The Scottish Enlightenment
The Scottish Enlightenment was a
period of intellectual ferment in
Scotland,
running from approximately 1740 to 1800.
running from approximately 1740 to 1800.
| See also these links to other documents on this website: | ||
| The Age of Enlightenment | Utilitarianism | Scottish School of Common Sense |
| Political economy | Consequentialism | Scientific method |
| The Wealth of Nations | Globalization | Tariff |
| Sir Walter Scott | David Hume | Robert
Adam, architect. |
| James Hutton | James Boswell | Adam Smith |
Period
In the period following the Act of Union 1707 Scotland's place in the world altered radically. Following the Reformation, many Scottish academics were teaching in great cities of mainland Europe but with the birth and rapid expansion of the new British Empire came a revival of philosophical thought in Scotland and a prodigious diversity of thinkers. Arguably the poorest country in western Europe in 1707, it was now able to turn its attentions to the wider world without the opposition of England. Scotland reaped the economic benefits of free trade within the British Empire together with the intellectual benefits of having established Europe's first public education system since classical times. Under these twin stimuli, Scottish thinkers began questioning assumptions previously taken for granted; and with Scotland's traditional connections to France, then in the throes of the Enlightenment, the Scots began developing a uniquely practical branch of humanism.
The first major figure of the Scottish Enlightenment was Francis Hutcheson, who held the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1729 to 1746. A moral philosopher with alternatives to the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, he founded one of the major branches of Scottish thinking, and opposed Hobbes' disciple David Hume. Hutcheson's major contribution to world thought was the utilitarian and consequentialist principle that virtue is that which brought the greatest good to the most people.
Hume himself is arguably the most important thinker in the Scottish Enlightenment; his moral philosophy eventually triumphed over Hutcheson's, and his investigations into political economy inspired his friend Adam Smith to more detailed work. Hume was largely responsible for giving the Scottish Enlightenment its practical hue, for he was concerned with the nature of knowledge, and developed ideas related to evidence, experience, and causation. Much of what is incorporated in the scientific method, and many modern attitudes towards the relationship between science and religion, were developed by him.
If Hume was primarily concerned with philosophy and worked less in economics, his ideas nevertheless led to important work in the latter field. Following Hume's impassioned defense of free trade, Adam Smith developed the concept and in 1776 published what is arguably the first work of modern economics -- The Wealth of Nations. This famous study had an immediate impact on British economic policy, and it still informs 21st century discussions on globalization and tariffs.
The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers developed a "science of man", which built upon Hume's work in the field of moral philosophy and his studies of human nature. This was expressed historically in works by major Scottish thinkers such as James Burnett, Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and William Robertson, all of whom merged a scientific study of how humans behave in ancient and primitive cultures with a strong awareness of the determining forces of modernity.
The Scottish Enlightenment shifted focus from intellectual and economic matters to those specifically scientific. The harbinger of this shift was James Anderson, a doctor with an abiding interest in agronomy. While the Scottish Enlightenment is traditionally considered to have ended with this change (which occurred at the tail end of the 18th century), it is worth noting that disproportionately large Scottish contributions to British science and letters continued for another fifty years or so, thanks to such figures as James Hutton, James Watt, William Murdoch, James Clerk Maxwell, Lord Kelvin and Sir Walter Scott.
Francis Hutcheson (August 8, 1694–August 8, 1746) was an Irish philosopher and one of the founding fathers of the Scottish Enlightenment.
Beginnings
Other works
Ethics
Mental Philosophy
Aesthetics
He is thought to have been born at Drumalig, in the parish of Saintfield, County Down, Northern Ireland. University of Glasgow, where he spent six years, at first in the study of philosophy, classics and general literature, and afterwards in the study of theology.
On leaving university, he returned to northern Ireland, and received a licence to preach. When, however, he was about to enter upon the pastorate of a small dissenting congregation he changed his plans on the advice of a friend and opened a private academy in Dublin. In Dublin his literary attainments gained him the friendship of many prominent inhabitants. Among these was Archbishop of Dublin, William King, who refused to prosecute Hutcheson in the archbishop's court for keeping a school without the episcopal licence. Hutcheson's relations with the clergy of the Established Church, especially with King and with Hugh Boulter (the archbishop of Armagh) seem to have been cordial, and his biographer, speaking of "the inclination of his friends to serve him, the schemes proposed to him for obtaining promotion," etc., probably refers to some offers of preferment, on condition of his accepting episcopal ordination.
While residing in Dublin, Hutcheson published anonymously the four essays by which he is best known: the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, the Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, in 1725, the Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections and Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, in 1728. The alterations and additions made in the second edition of these Essays were published in a separate form in 1726. To the period of his Dublin residence are also to be referred the Thoughts on Laughter (a criticism of Thomas Hobbes) and the Observations on the Fable of the Bees, being in all six letters contributed to Hibernicus' Letters, a periodical which appeared in Dublin (1725-1727, 2nd ed. 1734). At the end of the same period occurred the controversy in the London Journal with Gilbert Burnet (probably the second son of Dr Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury); on the "True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness." All these letters were collected in one volume (Glasgow, 1772).
In 1729, Hutcheson succeeded his old master, Gershom Carmichael, in the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. It is curious that up to this time all his essays and letters had been published anonymously, though their authorship appears to have been well known. In 1730 he entered on the duties of his office, delivering an inaugural lecture (afterwards published), De naturali hominum socialitate. He appreciated having leisure for his favourite studies; "non levi igitur laetitia commovebar cum almam matrem Academiam me, suum olim alumnum, in libertatem asseruisse audiveram."
Yet the works on which Hutcheson's reputation rests had already been published.
Other works
In addition to the works named, the following were published during Hutcheson's lifetime: a pamphlet entitled Considerations on Patronage (1735); Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria, ethices et jurisprudentiae naturalis elementa continens, lib. iii. (Glasgow, 1742); Metaphysicae synopsis ontologiam et pneumatologiam campleciens (Glasgow, 1742). The last work was published anonymously. After his death, his son, Francis Hutcheson published much the longest, though by no means the most interesting, of his works, A System of Moral Philosophy, in Three Books (2 vois.. London, 1755). To this is prefixed a life of the author, by Dr William Leechman, professor of divinity in the University of Glasgow. The only remaining work assigned to Hutcheson is a small treatise on Logic (Glasgow, 1764). This compendium, together with the Compendium of Metaphysics, was republished at Strassburg in 1722.
Thus Hutcheson dealt with metaphysics, logic and ethics. His importance is, however, due almost entirely to his ethical writings, and among these primarily to the four essays and the letters published during his time in Dublin. His standpoint has a negative and a positive aspect; he is in strong opposition to Thomas Hobbes and Mandeville, and in fundamental agreement with Shaftesbury, whose name he rightly coupled with his own on the title page of the first two essays. The analogy drawn between beauty and virtue, the functions assigned to the moral sense, the position that the benevolent feelings form an original and irreducible part of our nature, and the unhesitating adoption of the principle that the test of virtuous action is its tendency to promote the general welfare are obvious and fundamental points of agreement between the two authors.
Ethics
According to Hutcheson, man has a variety of senses, internal as well as external, reflex as well as direct, the general definition of a sense being" any determination of our minds to receive ideas independently on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain" (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. 1). He does not attempt to give an exhaustive enumeration of these "senses," but, in various parts of his works, he specifies, besides the five external senses commonly recognized (which, he rightly hints, might be added to):
1.consciousness,
by which each
man has a perception of himself and of
all that is going on in his own mind (Metaph. Syn. pars i. cap. 2)
2.the sense of beauty (sometimes called specifically "an internal sense")
3.a public sense, or sensus communis, "a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery"
4.the moral sense, or "moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others"
5.a sense of honour, or praise and blame, "which makes the approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame"
6.a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain, as the author confesses, that there may be "other perceptions, distinct from all these classes," and, in fact, there seems to be no limit to the number of "senses" in which a psychological division of this kind might result.
2.the sense of beauty (sometimes called specifically "an internal sense")
3.a public sense, or sensus communis, "a determination to be pleased with the happiness of others and to be uneasy at their misery"
4.the moral sense, or "moral sense of beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or others"
5.a sense of honour, or praise and blame, "which makes the approbation or gratitude of others the necessary occasion of pleasure, and their dislike, condemnation or resentment of injuries done by us the occasion of that uneasy sensation called shame"
6.a sense of the ridiculous. It is plain, as the author confesses, that there may be "other perceptions, distinct from all these classes," and, in fact, there seems to be no limit to the number of "senses" in which a psychological division of this kind might result.
Of these "senses" that which plays the most important part in Hutcheson's ethical system is the "moral sense." It is this which pronounces immediately on the character of actions and affections, approving those which are virtuous, and disapproving those which are vicious. "His principal design," he says in the preface to the two first treatises, "is to show that human nature was not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue, to form to itself observations concerning the advantage or disadvantage of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. The weakness of our reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature, are so great that very few men could ever have formed those long deductions of reasons which show some actions to be in the whole advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. The Author of nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely form, to excite our pursuit of it, and has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action."
Passing over the appeal to final causes involved in this passage, as well as the assumption that the "moral sense" has had no growth or history, but was "implanted" in man exactly in the condition in which it is now to be found among the more civilized races, an assumption common to the systems of both Hutcheson and Butler, his use of the term "sense" has a tendency to obscure the real nature of the process which goes on in an act of moral judgment. For, as established by Hume, this act really consists of two parts: one an act of deliberation, resulting in an intellectual judgment; the other a reflex feeling of satisfaction at actions which we denominate good, of dissatisfaction at those which we denominate bad. By the intellectual part of this process we refer the action or habit to a certain class; but no sooner is the intellectual process completed than there is excited in us a feeling similar to that which myriads of actions and habits of the same class, or deemed to be of the same class, have excited in us on former occasions.
