The War without frontiers - By Professor Paul Wilkinson

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The excellent article below is taken from: Scotland On Sunday, September 8, 2002 The War Without Frontiers By Professor Paul Wilkinson Part One: THE September 11 attacks confronted America and the international community with a new mode of terrorism unprecedented in its lethal and destructive nature. Using a carefully synchronized multiple suicide hijacking, the al - Qaeda terrorists caused more deaths than the Japanese did at Pearl Harbor and struck a stunning blow at the solar plexus of the American economy. The attacks were a devastating demonstration of the capacity of mass -destruction terrorism as a weapon to inflict massive damage even against a superpower with all the military and economic resources of America. How have America and the international community responded to these traumatic events? President George W Bush caught the mood of the American public in his determined and defiant declaration of war on terrorism, and, with the help of Prime Minister Tony Blair and other allies, moved rapidly to form a coalition to help the US to wage a war, not only against al-Qaeda, but also against other terrorist organizations with 'global reach'. One year on from September 11, to what extent, if any, does al-Qaeda and its global network of cells and affiliated groups still constitute a clear and present danger to America and to international peace and security? Can we construct a balance sheet of the successes and failures of US and coalition responses to the al-Qaeda threat? Can significant weaknesses in response be identified? If so, how can they be rectified? Is it possible, drawing on the experience of the past year, to identify the key components of a winning strategy against al-Qaeda? The strategist's axiom 'know your enemy' is as vital in the business of combating terrorism as it is in conventional warfare. We should be clear at the outset that Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network is far and away the most dangerous and difficult contemporary terrorist organisation to combat. What makes it such a major threat? It is a truly transnational organisation with a network of cells, preparatory cells and sleepers in at least 50 countries, and collaborators and supporters among all the main extreme Islamic organisations in the world. Al-Qaeda's ideology is bitterly hostile to the contemporary system of nation states. One of its aims is to topple the governments of Arab and Muslim states it accuses of betraying 'true Islam' and ultimately it seeks to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate. A key feature is that al-Qaeda is not dependent on the support or sponsorship of any particular Muslim state. Bin Laden has been able to use his personal fortune, donations from wealthy supporters, the siphoning off of money from charitable organisations, and a wide range of legitimate business ventures to fund al-Qaeda. Also, we should bear in mind that bin Laden and his entourage of senior aides and followers are used to moving across frontiers to continue their operations. (At various times they have been based in Afghanistan, the Sudan, and Pakistan). It is because of al-Qaeda's diffuse global network, the ability of its regional cells to operate with a degree of autonomy, and its access to ample resources and fresh recruits that it poses a far more elusive and intractable opponent for the US and the coalition against terrorism than the old-style state sponsors of terrorism so predominant in the 1970s and '80s (eg Libya, Syria, Iraq). Clearly, in the post-Cold War era it has been relatively easy for the US and its allies to contain state sponsors of terrorism, using economic sanctions and other pressures. The dictators who control state -sponsored regimes have known headquarters and buildings, the regimes have military, air, and naval bases, and embassies and missions abroad which can be easily identified and subjected to close monitoring and surveillance. In brief, they can be contained and deterred. A transnational terrorist network such as al-Qaeda, on the other hand, does not generally occupy or control a specific territory. Its activists can hide themselves among the civilian population and, using false identities and fake passports, they can move easily across international borders. Another feature of al-Qaeda which makes it the archetype of the new terrorism is the extreme fanaticism of its activists: they firmly believe they are fighting a jihad and carry out the will of Allah, and many of them are fully prepared to sacrifice their lives in suicide attacks. A key feature of al-Qaeda, which distinguishes it from older, more traditional terrorist organisations, is its propensity for mass killing. Al -Qaeda has demonstrated its willingness to kill thousands of civilians without any compunction. Bin Laden has openly called on fellow Muslims to kill as many Americans as possible. A worrying implication of this propensity for mass-killing of civilians, and their assumptions that the lives of 'infidels' are expendable, is that al -Qaeda would not hesitate to use chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear weapons if they could obtain them. Documents captured by allied forces in Afghanistan show the serious efforts the group has been making to acquire the means of constructing and developing weapons of mass