public sector? I don't know. But there's something familiar about Colman's warning that the "pseudo-scientific mumbo jumbo" behind the private finance initiative's financial modelling "takes over from thinking. It becomes so complicated that no one, not even the experts, understands what is going on". And the record of the past three weeks is hardly reassuring. New Labour’s enthusiasm for business is matched only by its lack of business sense, as the private finance fiasco shows. The government can’t pretend that it lacked advice. In 1997, before construction had begun, the doctors who had seen the plans for the proposed Cumberland Infirmary warned that it looked “more like a doss-house” than a hospital. Carlisle’s consultants’ committee pronounced the scheme “clinically unworkable”. But selective hearing is New Labour’s primary sense. In June 2000, when Tony Blair unveiled the plaque, he announced that “this magnificent new hospital … symbolises what we have been trying to do for the health service”. Within weeks the magnificent new hospital began falling apart. Pipes split, flooding the wards with water and the operating theatre with sewage. Power cuts left nurses ventilating patients on life support machines by hand. Ceilings collapsed and windows blew out of their frames. By August, all the beds were full and doctors were being asked to move patients into armchairs to make way for people recovering from surgery. All new hospitals encounter problems, but those plaguing the Cumberland have proved to be both persistent and systemic. Both in design and in execution, the people who built it appear to have cut corners. Though the new hospital contains 75 fewer beds than the buildings it replaced, there is so little space in the wards that the doors have had to be removed to make room, and the trolleys redesigned to fit in the aisles. The hospital was built with a glass atrium but no air conditioning, with the result that temperatures have reached 110 degrees in the summer. All this might sound like a classic tale of NHS mismanagement. But this case is different. The Cumberland was the first privately financed hospital to open in the United Kingdom, the flagship for a whole new fleet, which would cruise past the squalls and doldrums of public funding. For the past six years, I have been investigating the private finance initiative, particularly in the health sector. My research suggests that problems of the kind infesting the Cumberland are likely to emerge in almost all the new hospitals built by this means. Because the private finance initiative mobilises private capital, ministers have argued, it allows the government to start more schemes than it would otherwise be able to commission. Private companies provide the money for public infrastructure the state can’t afford, and the government pays it back over a number of years. Because the private sector is more efficient, they insist, PFI schemes offer better value for money than public funding. And because private companies, rather than the government, provide the capital, the money spent on new projects does not contribute to the public sector borrowing requirement. The reality is that PFI, or “public private partnership” as the government now prefers to call it, is a scam. It works for neither socialists nor free marketeers, as it offers neither effective public provision nor business efficiencies. Far from introducing market disciplines, it has become an official licence to fleece the taxpayer. Far from reducing the public sector borrowing requirement, PFI is, as the Accounting Standards Board has noted, simply an “an off-balance sheet fiddle”. Most alarmingly, the ministers I have spoken to simply do not understand how it works. The initiative was a Conservative experiment. In opposition, Labour fiercely contested it. But as soon as the party came to power, it resolved that PFI would become the means by which most of our new public infrastructure would be built. By the time it became obvious that the experiment was failing, Labour had waded in too far. Awestruck by its glittering new friends in business, but baffled by the complexities of the scheme it supports, it has been consistently outwitted and outmanoeuvred. The first of the problems Labour has failed to grasp is the process by which the private investors are chosen. The government announces a new scheme, companies make their bids, and the government selects the bid which appears to offer best value for money. The chosen consortium is named the “preferred bidder”, and the government starts to negotiate the contract. The consortium then has the government over a barrel. In theory, the contract is still open to competition. In practice, preferred bidders have been deselected only, as far as I can discover, in two of the hundreds of PFI schemes the government has launched. Once the consortium has its foot in the door, it starts to raise its price and reduce its services. It will discover costs which weren’t envisaged before. It will price the likely inflation of labour and materials as generously as possible. In some cases, I have found, companies have simply slipped extra figures into the spreadsheets. Most importantly, value for money in PFI contracts is a function of the extent to which the projects’ risks are transferred to the private sector. Because the government is hopelessly outclassed, during negotiations companies routinely transfer most of the key risks back to the taxpayer. As a result, PFI, from the corporate point of view, is a far better deal than privatisation. The consortia get the assets but not the liabilities. In some cases, they carry no greater risk than ordinary contractors for the public sector, but they are rewarded as if they were the most reckless entrepreneurs. Last summer I received definitive evidence that Octagon Healthcare, the private consortium building the Norfolk and Norwich hospital, was in a position to extract £70 million from the scheme, before it had taken a single patient. The money, which would have taken the form of a “refinancing” of its bank loans, represented just part of the difference between the presumed transfer of financial risk on which the contract had been based and financed, and the actual transfer of risk. The consortium could, quite legally, have withdrawn the money (which was enough, by itself, to build a medium-sized hospital) by renegotiating the terms of its borrowing. When I broke the story it caused a minor scandal, and Octagon appears not to have taken advantage of its position. But deals of this kind are now routine. In one case—the PFI prison built by Group 4 and Carillion in Liverpool—refinancing has allowed the companies to double their rate of return: they will break even just two and a half years into the 25-year contract. These problems