Even if the latter part of this process is instantaneous, uniform and exempt from error, the former is not. All mankind may approve of that which is virtuous or makes for the general good, but they entertain the most widely divergent opinions and frequently arrive at directly opposite conclusions as to particular actions and habits. This obvious distinction is recognized by Hutcheson in his analysis of the mental process preceding moral action, nor does he invariably ignore it, even when treating of the moral approbation or disapprobation which is subsequent on action. None the less, it remains true that Hutcheson, both by his phraseology, and by the language in which he describes the process of moral approbation, has done much to favour that loose, popular view of morality which, ignoring the necessity of deliberation and reflection, encourages hasty resolves and unpremeditated judgments.
The term "moral sense" (which, it may be noticed, had already been employed by Shaftesbury, not only, as William Whewell suggests, in the margin, but also in the text of his Inquiry), if invariably coupled with the term "moral judgment," would be open to little objection; but, taken alone, as designating the complex process of moral approbation, it is liable to lead not only to serious misapprehension but to grave practical errors. For, if each man's decisions are solely the result of an immediate intuition of the moral sense, why be at any pains to test, correct or review them? Or why educate a faculty whose decisions are infallible? And how do we account for differences in the moral decisions of different societies, and the observable changes in a man's own views? The expression has, in fact, the fault of most metaphorical terms: it leads to an exaggeration of the truth which it is intended to suggest.
But though Hutcheson usually describes the moral faculty as acting instinctively and immediately, he does not, like Butler, confound the moral faculty with the moral standard. The test or criterion of right action is with Hutcheson, as with Shaftesbury, its tendency to promote the general welfare of mankind. He thus anticipates the utilitarianism of Bentham--and not only in principle, but even in the use of the phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3). Hutcheson does not seem to have seen an inconsistency between this external criterion with his fundamental ethical principle. Intuition has no possible connection with an empirical calculation of results, and Hutcheson in adopting such a criterion practically denies his fundamental assumption. Connected with Hutcheson's virtual adoption of the utilitarian standard is a kind of moral algebra, proposed for the purpose of "computing the morality of actions." This calculus occurs in the Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. 3.
Hutcheson's other distinctive ethical doctrine is what has been called the "benevolent theory" of morals. Hobbes had maintained that all other actions, however disguised under apparent sympathy, have their roots in self-love. Hutcheson not only maintains that benevolence is the sole and direct source of many of our actions, but, by a not unnatural recoil, that it is the only source of those actions of which, on reflection, we approve. Consistently with this position, actions which flow from self-love only are pronounced to be morally indifferent. But surely, by the common consent of civilized men, prudence, temperance, cleanliness, industry, self-respect and, in general, the personal virtues," are regarded, and rightly regarded, as fitting objects of moral approbation. This consideration could hardly escape any author, however wedded to his own system, and Hutcheson attempts to extricate himself from the difficulty by laying down the position that a man may justly regard himself as a part of the rational system, and may thus be, in part, an object of his own benevolence (Ibid),--a curious abuse of terms, which really concedes the question at issue. Moreover, he acknowledges that, though self-love does not merit approbation, neither, except in its extreme forms, did it merit condemnation, indeed the satisfaction of the dictates of self love is one of the very conditions of the preservation of society. To press home the inconsistencies involved in these various statement would be a superfluous task.
The vexed question of liberty and necessity appears to be carefully avoided in Hutcheson's professedly ethical works. But, in the Synopsis metaphysicae, he touches on it in three places, briefly stating both sides of the question, but evidently inclining to that which he designates as the opinion of the Stoics in opposition to what he designates as the opinion of the Peripatetics. This is substantially the same as the doctrine propounded by Hobbes and Locke (to the latter of whom Hutcheson refers in a note), namely that our will is determined by motives in conjunction with ou general character and habit of mind, and that the only true liberty is the liberty of acting as we will, not the liberty of willing as we will. Though, however, his leaning is clear, he carefully avoids dogmatising, and deprecates the angry controversies to which the speculation on this subject had given rise.
It is easy to trace the influence of Hutcheson's ethical theories on the systems of Hume and Adam Smith. The prominence given to these writers to the analysis of moral action and moral approbation with the attempt to discriminate the respective provinces of the reason and the emotions in these processes, is undoubtedly due to the influence of Hutcheson. To a study of the writings of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson we might, probably, in large measure, attribute the unequivocal adoption of the utilitarian standard by Hume, and, if this be the case, the name of Hutcheson connects itself, through Hume, with the names of Priestley, Paley and Bentham. Butler's Sermons appeared in 1726, the year after the publication of Hutcheson's two first essays, and the parallelism between the "conscience" of the one writer and the "moral sense" of the other is, at least, worthy of remark.
Mental Philosophy
In the sphere of mental philosophy and logic Hutcheson's contributions are by no means so important or original as in that of moral philosophy. They are interesting mainly as a link between Locke and the Scottish school. In the former subject the influence of Locke is apparent throughout. All the main outlines of Locke's philosophy seem, at first sight, to be accepted as a matter of course. Thus, in stating his theory of the moral sense, Hutcheson is peculiarly careful to repudiate the doctrine of innate ideas (see, for instance, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. I ad fin., and sect. 4; and compare Synopsis Metaphysicae, pars i. cap. 2). At the same time he shows more discrimination than does Locke in distinguishing between the two uses of this expression, and between the legitimate and illegitimate form of the doctrine (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 2).
All our ideas are, as by Locke, referred to external or internal sense, or, in other words, to sensation and reflection. It is, however, a most important modification of Locke's doctrine, and one which connects Hutcheson's mental philosophy with that of Reid, when he states that the ideas of extension, figure, motion and rest "are more properly ideas accompanying the sensations of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses"; that the idea of self accompanies every thought, and that the ideas of number, duration and existence accompany every other idea whatsoever (see Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. i. art. I; Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 1, pars ii. cap. I; Hamilton on Reid, p. 124, note). Other important points in which Hutcheson follows the lead of Locke are his depreciation of the importance of the so-called laws of thought, his distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of bodies, the position that we cannot know the inmost essences of things ("intimae rerum naturae sive essentiae"), though they excite various ideas in us, and the assumption that external things are known only through the medium of ideas (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. I), though, at the same time, we are assured of the existence of an external world corresponding to these ideas.
Hutcheson attempts to account for our assurance of the reality of an external world by referring it to a natural instinct (Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap. 1). Of the correspondence or similitude between our ideas of the primary qualities of things and the things themselves God alone can be assigned as the cause. This similitude has been effected by Him through a law of nature. "Haec prima qualitatum primariarum perceptio, sive mentis actio quaedam sive passio dicatur, non alia similitudinis aut convenientiae inter ejusmodi ideas et res ipsas causa assignari posse videtur, quam ipse Deus, qui certa naturae lege hoc efilcit, Ut notiones, quae rebus praesentibus excitantur, sint ipsis similes, aut saltem earum habitudines, si non veras quantitates, depingant" (pars ii. cap. I). Locke does speak of God "annexing" certain ideas to certain motions of bodies; but nowhere does he propound a theory so definite as that here propounded by Hutcheson, which reminds us at least as much of the speculations of Nicolas Malebranche as of those of Locke.
Amongst the more important points in which Hutcheson diverges from Locke is his account of the idea of personal identity, which he appears to have regarded as made known to us directly by consciousness. The distinction between body and mind, corpus or materia and res cogitans, is more emphatically accentuated by Hutcheson than by Locke. Generally, he speaks as if we had a direct consciousness of mind as distinct from body, though, in the posthumous work on Moral Philosophy, he expressly states that we know mind as we know body" by qualities immediately perceived though the substance of both be unknown (bk. i. ch. 1). The distinction between perception proper and sensation proper, which occurs by implication though it is not explicitly worked out (see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, - Lect. 24).
Hamilton's edition of Dugald Stewart's Works, v. 420),--the imperfection of the ordinary division of the external senses into two classes, the limitation of consciousness to a special mental facult) (severely criticized in Sir W Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics Lect. xii.) and the disposition to refer on disputed questions of philosophy not so much to formal arguments as to the testimony of consciousness and our natural instincts are also amongst the points in which Hutcheson supplemented or departed from the philosophy of Locke. The last point can hardly fail to suggest the "common-sense philosophy" of Reid.
Thus, in estimating Hutcheson's position, we find that in particular questions he stands nearer to Locke, but in the general spirit of his philosophy he seems to approach more closely to his Scottish successors.
The short Compendium of Logic, which is more original than such works usually are, is remarkable chiefly for the large proportion of psychological matter which it contains. In these parts of the book Hutcheson mainly follows Locke. The technicalities of the subject are passed lightly over, and the book is readable. It may be specially noticed that he distinguishes between the mental result and its verbal expression judgment-proposition, that he constantly employs the word "idea," and that he defines logical truth as "convenientia signorum cum rebus significatis" (or "propositionis convenientia cum rebus ipsis," Syn. Metaph. pars i. cap 3), thus implicitly repudiating a merely formal view of logic.
Aesthetics
Hutcheson may further be regarded as one of the earliest modern writers on aesthetics. His speculations on this subject are contained in the Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design, the first of the two treatises published in 1725. He maintains that we are endowed with a special sense by which we perceive beauty, harmony and proportion. This is a reflex sense, because it presupposes the action of the external senses of sight and hearing. It may be called an internal sense, both in order to distinguish its perceptions from the mere perceptions of sight and hearing, and because "in some other affairs, where our external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like in many respects to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with like pleasure" (Inquiry, etc., sect. 1). The latter reason leads him to call attention to the beauty perceived in universal truths, in the operations of general causes and in moral principles and actions. Thus, the analogy between beauty and virtue, which was so favourite a topic with Shaftesbury, is prominent in the writings of Hutcheson also. Scattered up and down the treatise there are many important and interesting observations which our limits prevent us from noticing. But to the student of mental philosophy it may be specially interesting to remark that Hutcheson both applies the principle of association to explain our ideas of beauty and also sets limits to its application, insisting on there being "a natural power of perception or sense of beauty in objects, antecedent to all custom, education or example" (see Inquiry, etc., sects. 6, 7; Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. 44 ad fin.).