destruction. Bin Laden has stated that it is al-Qaeda's duty to secure such weapons. And a captured video shows chemical weapons being tested on animals. An al-Qaeda plot to attack the US embassy in Rome, thwarted by the Italian police, involved a plan to poison the water supply. One of the features of al-Qaeda which makes it such a dangerous network is its highly developed terrorist tradecraft. They have accumulated knowledge of how to conduct covert operations from a wide range of sources, including the role of secret intelligence during the Cold War. Hence they stress the importance of their operatives merging with their surroundings and keeping their communications secure. Their major attacks also show every sign of being carefully planned over long periods of time. For example, it is believed by investigators that the initial planning of the September 11 operation can be traced back to 1999. Another characteristic of al-Qaeda terrorism is its use of synchronised attacks, as seen in the East African embassy bombings of 1998, and the September 11 multiple suicide airliner hijacking. It is also very important to stress that al-Qaeda is still a clear and present danger to the security of the US and the international community. The military success of the US and its Alliance partners in Afghanistan in toppling the Taliban regime, flushing out al-Qaeda operatives from their mountain hideouts, and destroying large numbers of weapons does not mean that the terrorists' global network has been eradicated. It is believed that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri managed to escape from Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. Some of al-Qaeda's activists have moved into the tribal areas in Pakistan. A leaked UN report has concluded that al-Qaeda is now successfully circumventing the efforts of the G7 Finance Ministers Task Force to block their finances, and that the network is still able to support its activities from secret funds worth millions of dollars. A whole series of successful and thwarted terrorist attacks linked to al -Qaeda testifies to the resilience of the international network and its close affiliates. It is worth remembering that the network has taken several years or more to plan its major attacks. It would be foolishly complacent to assume that it is incapable of carrying out further attacks as lethal and destructive as those of September 11. Nor should we fall into the trap of assuming that this threat is solely against the US homeland and US targets abroad. The UK, as America's closest ally, is clearly a potential target. Some al-Qaeda conspiracies against other European countries have recently been uncovered as a result of intensive criminal investigations and improved intelligence-sharing. Perhaps most ominous of all, but less well understood by western publics, is the growing al - Qaeda terrorist threat against Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, where the terrorists believe that the regime concerned has 'betrayed' what they choose to call 'true Islam', ie the version of Islamic fundamentalism and politics espoused by bin Laden. The difficulties facing the American government and others in deciding how to respond to the September 11 attacks should not be underestimated. The psychological shock created by the sheer scale of the death and destruction caused by the terrorists brought home the vulnerability of the US homeland and confronted the newly-elected President Bush with an unprecedented challenge. Part Two: President Bush had no real experience of foreign affairs and national security issues prior to coming into office. In the election campaign the Bush camp promised a retreat from the high levels of US involvement and military burdens taken on by previous administrations, and a stronger emphasis on the pursuit of US national economic interests. Following the September 11 attacks Bush responded swiftly to the new public mood of anger and resolve and the extremely powerful resurgence of American nationalism and patriotism noted by all who visited the US in the weeks following the attacks. By his firm response to the crisis, his declaration of war against terrorism and the speed and energy with which he set about developing a multinational coalition to prosecute this war, the president dramatically enhanced his stature in the eyes of Americans and received overwhelming public support. Bush made a 180-degree shift in his foreign policy from a pre-election 'Fortress America' approach to a level of frenetic global activism and readiness to deploy the US military around the globe in a manner reminiscent of the height of the Cold War. His rallying cry of "war against terrorism" also had some obvious advantages in the eyes of the president and his colleagues: for the US public it encapsulated the determination to avenge September 11 and to decisively defeat the terrorists, and it was useful for rallying and mobilising a broad world-wide coalition of states from the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region to India, Egypt, and Colombia, which have suffered so heavily from decades of violence and terrorism from a variety of indigenous movements. In short, the Bush administration appeared to get off to a good start in developing its response to September 11. However, it soon became evident that there was a dangerous ambiguity about the phrase 'war on terrorism', and that a good