are compounded by the lack of effective competition between the private and the public sectors. When Alan Milburn, the health secretary, warned the NHS that “it’s PFI or bust”, hospital trusts began redesigning their projects to attract private money. In Coventry, for example, the NHS had originally intended to renovate the Walsgrave Hospital, on the outskirts of town, at a cost of some £30 million. Built in the 1970s, it appeared to be structurally sound, but it was in need of modernisation. But in 1997, after the Labour government indicated that no substantial public funding would be available, the NHS submitted a new plan: for the privately financed demolition of both the Walsgrave and the city centre’s Coventry and Warwick Hospital, and the construction of a new hospital on the Walsgrave site. This would provide 25 per cent fewer all-purpose beds and 20 per cent fewer staff than the two hospitals it replaced, and it would cost £174 million to build. The NHS would pay the consortium £36 million a year for 25 years, plus a one-off equipment grant of £25 million, and it would give the companies the land on which the city centre hospital stands. Since then, the cost of construction has risen to £311 million, but the new scheme still offers fewer beds than the two hospitals it will replace. None of this made sense until I received a leaked copy of a confidential report commissioned by the local health authority. To become profitable for a private operator, a new scheme, the paper revealed, would have to make four times as much money as the nominal “surplus” returned to the Treasury by the city’s existing hospitals. The £30m contract for renovating the Walsgrave, in other words, would have been too small to make it attractive to a private consortium. This option had had to be rejected because it was too cheap. The project, the report found, had been “progressively tailored to fit the needs of private investors”. I have also obtained evidence that, in order to smooth the way for the private money they need, public bodies are deliberately setting the “public sector comparator” higher than the private sector bids they receive. The National Audit Office and the independent auditors the government appoints look at these projects and pronounce them value for money. But by relying on the official comparators, the official assessments of risk and the official view of whether or not these schemes were needed in the first place, they are bound to find in their favour. There’s no question that attracting private money allows the government to commission more public infrastructure schemes (though in the NHS the result is a substantial net reduction in the number of hospitals, as the private operators concentrate the new facilities on single sites). But, as the Labour minister Alastair Darling commented when he was shadow chief secretary to the Treasury, “apparent savings now could be countered by the formidable commitment on revenue expenditure in years to come”. As the service payments for projects commissioned today mount up, future governments will discover that there’s no money left for starting new ones. There is only ones means of meeting the outrageous costs of PFI, and that is by cutting public services. A study by a consultancy company which works for the Department of Health shows that every £200 million spent on privately financed hospitals will result in the loss of 1000 doctors and nurses. The first PFI hospitals contain some 28 per cent fewer beds than the ones they replaced. Alan Milburn has promised that future schemes will not result in bed reductions, but he can keep this promise only by increasing their costs still further. The government is in the most dangerous of all positions: its fawning willingness to prove that it is now the party of big business is matched only by a total failure to understand how business works. Without commercial experience, Blair and his ministers regard the companies they court with a kind of superstitious awe: “partnership”, irrespective of terms, will summon up some economic magic which turns base motives into gold. And these are the people who now call themselves the party of economic competence. For years, lefty that I am, I have argued against the privatisation of the NHS. This is still my position. But after discovering how the public sector is being savaged by the government which claims to be its saviour, I must reluctantly conclude that even the outright sale of the service—with its liabilities as well as its assets—would provide a better deal for both patients and taxpayers than Blair’s great giveaway. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are arrangements between the government and the private sector with the main objective of securing investment and greater efficiency in the delivery of public infrastructure, community facilities and other related services. These partnerships are characterised by a sharing of investments, risks, rewards and responsibilities between the two parties. PPP present a number of recognised advantages for the public sector. These include the ability to 1) raise additional finance in an
environment of budget restrictions
2) make the best use of private
sector operational efficiencies to reduce cost
3) increase quality to
the public and
4) speed up infrastructure
development.
PricewaterhouseCoopers Makes recommendations for streamlining of ppp procurement process In a new report, PricewaterhouseCoopers reveals the results of their survey of PPP activity and makes recommendations for further streamlining of the procurement process. The report was initially written as the background paper to the Transport PPP Summit for EU public sector officials, held in October 2005 and hosted by the Department for Transport and the Scottish Executive. This version of the report has been updated for the wider market and describes recent developments on the issues and activities surrounding the PPP marketplace. PwC's survey of PPP activity across Europe has been extended in this report to look at the wider, most active markets for PPPs globally. This survey has shown that the PPP approach to procurement is increasingly being adopted to deliver new investment in infrastructure and is extending into new sectors as value for money and other benefits are established. While the use of PPPs raises a number of complex issues and choices, the solutions to which are often country or project specific, this publication reviews the benefits and challenges of using the PPP model, looks at where its use is most appropriate, and makes strong recommendations on improving the procurement process. Delivering the PPP Promise PDF (1Mb) See Link: Deal for Inverness Airport buy-out secured See Link: Skye Bridge |
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