Hutcheson's writings naturally gave rise to much controversy. To say nothing of minor opponents, such as "Philaretus" (Gilbert Burnet, already alluded to), Dr John Balguy (1686-1748), prebendary of Salisbury, the author of two tracts on "The Foundation of Moral Goodness, and Dr John Taylor (1694-1761) of Norwich, a minister of considerable reputation in his time (author of An Examination of the Scheme of Amorality advanced by Dr Hutcheson), the essays appear to have suggested, by antagonism, at least two works which hold a permanent place in the literature of English ethics--Butler's Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, and Richard Price's Treatise of Moral Good and Evil (1757). In this latter work the author maintains, in opposition to Hutcheson, that actions are -in themselves right or wrong, that right and wrong are simple ideas incapable of analysis, and that these ideas are perceived immediately by the understanding. We thus see that, not only directly but also through the replies which it called forth, the system of Hutcheson, or at least the system of Hutcheson combined with that of Shaftesbury, contributed, in large measure, to the formation and development of some of the most important of the modern schools of ethics.
James Burnett,
Lord Monboddo (October 25, 1714 -
May 26, 1799) was a
Scottish judge, scholar of language evolution and philosopher. He is
most famous today as a founder of modern comparative historical
linguistics (Hobbs,1992). In 1767 he became a judge in the Court of
Session, effectively the supreme court of Scotland. Thence Burnett
adopted a title based on his father's estate, Monboddo House. Monboddo is considered by a number of scholars to have developed the concepts of evolution seventy years before Darwin, as summarized in the history of evolutionary thought.
Early years
Later years as patron of the arts and Court of Session Justice
Historical linguistics
Evolutionary theorist
Metaphysics
An eccentric
Publications of Lord Monboddo
Publications about Lord Monboddo
Early years
James Burnett was born in 1714 at Monboddo House in Kincardineshire, Scotland. After his primary education at the parish school of Laurencekirk, he studied at Marischal College, Aberdeen where he was graduated in 1729. He also studied at Edinburgh University and the University of Groningen. At Edinburgh University he was graduated at law and was admitted to the Scottish Bar in 1737.
Burnett married Grace Farquharson and they had two daughters and a son. Burnett's youngest daughter Elizabeth Burnett was an Edinburgh celebrity, known for her beauty and amiability. Tragically she died of consumption at the age of 25. Burnett's friend Robert Burns had a romantic interest in Eliza and wrote a poem referencing her beauty and which ultimately became her elegy.
His early work in practicing law found him in a landmark litigation of his time, called the Douglas case. The matter involved the inheritance standing of a young heir and took on the form of a mystery novel of the era, with a complex web of events spanning Scotland, France and England. Burnett, as the solicitor for the young Douglas heir, was victorious after years of legal battle and appeals.
Later years as patron of the arts and Court of Session Justice
From 1754 until 1767 Monboddo was one of a
number of distinguished
proprietors of the Canongate Theatre. He clearly enjoyed this endeavor
even when some of his fellow judges pointed out that the activity might
cast a shadow over his somber image as jurist.Here he had occasion to further associate with David Hume who was a principal actor in one of the plays. He had actually met Hume earlier when Monboddo was a curator of the Advocates Library and David Hume served as keeper of that library for several years while he wrote his history.
In the era after Monboddo was appointed to Justice of the high court, he organized "learned suppers" at his house in St John Street, where he discussed and lectured about his theories. Local intellectuals were invited to attend attic repasts, regular guests including Burns, Samuel Johnson and James Boswell. Henry Home, Lord Kames was conspicuously absent from such socializing; while Kames and Monboddo served on the high court at the same time and had numerous interactions, they were staunch intellectual rivals.
Historical linguistics
In The Origin and Progress of Language he painstakingly analyzes the structure of primitive and modern languages that argues that mankind had evolved language skills in response to his changing environment and altering social structures. His work in language evolution departed radically from then existing theories. This analysis was totally remarkable, since Burnett was partially deaf. He was intrigued with the systematics he discovered in codifying a multitude of primitive languages. Burnett was the first to discover that primitive languages actually create unnecessarily lengthy words for rather simple concepts. He reasoned that in early languages there was an imperative for clarity, so that redundancy was built in and seemingly unnessessary syllables added. He reasoned that this form of language evolved as a method of survival when clear communication might be the determinant of avoiding danger. He demonstrated at many junctures in his analysis that he was aware of the concept of evolution and of natural selection of those peoples who could develop superior language skills. This concept, while transparent in current times, bordered on heresy. Ironically, Burnett was deeply religious and often digressed to credit God with the divine first mover concept as argued in a similar vein by Aristotle.
Monboddo studied in great detail a number of primitive languages including the Carib, Eskimo, Huron, Algonquin, Peruvian and Tahitian languages He was the first to see the preponderance of polysyllabic words, where most of his predecessors had summarily dismissed primitive language as a series of monosyllabic grunts. He also made the astute observation that in Huron (or Wyandot) the words for very similar objects are astoundingly different. This fact made Monboddo to understand that primitive peoples needed to communicate reliably regarding a more limited number of subjects than in modern civilizations, which led to the polysyllabic and redundant nature of many words. He also was apparently the first to establish that primitive languages are generally vowel rich; correspondingly, very late advanced languages such as German and English are in the opposite sense vowel starved. Partially this disparity arises from the greater vocabulary of modern languages and the decreased need for the polysyllabic content.
Monboddo also traced the evolution of modern European languages and gave particularly great effort to understanding the ancient Greek language, in which he was proficient. He argued that Greek is the most perfect language ever established because of its complex structure and tonality, rendering it capable of expressing a wide gamut of nuances.
Evolutionary theorist
Monboddo is considered by many (Cloyd, 1972), (Gray, 1929), (Lovejoy, 1933) as a precursive thinker in the theory of evolution. Most modern evolution historians other than Cloyd do not give Monboddo a high standing in the influence of the history of evolution. Lovejoy clearly states that Monboddo has suggested the concept of organic evolution in his comparison to Rousseau:
[Monboddo] has developed the [evolutionary] ideas far more fully; by most educated persons in Great Britain in the [17]80s he was probably looked upon as their originator; and he with some wavering extended Rousseau's doctrine of the identity of species of man and the chimp into the hyposthesis of common descent of all the anthropoids, and suggested by implication a general law of evolution.
Lord Neaves, one of Monboddo's successors on the high court of Scotland believed that proper credit (Neaves, 1875) was not given to Monboddo in evolutionary theory development. Neaves wrote in poetic form:
Though
Darwin now proclaims the law
And sreads it far abroad, O!
The man that first the secret saw
Was honest old Monboddo.
The architect precedence takes
Of him that bears the hod, O!
So up and at them, Land of Cakes,
We'll vindicate Monboddo.
And sreads it far abroad, O!
The man that first the secret saw
Was honest old Monboddo.
The architect precedence takes
Of him that bears the hod, O!
So up and at them, Land of Cakes,
We'll vindicate Monboddo.
Erasmus Darwin clearly notes Monboddo's work in his publications (Darwin, 1803). Later scholars and historical writers knowlegeable of evolutionary theory, such as E.L. Cloyd (Cloyd, 1972) and W. Forbes Gray (Gray, 1929) consider Monboddo's analysis as precursive theory to the theory of Evolution. In any event, Maupertuis is known to have outlined the basic principles of natural selection far in advance (1745) of the english writers. Whether Charles Darwin read Monboddo is not certain, although his grandfather's understanding (Darwin, 1803) of Monboddo's thought is an indication that Charles Darwin may have drawn ideas from him. In regard to his contemporaries, Monboddo debated with Buffon regarding man's relationship to other primates. Buffon thought that man was a species unrelated to lower primates, but Monboddo rejected Buffon's analysis and argued that the antrhopoidal ape must be related to the species of man. Partly because of Monboddo's deeply religious thought, it was difficult for him to place the apes on an equal plane with man, so he sometimes referred to the anthropoidal ape as the "brother of man". Monboddo suffered a setback in his standing on evolutionary thought, because he claimed that men had caudal appendages; some historians failed to take him very seriously after that remark, even though Monboddo was known to bait his critics with preposterous sayings.
In his linguistic analysis, he is probably the first person to associate language skills evolving from primates and continuing to evolve in primitive man (Monboddo, 1773). He writes specifically about how the language capability has altered over time in the form not only of skills but physical form of the sound producing organs (mouth, vocal chords, tongue, throat), suggesting he had formed the concept of evolutionary adaptive change. He also elaborates on the advantages created by the adaptive change of primates to their environment and even to the evolving complexity of primate social structures.
As an agriculturist and horse-breeder, Monboddo was quite aware of the significance of selective breeding and even transferred this breeding theory to communications he had with James Boswell in Boswell's selection of a mate! Monboddo has stated in his own works that degenerative qualities can be inherited by successive generations and that by selective choice of mates, creatures can improve the next generation in a biological sense.
It is also noteworthy that Monboddo, like his comtemporaries that were deeply religious, never undermined the existence of God, referred to the Adam and Eve account as an allegory. That is a strong indication that Monboddo understood the role of natural processes in evolution, since Monboddo was a vigorous opponent of other scientific thinking that philosophically questioned the role of God (See partiuclarly Monboddo's prolific diatribes on Newton's theories.)
It is interesting as Cloyd notes that Monboddo struggled with how to "get man from an animal" without divine intervention, because of his religious beliefs. He developed an entire theory of language evolution around the Egyptian civilization to assist in his understanding of how man descended from animals, since he explained the flowering of language upon the spinoff of the Egyptians imparting language skills to other cultures. Monboddo cast man in his primitive state to be a wild, solitary, herbivorous quadruped. He believed that contempory man suffered many diseases because he had removed himself from his natural state in the environment of being unclothed and exposed to extreme swings in climate.