rhetorical device does not necessarily translate into a well -considered, effective long-term strategy for defeating an elusive, sophisticated and fanatical global terrorist network with a presence in at least 50 countries, let alone eliminating all varieties of contemporary terrorism with a 'global reach'. Moreover, use of the term war arouses expectations in the eyes of the US public and the international community that the major instrument for defeating international terrorism is the military and that a superpower with such huge military resources has only to apply the correct quotient of military force in the right location to achieve total victory within a relatively brief, finite period. However, it soon became clear that although the US military, assisted by British and Northern Alliance forces, were able to achieve a remarkably swift removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there were severe limits to what military force could achieve. Al-Qaeda was undoubtedly seriously disrupted by being forced to retreat from its safe haven in Afghanistan, but the allied military were unable to capture or kill bin Laden and his senior aides. Many of his followers, and very possibly bin Laden himself, were able to flee across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. The US military has played a valuable role by lending expert military assistance to countries such as the Philippines and Yemen, where the host governments have lacked the means to regain full control over lawless areas, exploited by terrorists groups, local warlords and organised crime gangs. Although the military certainly make an invaluable contribution to combating terrorism, the experience of the past 35 years of international terrorism shows that there is no 'military solution' to terrorism. Even Israel, with all its military firepower and experience of terrorism, has found that the most draconian use of military force cannot of itself prevent more suicide bombings of Israeli targets. On the contrary, there are grave dangers attached to over-dependence on military power. Just as the bulldozing of Jenin probably created hundreds of fresh Palestinian volunteers for suicide bombing, so the US reliance on massive aerial bombardment in Afghanistan has created great problems for the new Afghan government and has weakened US legitimacy and credibility both in Afghanistan and the wider Muslim world as a result of the deaths and injuries inflicted on innocent civilians caught up in the raids. A clear lesson is that where the military are used to combat terrorism there is no real substitute for well-trained ground troops. If the US had been ready to deploy more ground troops in Eastern Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, there would have been a better chance of capturing bin Laden and other senior terrorist figures and bringing them to justice. Some terrorist conflicts are potentially corrigible. When ceasefires can be achieved and politics and diplomacy deployed to address the roots of an ethnic or ethno-religious conflict there is a possibility of dramatically reducing the levels of violence, isolating the incorrigible extremists who are unwilling to abandon terrorism, and establishing greater stability and security for the majority of the population. It is fairly obvious that al-Qaeda is an incorrigible group. It would be an abject betrayal of the values of the rule of law and protection of the innocent for the government of the US or any law-abiding country to enter into political 'deals' with Bin Laden or his successors in the hope of 'buying off' further mass-destruction terrorist attacks. The only way of ultimately defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates is by a carefully planned multinational and multipronged strategy agreed in all its essentials by the coalition partners. The US, despite its huge superiority in military and economic power, cannot possibly unilaterally achieve the unraveling of Bin Laden's widely diffused global network. It is the intelligence battle that is the heart of successful counter-terrorism, together with criminal investigation and effective co-operation between criminal justice and police structures. September 11 revealed the appalling deficit in counter-terrorism intelligence on al-Qaeda prior to the attack, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT) on the intentions and plans of the terror network. The US desperately needs the intelligence sharing and co-operation of the maximum number of coalition partners in order to defeat al-Qaeda. And, as dramatically demonstrated in the case of Pakistan, it is crucial to keep the major Muslim governments on board in the alliance. This inevitably also means being sensitive to the internal problems of their states and avoiding actions that will alienate them from the coalition against terrorism. I am a realist but not a fatalist. I firmly believe that provided the weakness of the US and international response are rectified, and if our leaders are fully aware of the severity of the threat posed by the 'new terrorist' and have the will to take the necessary international action, it will be possible to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates without destroying democracy and the rule of law, or causing a wider and infinitely more destructive full-scale international war, in the process.
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