Metaphysics
In Antient Metaphysics, Burnett claimed that man is gradually elevating himself from the animal condition to a state in which mind acts independently of the body. He was a strong supporter of Aristotle in his concepts of Prime Mover. Much effort was devoted to crediting Isaac Newton with brilliant discoveries in the Laws of Motion, while defending the power of the mind as outlined by Aristotle. His analysis was further complicated by his recurring need to assure that Newton did not obviate the presence of God.
An eccentric
Burnett was widely known to be an eccentric. He often asserted that he followed practices of the ancient Greeks to keep in good physical condition. Accordingly when he came out of court one day in a downpour, he calmly placed his wig in his sedan chair and walked home. Habitually he rode on horseback between Edinburgh and London instead of journeying by carriage. Another time after a decision against him regarding the value of a horse, he refused to sit with the other judges and assumed a seat below the bench with the court clerks. When Burnett was visiting the King's Court in London in 1787, part of the ceiling of the courtroom started to collapse. People rushed out of the building but Burnett who, at the age of 71, was partially deaf and shortsighted, was the only one not move. When he was later asked for a reason, he stated that he thought it "an annual ceremony, with which, as an alien, he had nothing to do".
Finally one must remark that Burnett seemed strangely obsessed with man's relation to other primates. He clearly believed that the orangutan was a form of man; furthermore, he accepted an account of a Swedish explorer that reported one primitive tribe had tails. Most astonishingly, he at one time said that humans must have all been born with tails, that were simply removed by midwives at birth. His contemporaries ridiculed his views, but many later commentators have seen him preceding the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin. In any case in his serious analysis he clearly argued that animal species adapted and changed to survive, and his observations on the adaptive progression of primates to man underscored his clear concepts of evolution.
Publications of Lord Monboddo
The Origin and Progress of Language (6 volumes, 1773-1792)
Antient Metaphysics (6 volumes, 1779 - 1799)
British Museum, James Burnett to Cadell and Davies, 15 May, 1796, A letter bound into Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson, D.D., F.R.S.E, 2nd ed., London (1802). Shelf no.1203.f.3
Yale University Boswell Papers, James Burnett to James Boswell, 11 April and 28 May, 1777 (C.2041 and C.2042)
Publications about Lord Monboddo
Brown, M.P., ed. General Synopsis of the Decisions of the Court of Session, 5 vols. (William Tait, Edinburgh. 1829 'Decisions Collected by Lord Monboddo' V, 651-941
Boswell, James, The Essence of the Douglas Case, J. Wilke, London (1767)
Cloyd, E.L., James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1972)
Darwin, Erasmus, The temple of nature, J. Johnson, London (1803)
Gray, W. Forbes, A Forerunner of Darwin, Fortnightly Review n.s. CXXV pp 112-122 (1929)
Graham, Henry Gray, Scottish men of Letters in the Eighteenth Century, A.& C. Black, London (1901)
Hobbs, Catherine, Rhetoric on the Margin of Modernity, Vico, Condillac, Monboddo, Southern Illinois University Press (1992)
Knight, William Angus, Lord Monboddo and some of his contemporaries John Murray, London (1900)
Lovejoy, Arthur O., Monboddo and Rousseau, Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore, 1948) p61, first appearing in Modern Philogy XXX, pp 275-96, Feb, 1933
Neaves, Charles, Lord Neaves, Songs and Verses, Fourth Edition, London p5 (1875)
Nichols, W.L., Lord Monboddo Notes and Queries VII, 281 (1853)
Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696 – December 27, 1782) was a Scottish philosopher of the 18th century. Born in Kames, Berwickshire, he became an advocate (the Scottish equivalent of the English barrister) and was one of the leaders of the Scottish Enlightenment. In 1752, he was "raised to the bench", thus acquiring the title of Lord Kames.
Homes wrote much about the imporance of property to society. In his Essay Upon Several Subjects Concerning British Antiquities, written just after the Jacobite revolt of 1745 he described how the politics of Scotland were not based on loyalty to Kings or Queens as Jacobites had said but on royal land grants given in return for loyalty.
In Historical Law Tracts and later in Sketches on the History of Man he described human history as having four distinct stages. The first was as a hunter gatherer where people avoided each other out of competition. The second stage he described was a herder of domestic animals which required forming larger societies. No laws were needed at these stages except those given by the head of the family or society. Agriculture was the third stage requiring greater cooperation and new relationships to allow for trade or employment (or slavery). He argued that 'the intimate union among a multitude of individuals, occasioned by agriculture' required a new set of rights and obligations in society. This requires laws and law enforcers. A fourth stage moves from villages and farms to seaports and market towns requiring yet more laws and complexity but also much to benefit from.
The above studies created the genre of the story of civilisation and defined the fields of anthropology and sociology and therefore the modern study of history for two hundred years.
Home was also on the panel of judges in the Joseph Knight case which ruled that there could be no slavery in Scotland.
He enjoyed intelligent conversation and cultivated a large number of friends, among them John Home, David Hume and James Boswell.
His works included:
Essays upon Several Subjects in Law (1732)
Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751)
Introduction to the Art of Thinking (1761)
Elements of Criticism (1762)
Sketches of the History of Man (1776).
James Boswell
(October 29, 1740 - May 19, 1795) was a lawyer, diarist,
and author born in Edinburgh, Scotland. He was the eldest son of a
judge, Alexander Boswell of Auchinleck, Lord Auchinleck. He is best
known as the biographer of Samuel Johnson. His name has passed into the
English language as a term (Boswell, Boswellian, Boswellism) for a
constant companion and observer.Boswell is known for taking voluminous notes on the grand tour of Europe that he took as a young nobleman and, subsequently, of his tour of Scotland with Johnson. He also recorded meetings and conversations with eminent individuals belonging to The Club, including Lord Monboddo, David Garrick, Edmund Burke, Joshua Reynolds and Oliver Goldsmith. His written works focus chiefly on others, but he was admitted as a good companion and accomplished conversationalist in his own right.
Early life
European travels
Mature life
Quotes
Discovery of papers
Works
Early life
Boswell was born near St Giles Cathedral in Edinburgh. He was educated at James Mundell's academy, followed by a string of private tutors before being sent at the age of thirteen to the city's University by his father to study law. Upon turning nineteen he was sent to continue his studies at the University of Glasgow, where he was taught by Adam Smith. While at Glasgow, Boswell decided to convert to Catholicism and become a monk. Upon learning of this, Boswell's father ordered him home. Instead of obeying, Boswell ran away to London.
Boswell spent three months in London, where he lived the life of a libertine before he was taken back to Scotland by his father. Upon returning, Boswell was re-enrolled at Edinburgh University and was forced by his father to sign away most of his inheritance in return for an allowance of £100 a year. On July 30, 1762 Boswell took his oral law exam, which he passed with some skill. Upon this success, Lord Auchinleck decided to raise his son's allowance to £200 a year and allowed him to return to London. It was during this spell in London that Boswell met Johnson for the first time, on May 16, 1763; the pair became friends almost immediately. Boswell was eventually nicknamed Bozzy by Johnson.
European travels
It was around three months after this first encounter with Johnson that Boswell departed for Europe with the initial goal of continuing his law studies at Utrecht University. Boswell, however, spent most of the next two and a half years travelling around the continent. During this time he met such people as Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and made a pilgrimage to Rome. Boswell also travelled to Corsica to meet one of his heroes, the independence leader Pasquale Paoli.
Mature life
Boswell returned to London in February 1766, accompanied by Rousseau's mistress. After spending a few weeks in the capital, he returned to Scotland to take his final law exam. He passed the exam and became an advocate. He practiced for over a decade, during which time he spent no more than a month every year with Johnson.
Boswell married his cousin, Margaret Montgomerie, in November 1769. She remained faithful to Boswell, despite his infidelities, until her death of tuberculosis in 1789. Despite his relative literary success with accounts of his European travels, Boswell was an unsuccessful advocate. By the late 1770s he descended further and further into alcoholism and gambling addiction. James and Margaret had four sons and three daughters. Two sons died in infancy; the other two were Alexander (1775-1822) and James (1778-1822). Their daughters were Veronica (1773-1795), Euphemia (1774-ca. 1834) and Elizabeth (1780-1814). Boswell also had at least two illegitimate children, Charles (1762-1764) and Sally (1767-1768?).
After Johnson's death in 1784, Boswell moved to London to try his luck at the English bar, which proved even more unsuccessful than his career in Scotland. He also offered to stand for Parliament but failed to get the necessary support. He spent the final years of his life writing his Life of Johnson, which at once commanded an admiration which has suffered no diminution since, while his health began to fail due to his years of drinking and venereal disease.
The question has often been raised of how a man like Boswell could have produced so remarkable a work as the Life of Johnson. Among those attempting an answer were Macaulay and Carlyle: the former arguing, paradoxically, that Boswell's uninhibited folly and triviality were his greatest qualifications; the latter, with deeper insight, replying that beneath such traits were a mind to discern excellence and a heart to appreciate it, aided by the power of accurate observation and considerable dramatic ability.
Quotes
"For my own part I think no innocent species of wit or pleasantry should be suppressed: and that a good pun may be admitted among the smaller excellencies of lively conversation."
"We cannot tell the precise moment when friendship is formed. As in filling a vessel drop by drop, there is at last a drop which makes it run over. So in a series of kindnesses there is, at last, one which makes the heart run over."
"My heart warmed to my countrymen, and my Scotch blood boiled with indignation. I jumped from the benches, roared out 'Damn you, you rascals!', hissed and was in the greatest rage . . . I hated the English; I wished from my soul that the Union was broke and that we might give them another battle of Bannockburn"
Discovery of papers
In the 1920s a great part of his private papers were discovered at Malahide Castle, north of Dublin. They were sold to the American collector Ralph H. Isham and have since passed to Yale University, which has published general and scholarly editions of his journals and correspondence. His London Journal 1762-63 was published in 1950.
Works
London Journal (1762-1763)
Dorando, a Spanish Tale (1767, anonymously)
Account of Corsica (1768)
The Hypochondriack (1777-1783, a monthly series in the London Magazine)
A Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides (1785)
The Life of Samuel Johnson (1791, reprinted in Everyman's Library)
Samuel Johnson,
LL.D. (September 7, 1709 Old Style/September 18 New
Style December 13, 1784 – see Note below), often referred to simply as
Dr Johnson, was one of England's greatest literary figures: a poet,
essayist, biographer, lexicographer, and often esteemed the finest
literary critic in English. Johnson was a great wit and prose stylist
of genius, whose bons mots are still frequently quoted in print today.Among students of philosophy, Dr. Johnson is perhaps best known for his "refutation" of Bishop Berkeley's idealism. During a conversation with his biographer, Johnson became infuriated at the suggestion that Berkeley's immaterialism, however obviously false, could not be refuted. In his anger, Johnson powerfully kicked a nearby stone and proclaimed, of Berkeley's theory, that "I refute it thus!".
Samuel Johnson circa 1772, painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds.
Life and work
Major works
Biography, criticism, lexicography, prose
Essays, pamphlets, periodicals
Poetry
Life and work
The son of a poor bookseller, Johnson was born in Lichfield, Staffordshire. He attended Lichfield Grammar School. A few weeks after he turned nineteen, on October, 31st 1728, he entered Pembroke College, Oxford; he was to remain there for thirteen months. Though he was a formidable student, poverty forced him to leave Oxford without taking a degree. He attempted to work as a teacher and schoolmaster; initially turned down by Revd Samuel Lea MA (headmaster of Adams' Grammar School) he found work at a school in Stourbridge, but these ventures were not successful. At the age of twenty-five, he married Elizabeth "Tetty" Porter, a widow twenty-one years his senior.
In 1737, Johnson, penniless, left for London together with his former pupil David Garrick. Johnson found employment with Edward Cave, writing for The Gentleman's Magazine. For the next three decades, Johnson wrote biographies, poetry, essays, pamphlets, parliamentary reports and even prepared a catalogue for the sale of the Harleian Library. Johnson lived in poverty for much of this time. The poem "London" (1738) and the Life of Savage (1745), a biography of Johnson's friend and fellow writer Richard Savage, who had shared in Johnson's poverty and died in 1744, are important works of this period.
Johnson began on one of his most important works, A Dictionary of the English Language, in 1747. It was not completed until 1755. Although it was widely praised and enormously influential, Johnson did not profit from it much financially, since he had to bear the expenses of its long composition. At the same time he was working on his dictionary, Johnson was also writing a series of semi-weekly essays under the title The Rambler. These essays, often on moral and religious topics, tended to be more grave than the title of the series would suggest. The Rambler ran until 1752. Although not originally popular, they found a large audience once they were collected in volume form. Johnson's wife died shortly after the final number appeared.
Johnson began another essay series, The Idler, in 1758. It ran weekly for two years. The Idler essays were published in a weekly news journal, rather than as an independent publication like The Rambler. They were shorter and lighter than the Rambler essays. In 1759, Johnson published his satirical novel Rasselas, said to have been written in two weeks to pay for his mother's funeral. At some point, however, Johnson gained a reputation for being a notoriously slow writer, and poet Charles Churchill wrote of him that He for subscribers baits his hook - and takes your cash, but where's the book.
In 1762, Johnson was awarded a government pension of three hundred pounds a year, largely through the efforts of Thomas Sheridan and the Earl of Bute. Johnson met James Boswell, his future biographer, in 1763. Around the same time, Johnson formed "The Club", a social group that included his friends Joshua Reynolds, Edmund Burke, David Garrick and Oliver Goldsmith. By now, Johnson was a celebrated figure. He received an honorary doctorate from Trinity College, Dublin in 1765, and one from Oxford ten years later.
In 1765, he met Henry Thrale, a wealthy brewer and member of Parliament, and his wife Hester Thrale. They quickly became friends, and soon Johnson became a member of the family. He stayed with the Thrales for fifteen years until Henry's death in 1781. Hester's reminiscences of Johnson, together with her diaries and correspondence, are second only to Boswell's as a source of biographical information on Johnson.
In 1773, ten years after he met Boswell, the two set out on A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, and two years later Johnson's account of their travels was published under that title. (Boswell's The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides was published in 1786) Their visit to the Scottish Highlands and Hebrides took place when pacification after the Jacobite Risings was crushing the Clan system and Gaelic culture which was increasingly being romanticised. Johnson proceeded to attack the claims that James Macpherson's Ossian poems were translations of ancient Scottish literature, on the basis that the Gaelic language "never was a written language." This reveals Johnson's undoubted anti-Gaelic and anti-Scottish prejudice, but also perhaps some of the paranoia left-over after being fooled by a Scotsman called William Lauder into proclaiming John Milton a fraud, before consequently being made to look ridiculous by yet another Scot, John Douglas. Johnson spent considerable time in Edinburgh in the 1770s, where he was a close friend of Boswell and of Lord Monboddo; this triumvirate conducted extensive correspondence and mutual literary reviews.
Johnson's final major work was the Lives of the English Poets, a project commissioned by a consortium of London booksellers. The Lives, which were critical as well as biographical studies, appeared as prefaces to selections of each poet's work.
Johnson died in 1784 and is buried in Westminster Abbey.
Large and powerfully built, Johnson had poor eyesight and was hard of hearing. His face was deeply scarred from childhood scrofula. Johnson suffered from a number of tics and larger jerky involuntary movements; symptoms described by his contemporaries suggest that Johnson may have suffered from Tourette syndrome and possibly obsessive-compulsive disorder. He tended towards melancholia. Johnson was a compassionate man, supporting a number of poor friends under his own roof. He was a devout, conservative Anglican as well as a staunch Tory. He admitted to sympathies for the Jacobite cause but by the reign of George III he came to accept the Hanoverian Succession. Nonetheless, Johnson was a fiercely independent and original thinker, as much a unique thinker-for-himself as Milton or Blake, which may explain his deep affinity for Milton despite the latter's intensely radical — and, for Johnson, intolerable — political and religious outlook; it is perhaps this privation of elaborate systematic and constructive intellectual proclivities that motivated his singular strength and recourse to the composition of satirical and critical works, though his profound and often deeply melancholy sense of humour or wit must also share responsiblity.
Johnson's fame is due in part to the success of Boswell's Life of Johnson. Boswell, however, met Johnson when Johnson had already achieved a degree of fame and stability; Boswell's biography puts disproportionate emphasis on the last years of Johnson's life. Consequently, Johnson has been seen more as a gruff, lovable clubman than as the struggling and poverty-stricken writer that he was for the greater part of his life.
His time in Birmingham (after leaving Oxford and before he moved to London) is remembered by a frieze in the city's Old Square, an area much changed from when he lived there. Birmingham Central Library has a Johnson Collection. It has around 2,000 volumes of works by him, and books and periodicals about him. It includes many of his first editions.
Major works
Biography, criticism, lexicography, prose
Life of Richard Savage (1745)
A Dictionary of the English Language (1755)
The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia (1759)
The Plays of William Shakespeare (1765)
A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland (1775)
Lives of the English Poets (1781)
Essays, pamphlets, periodicals
"Plan for a Dictionary of the English Language" (1747)
The Rambler (1750-2)
The Idler (1758-60)
"The False Alarm" (1770)
"The Patriot" (1774)
Poetry
London (1738)
"Prologue at the Opening of the Theatre in Drury Lane" (1747)
The Vanity of Human Wishes (1749)
Irene, a Tragedy (1749)
Note
After England's change from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar in 1752, Johnson celebrated his birthday on September 18.
James Hutton (3 June 1726 O.S. (14 June 1726
N.S.), Edinburgh, – 26
March 1797) was a Scottish geologist, noted for formulating
uniformitarianism and the Plutonist School of thought. He is considered by many to be the father of modern geology.
Study of rock formations
Publication
Opposing theories
Acceptance of geological theories
Other contributions
Meteorology
Evolution
Works
Study of rock formations
Trained as both a lawyer and medical doctor, Hutton found himself attracted to the nascent science of geology. While working as a "gentleman farmer" in Berwickshire during his thirties and forties, he hit on a variety of ideas to explain the rock formations he saw around him. Studying at the University of Edinburgh in the throes of the Scottish Enlightenment, he fell in with several first-class minds in the sciences including John Playfair and Joseph Black. He was also a close friend of philosopher David Hume and economist Adam Smith.
At Glen Tilt in the Cairngorm mountains in the Scottish Highlands, Hutton found granite penetrating metamorphic schists, in a way which indicated that the granite had been molten at the time. This showed to him that granite formed from cooling of molten rock, not precipitation out of water, and that the granite must be younger than the schists.
Hutton Unconformity at Jedburgh, Scotland, illustrated by John Clerk in 1787.
Hutton's Section Plaque,
Salisbury Crags, Edinburgh. Placed by Historic
Scotland
He also noted what became known as "Hutton's Unconformity" in layers of
sedimentary rocks at Siccar Point on the Berwickshire coast (Grid
reference NT813710) about midway between Dunbar and Eyemouth, some
30 miles (50 km) east of Edinburgh. Here, the lower part of
the cliff shows layers of grey shale tilted to lie almost vertically,
then immediately above this the upper part of the cliff shows near
horizontal layers of red sandstone. Hutton reasoned that there must have been several cycles, each involving deposition on the seabed, uplift with tilting and erosion then undersea again for further layers to be deposited, and there could have been many cycles before over an extremely long history.
At Siccar Point around 1786 he remarked of this discovery of geological time "that we find no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of an end", and when he brought John Playfair to see the strata, Playfair commented that "the mind seemed to grow giddy by looking so far into the abyss of time".
Publication
An abstract of Hutton's Theory was first read at meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh on 7 March 1785 and 4 April 1785. It was then published in Volume I of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 1788.
Following criticism, especially that of Richard Kirwan, who accused him of atheism and poor logic, among other things, Hutton published a two volume version of his theory in 1795, consisting of the 1788 version of his theory (with slight additions) along with much material drawn from shorter papers Hutton already had to hand on various subjects, such as the origin of granite. It also included a review of alternative theories, such as those of Thomas Burnet and Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon. A third volume was never completed.
Its 2,138 pages of opaque prose made Playfair remark that "The great size of the book, and the obscurity which may justly be objected to many parts of it, have probably prevented it from being received as it deserves."
Opposing theories
His new theories placed him into opposition with the then-popular Neptunist theories of Abraham Gottlob Werner, that all rocks had precipitated out of a single enormous flood. Hutton proposed that the interior of the Earth was hot, and that this heat was the engine which drove the creation of new rock: land was eroded by air and water and deposited as layers in the sea; heat then consolidated the sediment into stone, and uplifted it into new lands. This theory was dubbed "Plutonist" in contrast to the flood-oriented theory.
As well as combatting the Neptunists, he also opened up the concept of deep time for scientific purposes, in opposition to Catastrophism. Rather than accepting that the earth was no more than a few thousand years old, he maintained that the Earth must be much older (indeed, he went rather overboard and asserted that the Earth was infinitely old). His main line of argument was that the tremendous displacements and changes he was seeing did not happen in a short period of time by means of catastrophe, but that processes still happening on the Earth in the present day had caused them. As these processes were very gradual, the Earth needed to be ancient, in order to allow time for the changes. Before long, scientific inquiries provoked by his claims had pushed back the age of the earth into the millions of years – still too short when compared with what is known in the 21st century, but a distinct improvement.
Acceptance of geological theories
The prose of Principles of Knowledge was so obscure, in fact, that it also impeded the acceptance of Hutton's geological theories. Restatements of his geological ideas (though not his thoughts on evolution) by John Playfair in 1802 and then Charles Lyell in the 1830s removed this hinderance. If anything, Hutton's ideas were eventually accepted too well. At least some of the initial resistance to modern scientific ideas like plate tectonics and asteroid strikes causing mass extinctions can be attributed to too-strict adherence to uniformitarianism.
Meteorology
It was not merely the earth to which Hutton directed his attention. He had long studied the changes of the atmosphere. The same volume in which his Theory of the Earth appeared contained also a Theory of Rain. He contended that the amount of moisture which the air can retain in solution increases with temperature, and, therefore, that on the mixture of two masses of air of different temperatures a portion of the moisture must be condensed and appear in visible form. He investigated the available data regarding rainfall and climate in different regions of the globe, and came to the conclusion that the rainfall is regulated by the humidity of the air on the one hand, and mixing of different air currents in the higher atmosphere on the other.
Evolution
Hutton also advocated uniformitarianism for living creatures too – evolution, in a sense – and even suggested natural selection as a possible mechanism affecting them:
"...if
an organised body is not in the situation and circumstances best
adapted to its sustenance and propagation, then, in conceiving an
indefinite variety among the individuals of that species, we must be
assured, that, on the one hand, those which depart most from the best
adapted constitution, will be the most liable to perish, while, on the
other hand, those organised bodies, which most approach to the best
constitution for the present circumstances, will be best adapted to
continue, in preserving themselves and multiplying the individuals of
their race." –
Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge, volume 2
Hutton gave the example that where dogs survived through "swiftness of foot and quickness of sight... the most defective in respect of those necessary qualities, would be the most subject to perish, and that those who employed them in greatest perfection... would be those who would remain, to preserve themselves, and to continue the race". Equally, if an acute sense of smell was "more necessary to the sustenance of the animal... the same principle [would] change the qualities of the animal, and.. produce a race of well scented hounds, instead of those who catch their prey by swiftness". The same "principle of variation" would influence "every species of plant, whether growing in a forest or a meadow".
He came to his ideas as the result of experiments in plant and animal breeding, some of which he outlined in an unpublished manuscript, the Elements of Agriculture. He distinguished between heritable variation as the result of breeding, and non-heritable variations caused by environmental differences such as soil and climate.
Hutton saw his "principle of variation" as explaining the development of varieties, but rejected the idea of evolution originating species as a "romantic fantasy". As a deist, to him this mechanism allowed species to form varieties better adapted to particular conditions and was evidence of benevolent design in nature. Hutton's ideas on geology were clarified in Charles Lyell's books which Charles Darwin read with enthusiasm during the voyage of the Beagle, and it remained to Darwin to independently develop the idea of natural selection to explain The Origin of Species and bring it to the forefront of public consciousness at the same time as providing the voluminous evidence necessary to win over the scientific community to the theory.
Works
Investigation of the Principles of Knowledge 1794
Theory of the Earth 1795
Elements of Agriculture 1797
James Watt (19 January 1736 – 19 August 1819)
was a Scottish inventor
and engineer whose improvements to the steam engine were fundamental to
the changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution.Early years
Steam engine
Method and personality
Later years
Controversy
Legacy
Honours
Remembrance
References
Early years
James Watt was born on 19 January 1736 in Greenock, a seaport on the Firth of Clyde in Scotland. His father was a prosperous shipwright, shipowner and contractor, while his mother, Agnes Muirhead, came from a distinguished family and was well-educated. Both were Presbyterians and strong Covenanters.
Watt was a delicate child, attending school irregularly and instead mostly schooled at home by his mother. He exhibited great manual dexterity, an aptitude for mathematics and absorbed the legends and lore of the Scottish people.
When he was seventeen, his mother died and his father's fortunes had begun to fail. Watt traveled to London to study mathematical instrument-making for a year, then returned to Scotland – to Glasgow – intent on setting up his own instrument-making business. However, because he had not served at least seven years as an apprentice, the Glasgow Guild of Hammermen (any artisans using hammers) blocked his application, despite there being no other mathematical instrument-makers in Scotland.
Watt was saved from this impasse by the professors of the University of Glasgow, who offered him the opportunity to set up a small workshop within the university. It was established in 1757 and one of the professors, the physicist and chemist Joseph Black, became Watt's friend and mentor.
In 1767, Watt married his cousin, Margaret Miller, with whom he would have six children.
Steam engine
Four years after opening his shop, Watt began to experiment with steam after his friend, Professor Robison, called his attention to it. At this point Watt had still never seen an operating steam engine, but he tried constructing a model. It failed to work satisfactorily, but he continued his experiments and began to read everything about it he could. He independently discovered the importance of latent heat in understanding the engine, which, unknown to him, Black had famously discovered some years before. He learned that the University owned a model Newcomen engine, but it was in London for repairs. Watt got the university to have it returned, and he made the repairs in 1763. It too just barely worked, and after much experimentation he showed that about 80% of the heat of the steam was consumed in heating the cylinder, because the steam in it was condensed by an injected stream of cold water. His critical insight, to cause the steam to condense in a separate chamber apart from the piston, and to maintain the temperature of the cylinder at the same temperature as the injected steam, came finally in 1765 and he soon had a working model.
Now came a long struggle to produce a full-scale engine. This required more capital, some of which came from Black. More substantial backing came from John Roebuck, the founder of the celebrated Carron Iron Works, with whom he now formed a partnership. But the principal difficulty was in machining the piston and cylinder. Iron workers of the day were more like blacksmiths than machinists, so the results left much to be desired. Much capital was expended in pursuing the ground-breaking patent, which in those days required an act of parliament. Strapped for resources, Watt was forced to take up employment as a surveyor for eight years. Roebuck went bankrupt, and Matthew Boulton, who owned the Soho foundry works near Birmingham, acquired his patent rights. Watt and Boulton formed a hugely successful partnership which lasted for the next twenty-five years.
Watt finally had access to some of the best iron workers in the world. The difficulty of the manufacture of a large cylinder with a tightly fitting piston was solved by John Wilkinson who had developed precision boring techniques for cannon making. Finally, in 1776 the first engines were installed and working in commercial enterprises. These first engines were used for pumps and produced only reciprocating motion. Orders began to pour in and for the next five years Watt was very busy installing more engines, mostly in Cornwall for pumping water out of mines.
The field of application of the invention was greatly widened only after Boulton urged Watt to convert the reciprocating motion of the piston to produce rotational power for grinding, weaving and milling. Although a crank seemed the logical and obvious solution to the conversion Watt and Boulton were stymied by a patent for this, whose holder, John Steed, and associates proposed to cross-license the external condensor. Watt adamantly opposed this and they circumvented the patent by their sun and planet gear in 1781.
Over the next six years, he made a number of other improvements and modifications to the steam engine. A double acting engine, in which the steam acted alternately on the two sides of the piston was one. A throttle valve to control the power of the engine, and a centrifugal governor to keep it from "running away" were very important. He described methods for working the steam expansively. A compound engine, which connected two or more engines was described. Two more patents were granted for these in 1781 and 1782. Numerous other improvements that made for easier manufacture and installation were continually implemented. One of these included the use of the steam indicator which produced an informative plot of the pressure in the cylinder against its volume, which he kept as a trade secret. Another important invention, one of which Watt was most proud, was the three-bar linkage which produced the straight line motion required for the cylinder rod and pump, from the connected rocking beam, whose end moves in a circular arc. This was patented in 1784. These improvements taken together produced an engine which was something like five times as efficient in its use of fuel as the Newcomen engine.
Because of the danger of exploding boilers and the ongoing issues with leaks, Watt was opposed at first to the use of high pressure steam--essentially all of his engines used steam at near atmospheric pressure.
In 1794 the partners established Boulton and Watt to exclusively manufacture steam engines, and this became a large enterprise. By 1824 it had produced 1164 steam engines having a total nominal horsepower of about 26,000. Boulton proved to be an excellent businessman, and both men eventually made fortunes.
Method and personality
Watt was very much an enthusiastic inventor, with a very fertile imagination that sometimes got in the way of finally finishing his works, because he could always see "just one more improvement." He was quite skilled with his hands, but was also able to perform systematic scientific measurements that could quantify the improvements he made, and produce a greater understanding of the phenomenon he was working with.
Watt was a gentle man, greatly respected by other prominent men of the industrial revolution. He was an important member of the Lunar Society, and was a much sought after conversationalist and companion, always interested in expanding his horizons. He was a rather poor businessman, and especially hated bargaining and negotiating terms with those who sought to utilize the steam engine. Until he retired, he was always much concerned about his financial affairs, and was something of a worrier. His personal relationships with his friends and partners was always congenial and long-lasting.
Later years
Watt retired in 1800, the same year that his fundamental patent and partnership with Boulton expired. The famous partnership was transferred to the men's sons, Matthew Boulton and James Watt, Jr. William Murdoch was made a partner and the firm prospered.
Watt continued to invent other things before and during his semi-retirement. He invented a new method of measuring distances by telescope, a device for copying letters, improvements in the oil lamp, a steam mangle and a machine for copying sculpture.
He and his second wife traveled to France and Germany, and he purchased an estate in Wales, which he much improved.
He died in his home at Heathfield on 25 August 1819 at the age of 83.
Controversy
As with many major inventions, there is some dispute as to whether Watt was the original sole inventor of some of the numerous inventions he patented. There is no dispute, however, that he was the sole inventor of his most important invention, the separate condenser. It was his practice, (from around the 1780's) to pre-empt other's ideas which were known to him by filing patents with the intention of securing credit for the invention for himself, and ensuring that no one else was able practice it. As he states in a letter to Boulton of 17 August 1784:
"I have given such descriptions of engines for wheel carriages as I could do in the time and space I could allow myself; but it is very defective and can only serve to keep other people from similar patents".
Some argue that his prohibitions on his employee William Murdoch from working with high pressure steam on his steam locomotive experiments delayed its development. With his partner Matthew Boulton Watt battled against rival engineers such as Jonathan Hornblower who tried to develop engines which did not fall foul of his patents.
Watt patented the application of the sun and planet gear to steam in 1781 and a steam locomotive in 1784, both of which have strong claims to have been invented by his employee, William Murdoch. Watt himself described the provenance of the invention of the sun and planet gear in a letter to Boulton from Watt dated, January 3rd, 1782, :
"I
have tried a model of one of my old plans of rotative engines
revived and executed by W. M(urdock) and which merits being included in
the specification as a fifth method..."
The patent was never contested by Murdoch, who remained an employee of Boulton and Watt for most of his life, and Boulton and Watt's firm continued to use the sun and planet gear in their rotative engines, even long after the patent for the crank expired in 1794.
Legacy
James Watt's improved steam engine transformed the Newcomen engine, which had hardly changed for fifty years, into a source of power that transformed the world of work, and was the key innovation that brought forth the Industrial Revolution. The importance of the invention can hardly be underestimated--it gave us the modern world. A key feature of it was that it brought the engine out of the remote coal fields into factories where many mechanics, engineers, and even tinkerers were exposed to its virtues and limitations. It was a platform for generations of inventive men to improve. It was clear to many that higher pressures produced in improved boilers would produce engines having even higher efficiency, and would lead to the revolution in transportation that was soon embodied in the locomotive and steamboat. It made possible the construction of new factories that, since they were not dependent on water power, could work the year round, and could be placed almost anywhere. Work was moved out of the cottages, resulting in economies of scale. Capital could work more efficiently, and manufacturing productivity greatly improved. It made possible the cascade of new sorts of machine tools that could be used to produce better machines, including that most remarkable of all of them, the Watt steam engine.
Honours
Watt was a fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Royal Society of London. He was a member of the Batavian Society, and one of only eight Foreign Associates of the French Academy of Sciences.
Remembrance
Watt was buried in the grounds of St. Mary's Church, Handsworth, in Birmingham. Later expansion of the church, over his grave, means that his tomb is now buried inside the church. A statue of him, Boulton and Murdoch is in Birmingham. He is also remembered by the Moonstones and a school is named in his honour, all in Birmingham. There are over 50 roads or streets in the UK named after him. Many of his papers are in Birmingham Central Library. Matthew Boulton's home, Soho House, is now a museum, commemorating the work of both men.
There are colleges named after him in Scotland; most notably James Watt College, with campuses in Kilwinning (North Ayrshire), Finnart Street and The Waterfront in Greenock and the Sports campus in Largs. The Heriot-Watt University near Edinburgh was at one time the "Watt Institution and School of Arts" named in his memory, then merged with George Heriot's Hospital for needy orphans and the name was changed to Heriot-Watt College.
Watt was ranked #1, tying with Edison, among 229 significant figures in the history of technology by Charles Murray's survey of historiometry presented in his book Human Accomplishments. "Watt was ranked #22 on Michael H. Hart's list of the most influential figures in history.
The SI unit of power, the watt, is named after him.
A colossal statue of him by Chantrey was placed in Westminster Abbey, and on this cenotaph the inscription reads:
NOT TO PERPUATE A NAME,
WHICH MUST ENDURE WHILE THE PEACEFUL ARTS FLOURISH,
BUT TO SHOW
THAT MANKIND HAVE LEARNED TO HONOUR THOSE
WHO BEST DESERVE THEIR GRATIDUDE,
THE KING,
HIS MINISTERS, AND MANY OF THE NOBLES
AND COMMONERS OF THE REALM
RAISED THIS MONUMENT TO
JAMES WATT
WHO DIRECTING THE FORCE OF AN ORIGINAL GENIUS
EARLY EXERCISED IN PHILOSOPHIC RESEARCH
TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE STEAM-ENGINE
ENLARGED THE RESOURCES OF HIS COUNTRY
INCREASED THE POWER OF MAN
AND ROSE TO AN EMINENT PLACE
AMONG THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS FOLLOWERS OP SCIENCE
AND THE REAL BENEFACTORS OF THE WORLD
BORN AT GREENOCK MDCCXXXVI
DIED AT HEATHFIELD IN STAFFORDSHIRE MDCCCXIX
WHICH MUST ENDURE WHILE THE PEACEFUL ARTS FLOURISH,
BUT TO SHOW
THAT MANKIND HAVE LEARNED TO HONOUR THOSE
WHO BEST DESERVE THEIR GRATIDUDE,
THE KING,
HIS MINISTERS, AND MANY OF THE NOBLES
AND COMMONERS OF THE REALM
RAISED THIS MONUMENT TO
JAMES WATT
WHO DIRECTING THE FORCE OF AN ORIGINAL GENIUS
EARLY EXERCISED IN PHILOSOPHIC RESEARCH
TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE STEAM-ENGINE
ENLARGED THE RESOURCES OF HIS COUNTRY
INCREASED THE POWER OF MAN
AND ROSE TO AN EMINENT PLACE
AMONG THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS FOLLOWERS OP SCIENCE
AND THE REAL BENEFACTORS OF THE WORLD
BORN AT GREENOCK MDCCXXXVI
DIED AT HEATHFIELD IN STAFFORDSHIRE MDCCCXIX
References
Dickenson, H. W., "James Watt: Craftsman and Engineer" Cambridge University Press (1935).
Carnegie, Andrew James Watt University Press of the Pacific (2001) (Reprinted from the 1913 ed.), ISBN 0898755786.
Rev. Dr. Richard L. James Watt, Vol 1, His time in Scotland, 1736-1774 (2002) Landmark Publishing Ltd, ISBN 1843060450.
Dugald Stewart (November 22, 1753 - June
11, 1828), Scottish
philosopher, was born in Edinburgh. His father, Matthew Stewart (1715 -
1785), was professor of mathematics in the university of Edinburgh
(1747 - 1772).Dugald Stewart was educated in Edinburgh at the high school and the university, where he read mathematics and moral philosophy under Adam Ferguson. In 1771, in the hope of gaining a Snell exhibition and proceeding to Oxford to study for the English Church, he went to Glasgow, where he attended the classes of Thomas Reid. While he owed to Reid all his theory of morality, he repaid the debt by giving to Reid's views the advantage of his admirable style and academic eloquence.
In Glasgow Stewart boarded in the same house with Archibald Alison, author of the Essay on Taste, and a lasting friendship sprang up between them.
After a single session in Glasgow, Dugald Stewart, at the age of nineteen, was summoned by his father, whose health was beginning to fail, to conduct the mathematical classes in the university of Edinburgh. After acting three years as his father's substitute he was elected professor of mathematics in conjunction with him in 1775. Three years later Adam Ferguson was appointed secretary to the commissioners sent out to the American colonies, and at his urgent request Stewart lectured as his substitute. Thus during the session 1778 - 1779, in addition to his mathematical work, he delivered an original course of lectures on morals. In 1783 he married Helen Bannatyne, who died in 1787, leaving an only son, Colonel Matthew Stewart.
In 1785 he succeeded Ferguson in the chair of moral philosophy, which he filled for twenty-five years, making it a centre of intellectual and moral influence. Young men were attracted by his reputation from England, and even from the Continent and America. Among his pupils were Sir Walter Scott, Francis Jeffrey, Henry Thomas Cockburn, Francis Homer, Sydney Smith, Lord Brougham, Dr Thomas Brown, James Mill, Sir James Mackintosh and Sir Archibald Alison. The course on moral philosophy embraced, besides ethics proper, lectures on political philosophy or the theory of government, and from 1800 onwards a separate course of lectures was delivered on political economy, then almost unknown as a science to the general public. Stewart's enlightened political teaching was sufficient, in the times of reaction succeeding the French Revolution, to draw upon him the undeserved suspicion of disaffection to the constitution. The summers of 1788 and 1789 he spent in France, where he met Suard, Degbrando, Raynal, and learned to sympathize with the revolutionary movement.
Edenside, Dugald
Stewart’s Kelso residence
In 1790 Stewart married a Miss Cranstoun. His second wife was well-born and accomplished, and he was in the habit of submitting to her criticism whatever he wrote. They had a son and a daughter, but the son's death in 1809 was a severe blow to his father, and brought about his retirement from the active duties of his chair. Before that, however, Stewart had not been idle as an author. As a student in Glasgow he wrote an essay on Dreaming. In 1792 he published the first volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; the second volume appeared in 1814, the third not till 1827. In 1793 he printed a textbook, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, which went through many editions; and in the same year he read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh his account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith.
Similar memoirs of Robertson the historian and of Reid were afterwards read before the same body and appear in his published works. In 1805 Stewart published pamphlets defending Mr (afterwards Sir John) Leslie against the charges of unorthodoxy made by the presbytery of Edinburgh. In 1806 he received in lieu of a pension the nominal office of the writership of the Edinburgh Gazette, with a salary of £300. When the shock of his son's death incapacitated him from lecturing during the session of 1809-1810, his place was taken, at his own request, by Dr Thomas Brown, who in 1810 was appointed conjoint professor. On the death of Brown in 1820 Stewart retired altogether from the professorship, which was conferred upon John Wilson, better known as "Christopher North," From 1809 onwards Stewart lived mainly at Kinneil House, Linlithgowshire, which was placed at his disposal by the Duke of Hamilton. In 1810 appeared the Philosophical Essays, in 1814 the second volume of the Elements, in 1811 the first part and in 1821 the second part of the "Dissertation" written for the Encyclopaedia Britannica Supplement, entitled "A General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters."
In 1822 he was struck with paralysis, but recovered a fair degree of health, sufficient to enable him to resume his studies. In 1827 he published the third volume of the Elements, and in 1828, a few weeks before his death, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. He died in Edinburgh, where a monument to his memory was erected on Calton Hill.
Stewart's philosophical views are mainly the reproduction of his master Reid. He upheld Reid's psychological method and expounded the "common-sense" doctrine, which was attacked by the two Mills. Unconsciously, however, he fell away from the pure Scottish tradition and made concessions both to moderate empiricism and to the French ideologists (Laromiguière, Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy). It is important to notice the energy of his declaration against the argument of ontology, and also against Condillac's sensationalism. Kant, he confessed, he could not understand. Perhaps his most valuable and original work is his theory of taste--the Philosophical Essays. But his reputation rests rather on his inspiring eloquence and the beauty of his style than on original work.
Stewart's works were edited in 11 vols. (1854 - 1858) by Sir William Hamilton and completed with a memoir by John Veitch. Matthew Stewart (his eldest son) wrote a life in Annual Biography and Obituary (1829), republished privately in 1838. For his philosophy see McCosh, Scottish Philosophy (1875), pp. 162-173; A Bain, Mental Science, pp. 208, 313 and app. 29, 65, 88, 89; Moral Science, pp. 639 seq.; Sir L Stephen, English Thought in the XVIII Century.
Adam Ferguson, sometimes known as Ferguson of
Raith (June 20, 1723
(O.S.) - February 22, 1816) was a philosopher and historian in the
Scottish Enlightenment.Life
Thought
Main works by Adam Ferguson
Bibliography
Life
Born at Logierait in Perthshire, Scotland, he received his education at Perth grammar school and at the University of St Andrews. In 1745, owing to his knowledge of Gaelic, he gained appointment as deputy chaplain of the 43rd (afterwards the 42nd) regiment (the Black Watch), the licence to preach being granted him by special dispensation, although he had not completed the required six years of theological study. It remains a matter of debate as to whether, at the Battle of Fontenoy (1745), Ferguson fought in the ranks throughout the day, and refused to leave the field, though ordered to do so by his colonel. Nevertheless, he certainly did well, becoming principal chaplain in 1746. He continued attached to the regiment till 1754, when, disappointed at not obtaining a living, he left the clergy and resolved to devote himself to literary pursuits.
After residing in Leipzig for a time, he returned to Edinburgh where in January 1757 he succeeded David Hume as librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, but soon relinquished this office on becoming tutor in the family of the Earl of Bute. In 1759 Ferguson became professor of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and in 1764 transferred to the chair of "pneumatics" (mental philosophy) "and moral philosophy."
In 1767, against Hume's advice, he published his Essay on the History of Civil Society, which was well received and translated into several European languages. In the mid 1770s he travelled again to the Continent and met Voltaire.
In 1776 appeared his (anonymous) pamphlet on the American Revolution in opposition to Dr Richard Price's Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, in which he sympathized with the views of the British legislature. In 1778 Ferguson was appointed secretary to the Carlisle commission which endeavoured, but without success, to negotiate an arrangement with the revolted colonies.
In 1783 appeared his History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic; it became very popular, and went through several editions. Ferguson believed that the history of the Romans during the period of their greatness formed a practical illustration of those ethical and political doctrines which he studied especially. The history reads well and impartially, and displays conscientious use of sources. The influence of the author's military experience shows itself in certain portions of the narrative. Tired of teaching, he resigned his professorship in 1785, and devoted himself to the revision of his lectures, which he published (1792) under the title of Principles of Moral and Political Science.
In his seventieth year, Ferguson, intending to prepare a new edition of the history, visited Italy and some of the principal cities of Europe, where he was received with honour by learned societies. From 1795 he resided successively at the old castle of Neidpath near Peebles, at Hallyards on Manor Water and at St Andrews, where he died on February 22, 1816.
Thought
In his ethical system Ferguson treats man as a social being, illustrating his doctrines by political examples. As a believer in the progression of the human race, he placed the principle of moral approbation in the attainment of perfection. Cousin criticised Ferguson's speculations (see his Cours d'histoire de la philosophie morale an dix-huitième siècle, pt. II., 1839-1840):
"We
find in his method the wisdom and circumspection of the Scottish
school, with something more masculine and decisive in the results. The
principle of perfection is a new one, at once more rational and
comprehensive than benevolence and sympathy, which in our view
places
Ferguson as a moralist above all his predecessors."
By this principle Ferguson attempted to reconcile all moral systems. With Hobbes and Hume he admits the power of self-interest or utility, and makes it enter into morals as the law of self-preservation. Hutcheson's theory of universal benevolence and Smith's idea of sympathy he combines under the law of society. But, as these laws appear as the means rather than the end of human destiny, they remain subordinate to a supreme end, and the supreme end of perfection.
In the political part of his system Ferguson follows Montesquieu, and pleads the cause of well-regulated liberty and free government. His contemporaries, with the exception of Hume, regarded his writings as of great importance, but he made minimal original contributions. (see Sir Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, x. 89-90). His work was especially influential for German writers, such as Hegel and Marx.
Main works by Adam Ferguson
An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767)
The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic (1783)
Principles of Moral and Political Science; being chiefly a retrospect of lectures delivered in the College of Edinburgh (1792)
Institutes of Moral Philosophy (1769)
Reflections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia (1756)
Bibliography
Biographical Sketch by John Small (1864)
Public Characters (1799-1800); Gentleman's Magazine, i. (1816 supp.)
W. & R. Chambers's Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen
memoir by Principal Lee in early editions of the Encyclopædia Britannica
J McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (1875)
articles in Dictionary of National Biography
Edinburgh Review (January 1867)
Lord Henry Cockburn, Memorials of his Time (1856).
Thomas Reid
(April 26, 1710 – October 7, 1796), Scottish philosopher,
and a contemporary of David Hume, was the founder of the Scottish
School of Common Sense, and played an integral role in the Scottish
Enlightenment. The early part of his life was spent in Aberdeen,
Scotland, where he created the "Wise Club" (a literary-philosophical
association) and graduated from the University of Aberdeen. He was given a professorship at King's College Aberdeen in 1752, where he wrote An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (published in 1764). Shortly afterward he was given a much more prestigious professorship at the University of Glasgow when he was called to replace Adam Smith.
He resigned from this position in 1781.
Reid believed that common sense (in a special philosophical sense) is, or at least should be, at the foundation of all philosophical inquiry. He disagreed with Hume and George Berkeley, who asserted that humans do not experience matter or mind as either sensations or ideas. Reid claimed that common sense tells us that there is matter and mind. This common sense is the result of the way that we were made by God.
In his day and for some years into the 19th century, he was regarded as more important than David Hume. He advocated direct realism, or common sense realism, and argued strongly against the Theory of Ideas advocated by John Locke, René Descartes, and (in varying forms) nearly all Early Modern philosophers who came after them. He had a great admiration for Hume, and asked him to correct the first manuscript of his (Reid's) Inquiry.
His theory of knowledge had a strong influence on his theory of morals. He thought epistemology was an introductory part to practical ethics: When we are confirmed in our common beliefs by philosophy, all we have to do is to act according to them, because we know what is right. His moral philosophy is reminiscent of the Latin stoicism mediated by the Scholastica, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Christian way of life. He often quotes Cicero, from whom he adopted the term "sensus communis".
His reputation waned after attacks on the Scottish School of Common Sense by Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, but his was the philosophy taught in the colleges of North America, during the 19th century, and was championed by Victor Cousin, a French philosopher. His reputation has revived in the wake of the advocacy of common sense as a philosophical method or criterion by G. E. Moore early in the 20th century, and more recently due to the attention given to Reid by contemporary philosophers such as William Alston and Alvin Plantinga.
He wrote a number of important philosophical works, including Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764, Glasgow & London), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788).